The EU’s External Border Management in the Context of the “Migration Crisis”

-Frontex’s Evolution from Coordinating Management of Operational Cooperation to Regulatory European Border and Coast Guards-. by Bergmaier, Aurora
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Münchener Beiträge  
zur Politikwissenschaft 
 
herausgegeben vom  
Geschwister-Scholl-Institut 
für Politikwissenschaft 
 
 
 
2019 
 
Aurora Bergmaier 
 
The EU’s External Border 
Management in the Context of 
the “Migration Crisis” 
-Frontex’s Evolution from 
Coordinating Management of 
Operational Cooperation to 
Regulatory European Border 
and Coast Guards-. 
 
 
 
Masterarbeit bei  
Prof. Dr. Berthold Rittberger 
2019 
GESCHWISTER-SCHOLL-INSTITUT  
FÜR POLITIKWISSENSCHAFT 
I 
Table of contents 
 
 
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................. III 
List of tables and figures ............................................................................................................. V 
1 Regulation in Times of EU Crises ........................................................................................ 1 
2 The Dependent Variable: EU Agencies’ Institutional Design ........................................... 5 
2.1 Regulation in the European Union ................................................................................... 5 
2.2 Frontex: an EU Agency sui generis? ............................................................................... 8 
2.3 EU Agencies’ Institutional Design ................................................................................ 12 
3 Mapping Variation: Expansion of Regulatory Tasks versus Continuity of 
Governance Structure ......................................................................................................... 15 
3.1 Regulatory Tasks............................................................................................................ 16 
3.1.1 Rule Setting .......................................................................................................... 16 
3.1.2 Monitoring ............................................................................................................ 16 
3.1.3 Enforcement.......................................................................................................... 17 
3.2 Governance Structure ..................................................................................................... 19 
3.2.1 Appointment of the Agency Head ........................................................................ 19 
3.2.2 Members of the Management Board .................................................................... 20 
4 Theoretical Approaches to the Creation, Design, and Transformation of EU 
Regulatory Institutions ....................................................................................................... 22 
4.1 Applicability of Theoretical Accounts ........................................................................... 23 
4.2 The Demand Side: the Functional Approach ................................................................. 24 
4.3 The Supply-Side: the Political Approach ....................................................................... 27 
4.4 A Combined Functional-Political Approach.................................................................. 30 
4.5 Observable Implications for the Combined Functional-Political Approach .................. 31 
4.5.1 Observable Implications for the Functional Part of the Explanation: 
Delegation of Further Tasks due to Regulatory Deficits ...................................... 31 
4.5.2 Observable Implications for the Political Part of the Explanation: Inter-
Institutional Power Struggles and Inter-State Bargaining due to 
Sovereignty Concerns ........................................................................................... 32 
  
II 
5 Methodological Approach: Robust Congruence Case Study .......................................... 35 
6 From Management of Operational Cooperation to European Border and Coast 
Guards .................................................................................................................................. 39 
6.1 A Widening Functional Gap in External Border Management ...................................... 40 
6.2 Rule Setting .................................................................................................................... 46 
6.2.1 Functional Reasons for the Creation of the Rule Setting Task: Lack of a 
Sound Legislative Framework for the EU’s Integrated Border Management ...... 46 
6.2.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Rule Setting: Exclusion of the 
European Parliament from Decision-Making Despite of Possible Violation 
of the Meroni Doctrine ......................................................................................... 49 
6.3 Monitoring ..................................................................................................................... 50 
6.3.1 Functional Reasons for the Enhancement of Monitoring: Deficiencies in 
the Supervision of Member States’ External Border Management ...................... 50 
6.3.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Monitoring: Consensus on Decision-
Making Procedures and Partial Success of the Council’s Attempts to 
Indirectly Control Supervision ............................................................................. 54 
6.4 Enforcement ................................................................................................................. 56 
6.4.1 Functional Reasons for the Creation of the Enforcement Task: Inability to 
Tackle Greece’s Reluctance to Request Assistance from Frontex ........................ 56 
6.4.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Enforcement: Inter-State Bargaining 
and Abolishment of the “Right to Intervene” through a Strategic Use of 
Norms ................................................................................................................... 58 
6.5 Governance Structure: Political Reasons for the Failure of the Struggle for 
Supranationalisation ................................................................................................... 64 
6.6 Alternative Explanations: Historical and Sociological Institutionalism ........................ 66 
7 Concluding Remarks .......................................................................................................... 70 
7.1 Empirical Findings ......................................................................................................... 70 
7.2 Contribution and Further Research ................................................................................ 73 
7.3 Implications for the Effectiveness of Regulation ........................................................... 75 
References ................................................................................................................................... 81 
 
  
III 
List of abbreviations 
AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
AH Agency head 
BAC Banking Advisory Committee 
CEBS Committee of European Banking Supervisors 
Commission European Commission 
CEPOL European Police College 
COSI Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal 
Security 
Council Council of the European Union 
DG Directorate-General 
EBA European Banking Authority 
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard 
EBM External border management 
ECB European Central Bank 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ED Executive director 
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights 
ECN Eurosur Communication Network 
EIOPA European Insurance and and Occupational Pensions Authori-
ty 
EP European Parliament 
EPP European People’s Party 
ERN European Regulatory Network 
ESAs European Supervisory Authorities 
ESMA European Securities and Markets Authority 
EU European Union 
Europol European Police Office 
Eurosur European Border Surveillance System 
Frontex European Agency for the Management of Operational Coop-
eration at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
EU/European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
HI Historical Institutionalism 
H1 Hypothesis 1 
H2 Hypothesis 2 
IBM Integrated border management 
IOM International Organisation for Migration 
JHA Justice and Home Affairs 
IV 
MB Management board 
MENA Middle East and North Africa 
MEP Member of the European Parliament 
MMB Member of the management board 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
NRA National Regulatory Agency 
PA Principal-agent 
PCU External Border Practitioners Common Unit 
PiS Prawo i Sprawiedliwość 
RaBIT Rapid Border Intervention Team 
SBC Schengen Borders Code 
SCIFA Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
SCIFA+ Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum 
incl. heads of national border guards services 
SEM Schengen Evaluation Mechanism 
SI Sociological Institutionalism 
SIS Schengen Information System 
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism 
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
 
 
  
V 
List of tables and figures 
 
Table 1: Frontex’s new regulatory tasks and their design     19 
(own illustration) 
 
Table 2: Continuity of Frontex’s governance structure     21 
(own illustration) 
 
Figure 1: Mechanisms in congruence and process tracing case studies   38 
(derived from Beach/Pedersen 2016) 
 
1 
1  Regulation in Times of EU Crises 
“As we all know from the Roman Empire, big empires go down if the external borders are not 
well-protected.” (Mark Rutte in November 2015, quoted from Politico 2015a) 
 
Even though Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s invocation of the decline and fall of the Roman 
Empire is a comparison that indeed “leaves a lot to be desired” (ECFR 2016), it is useful to  
illustrate the prevailing mood in the European Union (EU) at the height of the so-called  
“migration” or “refugee crisis”. Also from an academic perspective, 2015 is described as the 
most challenging year that the EUʼs Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice (AFSJ)1 has seen in 
its 16 years of existence (Monar 2016: 134). 
In particular, the incompleteness of the EUʼs border-control governance regime became 
all too apparent: while free movement is usually guaranteed within the Schengen area, the  
control of external borders was mostly left in national hands; existing European rules were  
“inadequate and poorly enforced” (Jones et al. 2016). As a consequence, 1.82 million “irregular” 
crossings – most of them at the Greek and Italian external borders – were counted in 2015, 
which is six times the number of detections reported the year before. After some member states 
had adopted a “wave-through approach” by neglecting rules on the identification, registration, 
and reception of asylum seekers, six of the 26 Schengen countries have unilaterally reintroduced 
temporary border controls (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016: 2; Monar 2016: 
141). Hence, a commitment-compliance gap lies at the heart of the migration crisis, “which has 
exacerbated the regulatory deficits of EU governance” (Börzel 2016: 9) in external border  
management (EBM).
2
 Because of its merely coordinating but lacking regulatory powers, this 
could not be compensated by the “toothless” (Jones et al. 2016) European Agency for the  
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
EU (Frontex).  
Following a functionalist line of reasoning, this obvious “mismatch between existing  
institutional capacities and the growing complexity of policy problems” (Majone 1996: 1632f.) 
should have led to enhanced regulation. Whenever regulatory deficits deteriorate in the context 
of serious crises, one would not only expect the delegation of further regulatory tasks – e.g. to a 
non-majoritarian actor like Frontex – but also more independent regulation, since the latter is 
expected to require a certain degree of independence in order to be carried out effectively 
                                                 
1
  The AFSJ is “an umbrella term for police and judicial cooperation, border management, asylum and migration, 
and counter-terrorism” (Kaunert et al. 2013: 273) and can be seen as “as one of the most dynamic policy fields in 
the European integration” (Kaunert et al. 2013: 274). 
2
  Following Rijpma, the term external border management “is understood as the processes and procedures associ-
ated with border checks, which take place at authorised crossing points, including airports, and border surveil-
lance, which is carried out on the so-called green (land) borders between authorised crossing points and along 
the blue (sea) borders.” (Rijpma 2009: 121) The legal basis for the EU’s EBM is laid down in articles 67 and 77 
TFEU; article 80 highlights that the implementation of these policies “shall be governed by the principle of soli-
darity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States.” For 
further details on the legal framework for the EU’s integrated border management see 6.1.1. 
2 
(Christensen/Nielson 2010: 178). Institutional changes that confirm these functional arguments 
could be observed in the course of the financial crisis, when banking regulation was tightened 
and rendered more independent through the creation of the Banking Union (McPhilemy 2014). 
 Indeed, being transformed into the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG)
 
Agency
3
  
in September 2016 (Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624), Frontexʼs regulatory tasks have been  
extended significantly.
 4
  In contrast, the agencyʼs governance structure has remained almost 
untouched and continues to be “of intergovernmental nature” (De Bruycker 2016: 563). The 
discrepancy between an expansion of regulatory tasks and the continuity of the governance 
structure contradicts the functionalist assumption that “the nature of an agent is defined by the 
function it is supposed to perform [i.e. effective regulation]” (Magnette 2005: 5). This is particu-
larly puzzling because “crises can be strong legitimising forces on their own, giving momentum 
to previously inconceivable institutional changes.” (Boin et al. 2014: 429). Hence, the following 
question arises: Why was Frontex granted with further regulatory tasks, but its governance 
structure not rendered more independent? 
 In order to explain this discrepancy between the expansion of Frontex’s regulatory tasks 
and the continuity of the agency’s governance structure, I draw on the two most common  
theoretical approaches from the literature on EU regulatory bodies. The functional approach 
assumes regulatory bodies to be created, designed, and sometimes transformed in order to fulfil 
certain functions. In contrast, the political approach focuses on diverging preferences and bar-
gaining among the relevant actors, investigating how these power struggles shape institutional 
outcomes. As suggested by Rittberger and Blauberger (2015, 2017), I do not treat these accounts 
as mutually exclusive, but instead increase their explanatory power by defining their domains of 
application and using a combined functional-political approach. More precisely, I argue that a 
functional logic is suitable to explain the delegation of new regulatory tasks to Frontex, while I 
consider the political approach adequate to account for the design of these tasks and the  
agencyʼs overall governance structure. This combination allows me not only to gain a thorough 
understanding of Frontex’s enhanced role in the regulation of EBM, but also of how the latter is 
governed. 
                                                 
3
  More precisely, the new EBCG is comprised of the EBCG Agency (Frontex) and the national border manage-
ment authorities (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, recital 5). However, as pointed out by De Bruycker (2016: 568), 
“the name ‘EBCG’ proposed by the European Commission is a flag of convenience that is misleading. Is is only 
a legal fiction made of the addition of the new Agency to the national authorities of Member States that remain 
mainly responsible for border management.” Despite this renaming, the agency’s acronym remains “Frontex” 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, recital 11). 
4
  It is not the purpose of this paper to investigate all changes that have been introduced, which is especially at the 
expense of the strengthening of Frontex’s operational role. For an overview of all articles that have been modi-
fied see COM(2015) 671 final, Annex 1; for more encompassing – but less in-depth – analyses of these changes 
see e.g. De Bruycker 2016; Carrera et al. 2017; Ferraro/Capitani 2016; Rosenfeldt 2016. While the agencyʼs ad-
ditional financial and human resources will not be investigated more closely, it is noteworthy that some observ-
ers doubt that they are sufficient to enable Frontex to actually fulfil its new tasks (European Public Affairs 2016). 
3 
The first hypothesis, being derived from the functional approach, assumes that a functional gap 
in the EUʼs EBM caused by regulatory deficits was the reason for decision-makers to delegate 
new regulatory tasks to Frontex. In the empirical analysis, I reveal that the shift from mere  
coordination to additional regulation indeed occurred due to functional necessities. I describe the 
increasingly complex policy problems in the context of the migration crisis, which further  
widened the functional gap in the EU’s EBM. More specifically, I demonstrate subsequently 
that regulatory deficits in EBM could be observed along three dimensions, namely rule setting, 
monitoring, and enforcement. This was finally recognised by decision-makers, who consequent-
ly decided to delegate regulatory tasks to Frontex. 
The second hypothesis, which is deduced from the political approach, presumes that  
inter-institutional power struggles and national sovereignty concerns shaped the design of these 
regulatory tasks and prevented a change of the governance structure. Moreover, it is to be  
expected that sovereignty concerns that were asymmetrically distributed across member states 
led to particular strong efforts to limit regulation and to control decision-making on it. Indeed, 
the empirical analysis reveals that the design of regulatory tasks was modified during the  
legislative process. In regard to enforcement, even the scope of regulation was diluted signifi-
cantly. Besides their effect on the design of regulatory tasks, I also show how power struggles 
among EU institutions prevented a change of Frontex’s governance structure. While most of the 
political approach’s expectations can be confirmed, I point out some peculiarities: for instance, 
it is particularly challenging to predetermine member states’ preferences when bargaining does 
not revolve around (re)distributional issues. 
The contributions I make are fourfold. First, the combined functional-political approach 
has so far only been applied to the creation and design of European Regulatory Networks 
(ERNs). By using it to investigate the case of Frontex, I demonstrate that it can account for the 
transformation of an already existing EU agency as well. Thereby, I contribute to the current 
debate between advocates of a purely non-functionalist perspective on EU regulatory bodies 
(Kelemen/Tarrant 2011, 2017), and their opponents who argue in favour of a combined  
approach (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015, 2017).  
Secondly, I analyse a case of tightened regulation in the course of an EU crisis. However, 
I do not study market regulation, but regulation of external border management.
5
 I demonstrate 
that bargaining on regulation in the policy area of border control, touching upon the very heart 
of EU member statesʼ sovereignty, is dominated by other issues than mere (re)distribution, and 
that predetermining actors’ preferences is complex. 
                                                 
5
  Some authors define regulation as mere “supervision and control of market actors and behaviour” (Eberlein/ 
Grande 2005: 107, italics added), which I do not consider to capture the whole phenomenon. 
4 
Thirdly, I carry out a theory-driven study that adds to a better understanding of the particular 
case of Frontex. Even though the latter is one of the best-known and most controversial EU 
agencies, one can still detect major gaps in its relating research. This bias is confirmed by the 
analyses that have been published on its most recent transformation: the establishment of the 
EBCG Agency has so far only been studied by legal scholars (De Bruycker 2016; Ferraro/De 
Capitani 2016; Rosenfeldt 2016), from a human rights perspective (Fink 2016; Gkliati 2016), 
and with the aim of making policy recommendations (Carrera et al. 2017). A comprehensive 
analysis of the changes Frontex’s institutional design experienced is still lacking. 
Fourthly, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) agencies’ role in the AFSJ is generally under-
researched. By making use of the fact that Frontex is the first JHA agency that has been granted 
a genuinely regulatory role, I provide one of the very few studies that combine the public policy 
literature on EU agencies and the empirics of agencies operating in the EU’s AFSJ. Since the 
integration of core state powers is a phenomenon of growing importance (Genschel/Jachten-
fuchs 2015), other JHA agencies might be afforded an expanded regulatory role in the future. 
This further increases the relevance of my study. 
In this thesis, I proceed as follows. In the second chapter, I describe the possible ways in 
which regulation might or might not be delegated within the EU. Subsequently, I elaborate on 
the particular case of Frontex and clarify to which degree it can be labelled an EU agency sui 
generis. In the last subsection, I conceptualise the dependent variables regulatory tasks and gov-
ernance structure. This allows me to assess the empirical variation one can observe in regard to 
both variables in the third chapter. I conclude the section by elaborating on why the observed 
evolution is puzzling. Hereafter, in the forth chapter, I present the most commonly used theoret-
ical approaches from the agency literature – the functional and the political approach – as well 
as a possible combination of both accounts, from which I deduce the above-mentioned hypothe-
ses. Following this, I develop observable implications for the combined approach in regard to 
the case at hand. In chapter five, I explain how these theoretical assumptions are to be assessed 
empirically by presenting the methodological approach of a robust congruence case study. 
In the empirical analysis, I collectively assess the observable implications that were de-
duced from the combined functional-political approach by using multiple pieces of  
evidence without making the study of the underlying causal mechanism explicit. I conclude the 
sixth chapter by discussing why possible alternative explanations offered by Historical and So-
ciological Institutionalism cannot adequately explain Frontex’s transformation, thereby updating 
the degree of confidence I have in the combined functional-political approach’s validity. In the 
concluding remarks, I summarise my main empirical findings. Moreover, I flesh out to what 
extent they complement previous research and suggest possible future studies. Eventually, I 
raise the question of what we can expect of “newly regulatory” Frontex in terms of effectiveness. 
5 
2 The Dependent Variable: EU Agencies’ Institutional Design 
In the second chapter, I first elaborate on regulation and the role it plays within the EU. I briefly 
review the case of banking regulation (with a focus on supervision) to illustrate the various ways 
in which regulation can be carried out and how this institutional set-up might change over time. 
In this way, I emphasise that the enhanced regulation of EBM is only one of many cases in 
which transnational crises led to institutional change (2.1). However, JHA agencies – including 
Frontex – show some distinct features, which I point out in the second subsection. By doing so, I 
also emphasise my contribution to previous research on EU agencies in general and on Frontex 
in particular (2.2). In the last part of this chapter, I eventually conceptualise the dependent  
variables “regulatory tasks” and “governance structure”. In order to provide a complete picture, 
I previously introduce six categories capturing EU agencies’ overall institutional design (2.3). 
 
2.1 Regulation in the European Union 
Generally, regulation can be defined as “sustained and focused control […] over activities that 
are valued by a community.” (Selznick 1985: 363) This paper is based on a rather broad  
definition of regulation, which I assume to be “not achieved simply by rule-making; it also  
requires detailed knowledge of, and intimate involvement with, the regulated activity.” (Majone 
2000: 280) Stating that “[r]egulatory activities do not necessary sic involve the adoption of 
legal acts” (COM(2005) 59 final: 4), this is also the European Commission’s (Commission’s) 
interpretation of the term. Hence, activities such as evaluating the implementation of regulation 
can be considered “regulatory” as well (COM(2005) 59 final: 4).6  
While EU politics had focused on legislative processes for a long time, deficient imple-
mentation of policies among member states has caused a demand for bureaucratic structures at 
the EU level that could not be met by the Commission (Groenleer 2009: 98).
7
 Today, the  
consistent application of EU regulations in the member states can be described as one of the 
most urging problems of European integration (Rittberger/Wonka 2011: 783). In order to meet 
this challenge, decision-makers can choose between various institutional solutions, ranging from 
National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) over ERNs to EU agencies.
8
 Moreover, regulation 
might also be delegated to supranational institutions such as the European Commission. The 
resulting “diverse set of regulatory structures” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 923) can be understood 
most accurately as a continuum, showing a variety of combinations of national, intergovernmen-
tal, and supranational elements.  
                                                 
6
  This broad definition of regulation is also reflected in my conceptualisation of regulatory tasks (see 3.1). 
7
  For further elaborations on the reasons why these regulatory tasks have not always been delegated to the Com-
mission, see 4.2 and 4.3. 
8
  Even though I apply a broad definition of regulation, it is accurate that the term European regulatory agencies 
being used by the Commission is “somewhat of a misnomer” (Busuioc 2013: 23). Hence, the term EU agencies 
will be used in this paper. For further details, see 2.2.  
6 
At the same time, these regulatory structures are everything but stable: the above-mentioned 
commitment-compliance gap continues to grow and lies at the heart of many transnational or 
“transboundary” crises that the EU has experienced in recent years, which has caused various 
institutional changes. Since they have questioned the ability of single states to individually cope 
with them, such crises have been identified as an “important reason behind agency creation and 
a veritable driver of agencification” (Busuioc 2013: 32). One of many examples is the creation 
of the European Food Safety Authority, which was established in reaction to the BSE and the 
dioxin crises. Many authors consider the initial creation of Frontex to be part of this phenome-
non. However, crises have not only triggered the creation of new agencies, they have also 
caused amendments of existing agencies’ mandates (Busuioc 2013: 33). Frontex’s most recent 
transformation is one of these cases.
 9
 
 As stated by Boin et al. (2014: 419), “the reactions to the financial crisis provide telling 
illustrations” of policy-makers’ efforts to manage crises by reforming EU regulation. Moreover, 
the financial sector is a suitable example to depict the different ways in which regulation can be 
executed in the EU. Whereas the first attempts of European financial integration, such as the 
creation of the Groupe de Contact, date back to the 1970s, they only implied informal dialogue 
and information sharing between national supervisors from the six European Economic  
Community states. Another informal group established in this decade was the Banking Advisory 
Committee (BAC), which was endowed with monitoring tasks, but did not possess any legally 
binding powers (McPhilemy 2014: 1478f.). 
 After the introduction of the common currency had made the issue of banking regulation 
more pressing, the Lamfalussy process finally led to the creation of the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors (CEBS) in 2004. Consisting of representatives from national supervisory 
authorities, the CEBS suffered the typical weaknesses of an ERN: while regulatory authority in 
fact remained in the hands of national regulators, the CEBS was a merely loose, advisory  
network enabling them to cooperate and only tasked with producing non-binding guidelines, 
recommendations and standards. The CEBS’s ability to act was further weakened by its consen-
sus culture (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 923, 931; McPhilemy 2014: 1480; Jones et al. 2015: 12). 
 Consequently, this network turned out to be unable to increase convergence in EU  
banking. This was confirmed by the 2007 review of the Lamfalussy system, which revealed that 
supervision hugely varied across member states (McPhilemy 2014: 1480). In the same year, the 
global financial crisis started to unfold, eventually leading to bail-outs of European banks by 
national governments. Accordingly, the Commission tasked an expert group with developing 
possible measures to tackle this problem. The 2009 Larosière Report criticised the lack of wil-
                                                 
9
  Legally, the new regulation did not amend but repealed previous legislation on Frontex. However, the agency 
kept its legal personality (Frontex 2017), “with full continuity in all its activities and procedures.” (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1624, recital 11) 
7 
lingness to cooperate and exchange information by national supervisors (De Larosière 2009: 41), 
and recommended to further supranationalise banking regulation (De Larosière 2009: 42-48). 
 This led to the CEBS’s conversion into an EU agency in 2011. The European Banking 
Authority (EBA) was granted more powers than its predecessor: inter alia, it was mandated with 
drafting technical standards (McPhilemy 2014: 1484) and imposing binding decisions to indi-
vidual banks when EU law was violated by national authorities. In emergency situations, the 
agency was allowed to replace national authorities. However, the Council maintained the right 
to decide on whether or not an emergency situation is present, and supervision by national  
regulators was only coordinated in a more formal way, but “remained intergovernmental for all 
practical purposes.” (Kudrna 2016: 255) Hence, the EBA’s “work on supervisory convergence  
remain[ed] at an early stage.” (McPhilemy 2014: 1484) Nevertheless, the creation of the  
European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs)
10
 was described as a qualitative shift, “potentially 
ushering in a new age of agencification.” (Busuioc 2013: 15) 
However, the deficits in supervision became visible when the stress tests conducted by 
the EBA in 2009 and 2011 were not able to calm the markets (Kudrna 2016: 255). As the  
situation kept worsening after the EBA’s creation and the financial crisis even transformed into 
a sovereign debt crisis, EU member states agreed on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
in 2013. By doing so, they delegated supervisory power to the European Central Bank (ECB). 
Hence, the supranational end of the “regulatory continuum” was reached, namely supervision of 
systematically relevant euro area banks by a supranational EU institution. While national  
supervisors continue to exist, the ECB can for instance issue binding instructions they have to 
comply with. Even though representatives from member states’ supervisory authorities are  
represented in the newly created supervisory board of the ECB, the governing council can veto 
its decisions and is therefore the final decision-making body (McPhilemy 2014: 1485). At the 
same time, the EBA continues to exist and oversees the so-called Single rulebook, which consti-
tutes the foundation of the newly created Banking Union (Kudrna 2016: 257).
11
  
Hence, banking supervision had first been subject to incremental changes. Eventually, the 
euro area crisis triggered a more punctuated change, namely the creation of the SSM, which can 
be seen as “one of the most radical institutional innovations of recent years.” (Glöckler et al. 
2017: 1136) As already mentioned in the introduction, this not only implied the delegation of 
further regulatory tasks, but also delegation to a more independent supervisor, the ECB. 
                                                 
10
  Besides the EBA, the ESAs consist of the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) 
and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (Busuioc 2013: 14).  
11
  The SSM only constitutes one pillar of the Banking Union. As already mentioned in the introductory part of this 
chapter, these elaborations on banking regulation do not claim to be complete, but rather illustrate the possible 
institutional solutions for EU regulation and clearly focus on supervision. For further details, also on banking 
resolution and the Single Resolution Mechanism’s creation, see (apart from the already cited publications) for in-
stance Ottow 2014 or De Rynck 2016. In the concluding remarks (7), the reader will again find some references 
to banking regulation. 
8 
In this subsection, I clarified that for the purpose of this study, regulation is defined rather 
broadly, and revealed the many ways in which it is carried out within the EU. Moreover, by 
drawing on the case of Banking Regulation, I illustrated that these regulatory structures might 
undergo major changes over time – in particular in the context of transnational crises. The  
creation of the SSM demonstrates that such exceptional situations can eventually lead to the  
delegation of regulatory tasks to a supranational EU institution such as the ECB.  
Having elaborated on EU regulation in general, I now move to the particular case of 
Frontex and raise the question of to what extent it can be labelled as an EU agency sui generis.  
 
2.2 Frontex: an EU Agency sui generis? 
The creation of the EBCG “has to be seen in the context of the long-term quest/search for an 
appropriate governance structure to ensure the management of EU external borders.”  
(Free-Group/Statewatch 2016)
12
 Frontexʼs initial creation dates back to 2004 (Regulation (EC) 
No 2007/2004),
13
 when it addressed the need for a common EBM that had been caused by the 
Schengen agreementʼs signatory statesʼ14 decision to abolish internal border controls already 20 
years before. Today, Frontex is “a key actor” in the EUʼs EBM (Rijpma 2017: 217): compared 
to the other agencies that have been established in recent years, it “experienced the most  
extensive upgrading in terms of financial and human resources.” (Pollak/Slominksi 2009: 904) 
However, the agencyʼs powers have always resisted “a true centralisation and a transfer of  
executive power.” (Heijer et al. 2016: 20) 
 Most studies on Frontex focus on its activities, i.e. its operational role (Leonard 2009: 
372; Ekelund 2013: 100; for examples see Mungiano 2013; Cortinovis 2015) and (alleged)  
human rights violations. In doing so, these analyses tend to be exploratory and descriptive, often 
arguing from a normative point of view, but are rarely explanatory and theoretically informed. 
The first of many of such papers was written by Carrera (2007), who critically studies Frontexʼs 
legal basis and work with a regional focus on the Canary Islands. An analysis conducted by the 
House of Lordʼs EU Committee is an example of studies being carried out outside the scholarly 
field (House of Lords/European Union Committee 2008). 
 Besides, there is also theory-driven research on Frontex. For instance, Pollack and 
Slominski investigate Frontex from an experimentalist governance perspective, which they  
                                                 
12
  For instance, a 2002 feasibility study led by Italy considered the establishment of a “European Border Police” 
(European Council 2002). In 2014, an inquiry on behalf of the European Commission evaluated the possibility of 
a “European System of Border Guards” (Unisys 2014). 
13
  Frontex was created as a “decentralised agency”; for a definition see European Parliament et al. 2012. 
14
  Is has to be noted that the external borders of the Schengen area are not the same like those of the EU because of 
the policy area’s external and internal differentiation, i.e. the opt-ins of several non-member states and the opt-
outs of some member states in regard to the Schengen acquis. The fact that both the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Ireland have been granted observatory status in Frontex’s management board (the UK also being involved in op-
erations, see House of Lords 2017) makes the picture even more complex. Thus, while referring to the external 
borders of the Schengen area, the commonly used term of the EUʼs external border management will be used. 
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argue is more suitable to assess Frontexʼs role than a principal-agent (PA) approach. The authors 
state that the agency will only succeed in case it is granted enough independence and support by 
all member states. Furthermore, they question Frontexʼs accountability by arguing that  
“(supra-)national actors are sidelined and relevant legal rules are ignored.” (Pollack/Slominski 
2009: 904) Frontex has also been studied from a security studies angle: Neal (2009) concludes 
that securitisation theory cannot fully account for the agency’s creation, remit, and practices. 
Ekelund (2013) uses Rational Choice, Sociological, and Historical Institutionalism as  
conceptual lenses to trace the process that led to the establishment of Frontex. The article con-
cludes that insights from all three main strands of new institutionalism are needed in order to 
capture the creation and design of Frontex. Wolff and Schout analyse the agency as a policy 
instrument and draw on a legitimacy-based model. By comparing the input and output legitima-
cy of Frontex and its more intergovernmental predecessors – the Strategic Committee on Immi-
gration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA+) and the External Border Practitioners Common Unit 
(PCU)
15
 – the authors reveal “that the design of Frontex hardly offers the advantages of the 
agency structure.” (Wolff/Schout 2013: 305) These examples reveal that theory-driven research 
on Frontex has so far focused on the agencyʼs initial creation, but largely neglected its further 
evolution. Concerning methodology, most analyses are single case studies using qualitative ap-
proaches; very few authors compare it to other JHA agencies such as Europol (Pandit 2012). 
 At first sight, it seems puzzling that there is hardly a study drawing on the rich body of 
literature on EU agencies when analysing Frontex. An exception is Leonardʼs investigation of 
the creation of Frontex, “which is theoretically informed by the literature on European agencies 
[and] unveils a complex institutionalisation process, characterised by the existence of various 
models for increased cooperation and political struggles amongst the actors involved in the  
policy-making process.” (Leonard 2009: 371) While the author draws on arguments from both 
the functional and the political approach, she does not make this combination explicit, for in-
stance in terms of domains of application (see 4.4). Some other studies include concepts such as  
accountability or autonomy, which are also represented in the literature on EU agencies. For 
instance, Pandit (2012) investigates Frontexʼs operational legitimacy and political accountability, 
taking a critical stance on the question if the agency can fulfil such requirements. 
 This gap is, however, not limited to the case of Frontex: publications on EU agencies 
generally show an imbalance at the expense of those operating in the AFSJ (Kaunert et al. 2013a: 
                                                 
15
  For more detailed analyses of Frontex’s and its predecessors’ development see also Leonard (2009). Rijpma 
(2017: 218f.) elaborates on the 2007 and 2011 amendments to the Frontex regulation. 
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274)
16
 – even though the first JHA agency, the European Police Office (Europol), has already 
been established in 1995. It was followed by the European Police College (CEPOL) in 2000 and 
Eurojust, an agency dealing with the enhancement of judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
(2002). Whereas CEPOLʼs and Eurojustʼs creation was initiated by the Commission, all of these 
agencies were set up under the authority of the Council of the European Union (Council)
17
 
(Groenleer 2009: 99f.). Nevertheless, public policy scholars have rarely chosen AFSJ agencies 
for their empirical research, which is why 
“little is known about European agencies that deal with security matters from a public policy per-
spective. Thus, it can be concluded that the role of European agencies in the development of the 
AFSJ – especially from a practical, rather than formal and legal, viewpoint – remains vastly un-
der-researched. This is problematic given the increasing importance of both the AFSJ in the EU 
and the apparently growing role of these European agencies within the AFSJ.” (Kaunert et al. 
2013: 275) 
 
The reason why JHA agencies are underrepresented in this strand of literature is the fact that 
they show quite unique characteristics and do not necessarily resemble other policy areasʼ regu-
latory bodies: since they touch upon EU member core state powers, operational cooperation 
between national actors is strongly pronounced in JHA agencies (Rijpma 2017: 219f.). JHA are 
of particular political sensitivity, which is why member states try to avoid “extensive harmonisa-
tion and hierarchical structures.” (Monar 2013: 339) This is reflected in JHA agenciesʼ “ʽlightʼ 
institutional governance structures with the task to facilitate, coordinate and strengthen the  
cooperation between national enforcement authorities, whilst at the same time respecting their 
prerogatives” (Rijpma 2012: 84 f.). Some authors even state that these agencies “have been  
designed to consolidate the predominance of member states in the AFSJ” (Trauner 2012: 785). 
 This look at the whole “population” of JHA agencies can be enlightening in order to  
better capture Frontexʼs nature before its most recent reform. Admittedly, it has to be noted that 
one year after the Commission had been enabled to initiate proposals on cooperation in the area 
of border control, Frontex was the first JHA agency to be created as a Community agency 
(Groenleer 2009: 99f.). Apart from that, Frontex shared many of the above-mentioned specifics 
of JHA agencies: it is an operational agency that coordinates operations between member statesʼ 
border guards. The resulting coordinating network structure, consisting of national border guard 
                                                 
16
  Vice versa, researchers with a focus on AFSJ topics have barely investigated agencies operating in this policy 
field. An exception is the special issue on “Justice and Home Affairs Agencies in the European Union” published 
in Perspectives on European Politics and Society and edited by Kaunert, Léonard, and Occhipinti (2013). For in-
stance, Busuioc and Groenleer (2013) investigate the evolution of Europol and Eurojust in terms of de jure as 
well as de facto autonomy and accountability, concluding that Eurojustʼs attempts to expand its autonomy have 
been more successful. However, none of the cases studied features a “regulatory shift” comparable to that expe-
rienced by Frontex when the EBCG regulation was adopted. 
17
  The initial distinction between two categories of EU agencies – “Commission” or “Community agencies” and 
“Council agencies” – reflected the former European pillar structure. Despite the abolishment of pillar divisions 
with the Treaty of Lisbon, this distinction “between the more supranational, former first pillar ‘Commission 
agencies’ and the more intergovernmental, former second and third pillar ‘Council agencies’ remains relevant.” 
(Busuioc 2013: 22) 
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authorities, protected and even reinforced their rights (Rijpma 2012: 90). Other tasks rather  
resemble those of “typical” agencies: Frontex also assists the Commission, and especially the 
member states, in the implementation of a common policy by providing technical and informa-
tional assistance such as the development of common training standards.  
 It has to be noted that there is no generally accepted functional classification of EU 
agencies. In particular, it remains difficult to draw a clear distinction between regulatory and 
non-regulatory agencies (Trondal 2010: 130).
18
 However, even if a broad definition of regula-
tion is applied, one cannot label all EU agencies as regulatory. Busuioc, who questions if there 
are “truly regulatory” EU agencies at all, suggests to distinguish between the following types 
(starting from the least to the more powerful): information providing, management, operational 
cooperation, decision-making, and quasi-regulatory agencies (Busuioc 2013: 38-41).
19
  
 Busuioc classifies Frontex as an operational-cooperation agency (Busuioc 2013: 39). 
Since Frontex did not possess formal decision-making responsibilities before it was transformed 
into the EBCG Agency, but instead facilitated information exchange between national authori-
ties, provided (technical) expertise as well as practical support, and coordinated operational  
activities (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 2), this can be considered accurate. Other  
scholars share the view that one could not consider Frontexʼs tasks as regulatory (Ekelund 2013: 
111). The agency’s nature did not change fundamentally in 2007 and 2011, when amendments 
to Frontexʼs regulation (Regulation (EC) No 863/2007; Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011) focused 
on reinforcing the agencyʼs operational role.20 This development confirmed the assumption that 
because of the EU treaties not foreseeing a transfer of law enforcement powers to the EU level, 
agenciesʼ activities in the AFSJ are likely to remain limited to coordinating operational activities 
between member statesʼ authorities (Rijpma 2012: 84 f.). At the same time, observers like  
Rijpma (2012) criticised that there is no appropriate constitutional framework providing a com-
prehensive and clear legal basis for the operational cooperation of Frontex and the member 
states. Therefore, they pleaded for a further development of the agencyʼs regulatory role – 
which would also be less likely to negatively impact individualsʼ rights and freedoms.21  
Indeed, the recent transformation of Frontex constitutes such a development of the agen-
cy’s regulatory role: it represents a major shift on the above-mentioned continuum towards a 
                                                 
18
  For details on the Commissionsʼs differentiation between regulatory and executive agencies, see Busuioc 2013: 
22-24. 
19
  While agencies primarily provided information and execution in the EUʼs early years of agency creation, one can 
observe an “increasing ‘mushrooming’ of more powerful agencies possessing operational, decision-making or 
even quasi-regulatory powers” (Busuioc 2012: 719), as evidenced by the financial sector. 
20
  Besides, the amendments included mechanism to ensure compliance with fundamental rights. Since this however 
only implied monitoring “the respect for fundamental in all the activities of the Agency” (Regulation (EU) No 
1168/2011, 26a, italics added), these changes cannot be considered a major step towards regulating the EU 
member states’ EBM. 
21
  Another distinct feature of AFSJ agencies is that they “potentially carry out direct or indirect implications for the 
fundamental rights of individuals” (Carrera et al. 2013: 338). 
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decision-making, if not even quasi-regulatory agency. In contrast to other EU agencies, Frontex 
cannot only adopt individual decisions that are binding on third parties (Curtin 2009: 163), but 
on national border guard authorities. Moreover, it even establishes a generally binding IBM 
strategy. This evolution from mere coordination to additional regulation (see 3.1) constitutes a 
remarkable qualitative shift of Frontexʼs institutional design towards a genuinely regulatory 
agency, which allows the researcher to draw on the theoretical approaches offered by the  
literature on EU regulation (see 4) in order to analyse the agency’s evolution. As demonstrated 
above, this is an innovative approach to the case of Frontex, making it possible to investigate 
whether a JHA agencyʼs institutional design follows the same logic like that of other agencies 
once it is assigned with a regulatory role – despite of the policy areaʼs specifics. 
Even though not being immediately connected to the EUʼs internal market, the consistent 
application of European rules at the EU’s external borders can be understood as regulation as 
well. As pointed out in a discussion paper for an informal meeting of the JHA ministers, “[t]he 
control by each Schengen Member State and Associated State of its parts of these external bor-
ders is not only in the interest of that Member State (MS), but in the interest of all.”  
(Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2016: 1) Hence, a well-
functioning external border management is clearly valued by the community of EU member 
states (as well as the EU institutions), and the transformation of Frontexʼs institutional design 
can be seen as an attempt to enhance sustained and focused control over these activities. 
 
To conclude, Frontex – just like other JHA agencies – can be indeed described as an EU agency 
with a very specific institutional design. However, the latter experienced a major qualitative 
shift towards a “decision-making” and even “quasi-regulatory” agency when the EBCG regula-
tion was adopted. Therefore, Frontex’s evolution can be fruitfully analysed by drawing on the 
public policy literature on EU regulatory bodies. By doing to, I address a major gap in research 
on the particular case of Frontex and on JHA agencies in general.  
Previous to the introduction of the above-mentioned theoretical accounts, I conceptualise 
the dependent variables in the last subsection of this chapter and subsequently describe the  
variation one can – or cannot – empirically observe on them. 
 
2.3 EU Agencies’ Institutional Design 
Following Kelemen, EU agencies are defined as “EU level public authorities with a legal per-
sonality and a certain degree of organisational and financial autonomy that are created by acts of 
secondary legislation in order to perform clearly specified tasks” (Kelemen 2005: 175). Whereas 
 
 
13 
many studies focus on agenciesʼ post-delegation behaviour (Rittberger/ Wonka 2010: 733),  
investigating their varying institutional design constitutes a crucial starting point.
22
  
 Before conceptualising this paper’s dependent variables, I briefly introduce a compara-
tive framework for agenciesʼ overall formal institutional design developed by Groenleer (2009). 
The author states that even though “they share certain formal characteristics, the differences 
among agencies outweigh the similarities” (Groenleer 2009: 115) and distinguishes between six 
analytical categories. First, as there is no explicit legal basis for their creation and design, 
agenciesʼ formal-legal status varies,23 and the degree of autonomy that is formally granted to 
them differs. Secondly, an agencyʼs institutional design is characterised by its mandate,  
objective(s) and task(s). Thirdly, agencies show different structures and compositions in regard 
to their management boards (MBs), executive directors (EDs), scientific/technical committees, 
and/or advisory forums. Among other things, these bodies are elected in different ways, show 
different decision-making procedures, and vary in their level of accountability. Fourthly,  
agenciesʼ regulations usually do not elaborate on staffing: personnel policy is the EDʼs respon-
sibility, who can in most cases act rather autonomously. This leads to different practices among 
agencies. The fifth category is financing. Agencies are funded by different sources; the degree to 
which they can allocate their financial resources freely varies. Last but not least, the relations 
agencies hold with external actors – namely the European Parliament (EP), the Commission, the 
Council, the member states, and other institutions such as the Court of Justice (ECJ) – are not 
uniform. Through varying formal obligations towards these actors, agencies are controlled and 
held accountable to different degrees (Groenleer 2009: 115-133). However, these “external  
relations” cannot be clearly separated from the institutional designʼs other components such as 
the MBʼs composition. 
 Since this study is in particular interested in regulation and how it is designed, the two 
categories that are to be chosen as the study’s dependent variable are “tasks” (more precisely, 
regulatory tasks) and “governance structure” (“structure and composition” according to Groen-
leerʼs framework). These features not only cover what kind of new tasks Frontex carries out, but 
also capture their design (especially who decides on them), and therefore seem appropriate for a 
thorough understanding of the agencyʼs new regulatory role in the EUʼs EBM. Being laid down 
by the agencyʼs regulation, both its tasks and governance structure can be assessed quite easily. 
                                                 
22
  At the same time, the researcher has to keep in mind that reality – for instance actual working practices – might 
deviate from the provisions that had been set down initially. For instance, Trondal reveals “that the de jure au-
tonomy of EU level agencies is only weakly associated with their de facto behavioural autonomy.” (Trondal 
2010: 147, italics in original) However, this study is interested in the institutional change that Frontex experi-
enced and and largely neglects how the agencyʼs new de jure role plays out de facto – after such a short period of 
time, it would only be possible to generate very limited findings anyway. For some considerations on how Fron-
tex’s new institutional design will affect the agency’s role in the EU’s EBM, see 7.3. 
23
  Groenleer refers to the already-mentioned distinction between Community agencies and Union agencies (Groen-
leer 2009: 116), see Footnote 17. 
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Since this is the most innovative and puzzling element of the new Frontex regulation, the  
analysis of the agencyʼs new tasks concentrates on those that can be described as regulatory. In 
order to assess the expansion of the agencyʼs regulatory tasks, Levi-Faurʼs categorisation of four 
basic functional tasks of regulation – namely information gathering, rule setting, monitoring, 
and enforcement – will be used as analytical framework (Levi-Faur 2011: 813). However, I  
follow various authors (Trondal 2010; Wonka/Rittberger 2010; Busuioc 2013) and do not con-
sider information gathering tasks as regulatory activities. Moreover, information gathering tasks 
such as the conducting of risk analyses (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 4) have been one of 
the agencyʼs main activities from the very beginning and were not extended significantly in the 
new regulation.
24
 
 The development of the agencyʼs governance structure will be analysed by drawing on 
Rittberger and Wonkaʼs (2010) index on the formal-institutional independence of EU agencies 
from their political principals – namely the Commission, the EP, and the member state  
governments in the Council. While this paper is not primarily interested in the concept of agen-
cy independence or autonomy, it rather aims at investigating the relation between Frontexʼs 
principals in order to assess how “intergovernmental” or “supranational” the agencyʼs  
governance structure was before the transformation into the EBCG Agency and whether or not 
this has changed in the course of the recent reform. However, this is closely intertwined with the 
concept of agency independence as formulated by Rittberger and Wonka: the “more equal”  
decision-making power is distributed among an agencyʼs principals (for instance in regard to the 
appointment of the agency head), the more independent the index considers an agency to be. 
Hence, the authorsʼ index is also useful to assess the relationship between Frontexʼs principals. 
 Only two of the indexʼs components will be used for this study: The first one (A2)  
covers the appointment of the agency head, the second one (A3) the members of the agencyʼs 
MB. The variables behind these components are suitable to capture how power over decision-
making is distributed among Frontexʼs principals, i.e. to apprehend who “governs” Frontex and 
whether or not this changed. 
 Instead of including the indexʼs forth component capturing agenciesʼ (internal) decision-
making (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 751f.), it will be analysed which actors play a role in deciding 
on Frontexʼs new regulatory activities. This acknowledges that the study at hand is particularly 
interested in the expansion of Frontexʼs regulatory role. Even though the analytical part will 
show that the continuity of the governance structure and the design of the decision-making  
procedures in the context of the regulatory tasks follow the same logic, the descriptive chapter 
will present the regulatory tasks and the way in which decisions on them are taken in the same  
                                                 
24
  While the newly established liaison officers also collect information, it is their primary function to supervise 
member statesʼ EBM (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12). Hence, they rather belong to the category of moni-
toring. 
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section. This approach is chosen for reasons of clarity. Except of monitoring tasks, it will not be 
possible to observe variation over time, as the other regulatory tasks are completely new features. 
 
In the second chapter, I first elaborated on the broad definition of regulation on which this study 
is based. I subsequently depicted the different ways in which various policy areas within the EU 
are regulated by drawing on the case of banking regulation. This allowed me to emphasise that 
regulatory structures might undergo fundamental transitions over time – especially in the con-
text of transnational crises. As demonstrated by the creation of the SSM, regulatory tasks may 
even be delegated to a supranational EU institution such as the ECB. 
 Secondly, I elaborated on the particular case of Frontex, which experienced a major 
qualitative shift towards a “decision-making” and even “quasi-regulatory” agency, when the 
EBCG regulation was adopted. This allows me to draw on the public policy literature on EU 
regulatory bodies, thereby addressing a major gap in research.  
In the last subsection, I introduced a comparative framework for EU agencies institution-
al design. This enables the reader to recognise the significant differences that exist between  
these institutions. I justified my choice of the dependent variables regulatory tasks and gover-
nance structure, which I expect to fully capture to what extent Frontex’s role in regulating the 
EU’s EBM has changed in the course of the agency’s most recent reform. These variables were 
conceptualised by drawing on Levi-Faur’s (2011) categorisation of functional tasks of regulation 
(rule setting, monitoring, and enforcement) as well as Rittberger and Wonkaʼs (2010) index on 
the formal-institutional independence of EU agencies (agency head, members of the MB).  
After having conceptualised the dependent variables on a theoretical level, I can now 
empirically assess what kind of variation one can observe on them. 
 
3 Mapping Variation: Expansion of Regulatory Tasks versus Continuity 
of Governance Structure 
By using the analytical categories developed in the previous chapter, I now assess the institu-
tional change Frontex experienced when Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624 was finally approved 
by the Council on 14 September 2016. In the first subsection, I demonstrate that a number of 
new regulatory tasks – namely rule setting, monitoring, and enforcement tasks – have been  
delegated to the agency. Furthermore, I describe the variation one can observe in regard to the 
design of these tasks. In the second subsection, I draw on the index on the formal-institutional 
independence of EU agencies in order to reveal that both in regard to the appointment of the 
agency head and to the members of the MB, Frontexʼs overarching governance structure did not 
undergo any significant change. 
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3.1 Regulatory Tasks 
In this section, I describe the enhancement Frontexʼs regulatory role has experienced. At the 
same time, it is necessary to keep in mind that the agencyʼs operational tasks have been expan-
ded as well and that both categories cannot always be clearly separated (Rijpma 2017: 219). 
 
3.1.1 Rule Setting 
Rule setting tasks experienced a remarkable expansion in Frontexʼs new regulation. Before its 
recent reform, the agency did not develop any comparable strategy that would have been bin-
ding for the member states.
25
 In contrast, the new Frontex regulation defines eleven components 
of integrated border management (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 4) and delegates the task of 
establishing “a technical and operational strategy for European integrated border management” 
to the agency (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, 3(2)). This strategy, which shall promote and  
support the implementation of European integrated border management (IBM) in all member 
states, is to be based on a proposal of the ED and set down by decision of the MB. Where  
justified, the agency shall take into account the specific situation of the member states, particu-
larly their geographical location. The strategies established by national border management  
authorities shall be in line with the Frontex IBM strategy (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, 3(3)). 
 
3.1.2 Monitoring 
The new regulation also introduces further monitoring tasks and strengthens the agencyʼs super-
visory role considerably. While assessments have already been added to Frontexʼs tasks in 2011, 
their conducting was neither mandatory nor regular (Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011, art. 4). 
According to the new regulation, the decision on the “new” vulnerability assessmentsʼ metho-
dology is to be taken by the MB, based on a proposal of the ED. Among other things, this  
methodology shall lay down objective criteria against which the agency carries out the tests 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13(1)). 
 However, the regulation already lists some elements to be established in the methodology. 
Based on its risk analyses, Frontex shall now carry out compulsory, at least annual (unless the 
ED decides otherwise) vulnerability assessments. The latter examine member statesʼ technical 
equipment, systems, capabilities, resources, infrastructure, and staff that is necessary for border 
control (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13(2)) in order to assess their capacity and readiness to 
face “present and future threats and challenges at the external borders” (Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624, art. 13(4)). Frontex also checks the member statesʼ capacity to contribute to the  
rapid reaction pool. Furthermore, the new regulation elaborates on the information member 
                                                 
25
  Being “unconditional and integral components of effective integrated border management” (Frontex 2011: 1), a 
so-called Fundamental Rights Strategy was introduced in 2011. However, the Fundamental Rights Strategy is le-
gally non-binding and does not constitute an overarching integrated border management strategy. 
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states have to provide in order to support the assessments (equipment, staff, financial resources, 
and contingency plans) (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13(3)).
26
 
 The assessmentsʼ results have to be submitted to the member states concerned, who may 
comment on them, as well as to the EP, the Council, and the Commission at least once a year 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13(5)(9)). Once the results are available, the ED will – if  
necessary and after consulting the member state concerned – recommend measures eliminating 
the identified vulnerabilities that have to be taken within a certain time limit and “invite” the 
respective state to implement these (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13 (6)). If a member state 
does not follow the recommendation within the defined period of time, the MB will adopt a 
binding decision based on a proposal of the ED that sets out the necessary measures to be taken 
by the respective member state. If the state does not follow this decision within the defined time 
limit, the MB shall notify the Council as well as the Commission and further action in accor-
dance with art. 19 may be taken (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 13(8), also see 3.1.3). 
 In ensuring regular monitoring of all member statesʼ EBM, Frontex is supported by  
liaison officers, who are to be deployed in member states (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 
12(1)), not only in third countries like before (Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011, art. 14). While 
the liaison officers are appointed by the ED, the MB decides – based on a proposal of the ED 
that is developed in consultation with the member states concerned – on the nature and terms of 
the liaison officersʼ deployment (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(2)). The regulation lists a 
number of delegated tasks; inter alia supporting the agency in carrying out the vulnerability  
assessments by collecting information, facilitating the communication between member states 
and the agency, reporting to the ED on the situation at the external borders, and contributing to 
promoting the application of the acquis communautaire relating to external border management, 
including with regard to respect for fundamental rights (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(3)). 
In order to fulfil these tasks, liaison officers receive information from national coordination  
centres (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(4)). The regulation emphasises that liaison officers 
only take instructions from the agency (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(6)). Their reports 
(being part of the vulnerability assessments) have to be sent to the member state concerned 
(Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(5)). 
 
3.1.3 Enforcement 
Similarly as in the case of rule setting, the regulationʼs enforcement tasks are a completely new 
element of Frontexʼs mandate. The provision will become relevant if so-called “situations at the 
external borders requiring urgent action [...] risk jeopardising the functioning of the Schengen 
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  The regulation also contains a more general provision stating that national authorities are now obliged to share 
all necessary information in a timely and accurate manner (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 10). 
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area” (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 19(1)). This might be the case when a member state does 
not take the corrective measures mentioned in article 13 (see 3.1.2), when it faces specific and 
disproportionate challenges at the external borders without requesting sufficient support from 
Frontex (according to Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 15, 17, 18), or when it does not take the 
necessary steps of implementation. 
 If such a situation occurs, the Council – based on a Commissionʼs proposal, that is made 
after consulting the agency – can adopt an implementing act that identifies measures mitigating 
those risks (implemented by the agency) and requiring the member state to cooperate (Regula-
tion (EU) 2016/1624, art. 19(1)). The EP has to be informed of this process (Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624, art. 19(2)). The possible measures taken by Frontex include inter alia the organisa-
tion and cooperation of rapid border interventions (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 19(3)). The 
ED determines the concrete actions and draws up an operational plan, on which the member 
state concerned shall agree within three working days (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 
19(4)(5)). Within five working days, Frontex shall deploy the necessary staff from the rapid  
reaction pool in order to execute the measures set down by the Council decision; the necessary 
technical equipment shall be deployed within ten working days (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 
19(6)(7)). If the state concerned does not comply with the Councilʼs decision within 30 days and 
decides not to cooperate with the agency (i.e. does not take the necessary action to facilitate the 
implementation of the decision), the Commission can trigger article 29 of the Schengen Borders 
Code (SBC), allowing other member states to reintroduce controls at internal borders  
(Regulation (EC) No 562/2006, art. 19(10)). Hence, a member statesʼ request can be superseded 
if the control of the external borders is rendered ineffective or if the state does not implement 
recommended measures, even though it is not possible to intervene against its will. 
 
Table 1 summarises the new regulatory tasks that have been delegated to Frontex – namely rule 
setting, monitoring, and enforcement activities. It also gives an overview of the decision-making 
procedures on which the execution of these tasks is based. The table reveals that monitoring is 
the only activity that does not represent a completely new feature of the Frontex regulation.
27
 
Moreover, it shows that decision-making on enforcement is – in contrast to rule-setting and 
monitoring, which are controlled by the ED and the MB – dominated by the Council and the 
Commission. 
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  It has to be noted that the expansion of all of these regulatory tasks in the present case questions Levi-Faurʼs 
assumption that the different tasks of regulation are “strictly divided between different actors and institutions” in 
the EU system of governance (Levi-Faur 2011: 813). 
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 Regulatory tasks 
according to   
Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004 
Regulatory tasks 
according to 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 
Change:  
No change:  
Minor change:
28
 
/  
Design 
Rule setting - Establishment of a 
technical and opera-
tional IBM strategy 
with which national 
strategies have to be 
in line 
 Proposal of the ED, 
decision of the MB 
Monitoring Execution of assess-
ments neither manda-
tory nor regular; 
liaison officers only 
in third countries
29
 
Execution of manda-
tory, at least annual 
assessments; liaison 
officers also in mem-
ber states 
 /  Proposal of the ED, 
decision of the MB 
Enforcement - Adoption of imple-
menting acts requir-
ing member states to 
cooperate; reintro-
duction of internal 
border controls in 
cases of noncompli-
ance 
 Proposal of the 
Commission, deci-
sion of the Council;   
Activation of article 
29, SBC by the 
Commission in cases 
of noncompliance 
 
Table 1: Frontex’s new regulatory tasks and their design (own illustration) 
 
3.2 Governance Structure 
In the second subsection, I compare Frontex’s governance structure before its recent reform with 
that being set down in the agency’s new regulation. Before describing the continuity one can 
observe in regard to this dependent variable, it has to be mentioned that some aspects are not 
covered by Rittberger and Wonkaʼs index. However, these elements have not experienced any 
change in the course of the recent reform. The agencyʼs consultative forum, which was estab-
lished in 2011, is still appointed by the MB on a proposal of the ED (Regulation (EU) No 
1168/2011, art. 26a(2); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 70(2)). The fundamental rights  
officer, whose position was also created in 2011, remains to be designated by the MB (Regula-
tion (EU) No 1168/2011, art. 26a(3); Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 71(1)). Moreover, it has to 
be noted that the MB continues to take its decisions by absolute majority voting (Regulation 
(EC) No 2007/2004, art. 24(1); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 67(1)). 
 
3.2.1 Appointment of the Agency Head 
The term of office of the agency head – Frontexʼs ED – continues to last five years. The Com-
mission still selects candidates, among whom the ED is, just as before, appointed by the MB by 
                                                 
28
  If a regulatory task has been present before and was only strengthened in the course of Frontex’s transformation, 
this change is described as “minor”. 
29
  It has to be noted that de facto, these assessments have never been carried out (see 6.3.1). However, since this 
chapter is only interested in Frontex’s formal-institutional design, the expansion of regulatory tasks regarding 
monitoring is categorised as “minor change”. 
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a two-thirds majority. A dismissal of the ED continues to be at the appointerʼs discretion  
(Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 26(4); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 69(2)). The 
EPʼs position in regard to the appointment of the agencyʼs ED was slightly strengthened: the 
candidates proposed by the Commission now have to make a statement before the competent 
committee or committees of the EP and answer questions. Afterwards, the EP adopts an opinion 
setting out its views and may also indicate a preferred candidate. However, the EPʼs opinion is 
not binding (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 69(2)) and this slight change would not cause any 
change in regard to the independence index (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 750). 
 The ED maintains his or her right to hold other offices (at least no specific provision 
ruling this out has been established) and can still be reappointed once (Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, art. 26(5); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 69(7)). By stating that the ED “shall 
neither seek nor take instructions from any government or from any other body”, his or her  
formal independence continues to be laid down (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 25(1); 
Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 68(1)). Last but not least, the new regulation also shows a 
formal requirement for the agency headʼs qualification (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 
26(2); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 69(2)). 
 
3.2.2 Members of the Management Board 
Lasting four years, the term of office of the MB members remains the same. It is still composed 
of one representative of each member state
30
 and two of the Commission (Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, art. 21(1); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 63(1)). Neither specific provisions 
for a dismissal of MB’s members, nor for their right to hold other offices have been added. Since 
the 2011 amendment of Frontexʼs regulation, members of the MB can be reappointed more than 
once (Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011, amendment 24(a); Regulation (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 
63(1)). There is still not article requiring the formal independence of MB members. However, 
they continue to be formally required to be qualified for the office (Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, art. 21(2); Regulation  (EU) No 2016/1624, art. 63(2)). 
 
Table 2 provides an overview of the continuity one observes in regard to Frontex’s governance 
structure. The only variation that can be assessed is a slight strengthening of the EP in the  
appointment of the ED. Since this does, however, not impact Rittberger and Wonka’s formal-
institutional independence index of EU agencies, it can be concluded that Frontex’s governance 
structure has remained stable and that the agency has not become more independent in the sense 
that power has been distributed more equally among the EP, the Council, and the Commission. 
                                                 
30
  The other four Schengen Area states retain limited voting rights; the UK and Ireland participate as observers 
(Frontex 2017a). 
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 Variable 
according to 
Rittberger and 
Wonka (2010) 
Governance struc-
ture according to 
Regulation (EC) 
No 2007/2004 
Governance struc-
ture according to 
Regulation (EU) 
2016/1624 
Change:  
No change:   
Minor change:
31
  
 /  
Agency Head (AH) Term of agency head 5 years 5 years  
Selectorate/appointees 
of AH 
Commission selects 
candidates; MB 
appoints AH 
Commission selects 
candidates; MB 
appoints AH 
 /  
(EPʼs role slightly 
strengthened ) 
Quorum appointment 
AH 
2/3 majority 2/3 majority  
Rules for AH dismis-
sal 
Dismissal at ap-
pointersʼ discretion 
Dismissal at ap-
pointersʼ discretion 
 
Other offices AH Yes (no specific 
provision) 
Yes (no specific 
provision) 
 
Reappointment of AH Yes, once Yes, once  
(Formal) AH inde-
pendence 
Yes, formal re-
quirement 
Yes, formal re-
quirement 
 
Formal requirement 
for AH qualification 
Yes Yes  
Members of the Man-
agement Board 
(MMB) 
Term of office MMB 4 years 4 years  
Selectorate/appointees 
of MMB 
Governments and 
Commission 
Governments and 
Commission 
 
Rules for MMB dis-
missal 
No specific provi-
sions for dismissal 
No specific provi-
sions for dismissal 
 
Other offices MMB Yes (no specific 
provision) 
Yes (no specific 
provision) 
 
Reappointment of 
MMB 
Yes, more than once Yes, more than once  
(Formal) MMB inde-
pendence 
Yes, formal re-
quirement 
Yes, formal re-
quirement 
 
Formal requirement 
for MMB qualifica-
tion 
Yes Yes  
 
Table 2: Continuity of Frontex’s governance structure (own illustration) 
 
In this chapter, I assessed the empirical variation one can observe in regard to the dependent 
variables regulatory tasks and governance structure. This comparison allows me to conclude that 
Frontexʼs institutional design has not developed consistently: while a number of regulatory tasks 
have been added, the agencyʼs governance structure has remained almost untouched. Moreover, 
one can observe variation across different categories of regulatory tasks: whereas Frontexʼs rule 
setting and monitoring tasks have been expanded significantly, tasks of enforcement do not  
enable the agency to genuinely coerce member states to cooperate. Furthermore, the agencyʼs 
MB has gained a considerable degree of power in regard to rule setting (deciding on Frontexʼs 
new IBM strategy) and monitoring (setting down the vulnerability assessmentsʼ methodology 
                                                 
31
  Changes that would not affect Rittberger and Wonka’s formal-institutional independence index of EU agencies 
are treated as “minor changes”. 
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and approving the nature and terms of the liaison officersʼ deployment), but is not involved in 
the agencyʼs reactions to situations at the external borders requiring urgent action: in contrast to 
the other new regulatory tasks, decision-making concerning enforcement was delegated to the 
Council and the Commission. 
 Stating that they expect agencies with regulatory tasks to be more independent than those 
with informational and executive tasks, Rittberger and Wonka (2010: 735) would find the  
mismatch between the regulatory tasksʼ expansion and the governance structureʼs continuity  
puzzling. This view is shared by other researchers, who for instance state that “delegation to 
independent agencies is particularly important within regulatory policy and administration. 
Therefore, we should expect a clear difference between agencies within the regulatory field and 
agencies responsible for non-regulatory policy.” (Christensen/Nielson 2010: 178, italics added) 
Therefore, further theoretical approaches from the literature on EU regulation are to be  
considered in order to investigate the causal links that have led to the particular change of Fron-
texʼs institutional design.  
 
4 Theoretical Approaches to the Creation, Design, and Transformation 
of EU Regulatory Institutions 
As already mentioned in the second chapter, there are various actors who carry out regulatory 
tasks. Since Frontex – just like other JHA agencies – legally is an agency, but also shows some 
distinct network features, I draw on theoretical approaches that focus on the two institutional 
types lying “in between” regulation at the national and the supranational level, namely ERNs 
and EU agencies. 
 In the introductory part of this chapter, I briefly elaborate on the relationship between 
both types of EU regulatory bodies and justify why the chosen theoretical framework is  
appropriate to explain the case of Frontex’s institutional change (4.1). In the following, I intro-
duce the two main theoretical approaches explaining the creation, transformation, and design of 
EU regulatory bodies: the functional and the political approach (4.2, 4.3). Usually, there is an 
analytical distinction between both accounts, and scholars use either functional or political  
explanations when analysing EU regulatory bodies. However, I present a combination of both 
approaches as suggested by Blauberger and Rittberger (2015, 2017) and deduce hypotheses for 
this functional-political approach (4.4), which I eventually translate into observable implications 
for the case at hand (4.5). 
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4.1 Applicability of Theoretical Accounts 
The first EU agencies have already been created in the 1970s. However, they were rather the 
exception than the rule (Christensen/Nielson 2010: 176). Since the early 1990s, a process of 
agencification has led to a gradual replacement of ERNs by EU agencies – a phenomenon for 
which Frontex serves as an example. Usually, the phase from the beginning to the mid-1990s is 
defined as the first wave of agencification, and the time from the early 2000s until the present as 
the second one (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 730). Moreover, EU agencies also “create, employ, and 
control” (Levi-Faur 2011: 810) ERNs (agencified networks), or are empowered by networking 
(networked agency). Scholars focusing on the underlying structural factors and trends of this 
development describe the proliferation of EU agencies as the result of isomorphism 
(Rittberger/Wonka 2011: 781) and argue that “EU lawmakers have simply followed a general 
trend that has been observed at the national, but has spread to the supranational level.” (Chris-
tensen/Nielson 2010: 177) That this evolution can indeed “be seen as a trend in public policy 
and as a fashionable idea within the realms of public management” (Egeberg et al. 2012: 30, 
italics in original) is inter alia evidenced by the references to New Public Management in Com-
mission documents on EU agencies and by the fact that the latter popped up within a short pe-
riod of time (Egeberg et al. 2012: 30f.) However, this line of reasoning would imply that agen-
ciesʼ institutional design only shows little variation. As already mentioned, this is not the case. 
 Consequently, many theoretical arguments about regulation aim at explaining why deci-
sion-makers create regulatory institutions of different kinds; in particular why they choose agen-
cies in some cases and prefer ERNs in others. Even though Frontex remained an agency, these 
approaches are suitable to explain the institutional change at hand because the lines between 
agencies and ERNs are blurred (Levi-Faur 2011: 812): whereas some agencies show inter-
governmental structures and rather resemble networks, others are more influenced by suprana-
tional actors. As already mentioned in the introduction, JHA agencies usually belong to the for-
mer category. That institutionsʼ legal status is not sufficient to capture their nature is for instance 
reflected in Boin et al.ʼs (2014) study on the EUʼs crisis management capacities, which makes 
an analytical distinction between a “network” and a “lead agency” model. Even though the lead 
agency model is typically found in nation states (Boin et al. 2014: 423) and many EU agencies 
resemble networks (Thatcher 2011: 790), features of the lead agency model can also be detected 
in EU regulatory bodies such as the new EU financial authorities (Boin et al. 2014: 423). 
 Whereas Frontexʼs formal status as an agency has not changed in the course of its reform, 
it experienced a remarkable shift towards a “less network-like agency”. Before the new regula-
tion was adopted, Frontex clearly was an agency with a network structure, operating at the cen-
tre of the national border guard authorities and only having supporting as well as coordinating 
tasks (Rijpma 2017: 219f.). This is confirmed by Wolff and Schoutʼs (2013) study on the agen-
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cyʼs initial creation: drawing on a legitimacy-based model, the authors compare Frontex to its 
predecessors SCIFA + and PCU and conclude that “Frontex as agency has not been a major 
addition” (Wolff/Schout 2013: 319, italics in original) and that the networking that had been 
practised before has continued under the agency (Wolff/Schout 2013: 319). 
 The recent delegation of further regulatory tasks has changed the agencyʼs institutional 
design significantly and introduced a more hierarchical relationship between the agency and the 
EU member states: the agency can now adopt decisions that are binding for member states’  
border management authorities. Hence, one can argue that the transboundary refugee crisis led 
to changes of the EUʼs crisis management governance, namely a development away from a  
coordinating network towards a lead agency model, which “impose[s] control on network ele-
ments to enhance coherence of the system and maintain [or rather introduce] efficiency.” (Boin 
et al. 2014: 423) Even though the agency had already existed before, one has to emphasise that 
existing institutional structures always shape the trajectory of institutional change (Blauberger/ 
Rittberger 2017: 3). Therefore, I also discuss Historical and Sociological Institutionalism as  
possible alternative explanations to the combined functional-political approach (see 6.6). 
 
In summary, the blurred lines between EU agencies and ERNs in general and the kind of  
transformation Frontex experienced in particular allow me to draw on the two main theoretical  
approaches usually explaining the creation of EU regulatory bodies to investigate the  
institutional change Frontex experienced. These accounts are to be introduced in the next  
subsections, followed by a suggestion of how they can be fruitfully combined in order to  
increase their explanatory power. 
 
4.2 The Demand Side: the Functional Approach 
Since functionalists explain the creation, design, and transformation of regulatory institutions by 
pointing to a “mismatch between existing institutional capacities and the growing complexity of 
policy problems” (Majone 1996: 1632f.), their studies focus on the demand-side of regulation 
and analyse the advantages regulatory institutions provide in practical terms. Hence, the  
functional approach assumes that “the nature of an agent is defined by the function it is  
supposed to perform” (Magnette 2005: 5), i.e. that regulatory bodies are created, designed, and 
sometimes transformed in order to fulfil certain functions. These functions are to be described in 
the following sections.
32
 
 The functional approach expects policy-makers to delegate regulatory activities in order 
to limit their own possibilities for political interventions (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 734) and thus 
                                                 
32
  Instead of providing an exhaustive list, it is this section’s aim to present the functions that are most commonly 
named in the literature. 
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to strengthen the independence and consistency of EU regulation (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 924f.). 
In this manner, the implementation of EU policies should be carried out more efficiently and 
flexibly, enhancing the harmonisation of – in many cases still diverging – national regulatory 
practices (Groenleer 2009: 101f.). 
 Moreover, functionalism assumes regulatory bodies to meet the demand for independent 
technical expertise (Groenleer 2009: 100; Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 924), which is expected to be 
based on high quality technical evaluations and not “influenced by political or contingent  
considerations.” (Groenleer 2009: 101) In this way, delegation to independent regulators enables 
national and EU policy-makers to make efficient as well as effective decisions (Rittberger/ 
Wonka 2010: 736) and the Commission to focus on the political dimension of regulation 
(Groenleer 2009: 101; Egeberg et al. 2012: 29). 
 Besides, EU regulatory bodies are expected to serve as a “solution to the credible  
commitment problem faced by policy-makers in regulatory policy-making” (Rittberger/Wonka 
2011: 781). By insulating regulation from office-seeking politicians and delegating it to non-
majoritarian institutions, policy-makers are able “to send strong signals of regulatory stability” 
(Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 734) and to credibly commit themselves to their future behaviour  
(Majone 2000: 289). While this argument is most prominent in studies on economic regulation, 
it is not obvious that credible commitment only plays a role in certain policy areas (Rittberger/ 
Wonka 2010: 735). Another function that primarily aims at sending certain signals is blame 
shifting, for which in particular EU agencies serve national governments and EU institutions in 
cases of unpopular policies (Thatcher 2002: 125). 
 In addition, regulatory institutions that operate above the national level and enhance  
European-wide cooperation allow member states’ governments to reduce transaction costs, to 
increase bureaucratic efficiency and to overcome collective action problems (Egeberg et al. 
2012). If, for instance, 28 national regulatory authorities are replaced by a single EU agency, 
this also provides cost-servings for industry and business, now only having to deal with one 
agency (Groenleer 2009: 102). Hence, assuming that actors always delegate if it increases effi-
ciency and lowers costs, functionalismʼs underlying ontology is rationalist (Magnette 2005: 5). 
 Whereas at first glance, functional arguments might rather suggest the choice of EU 
agencies, there are also functional arguments in favour of the creation of ERNs. For instance, 
ERNs can be the functionally more suitable solution in cases where EU rules “require case-by-
case implementation and a high level of local, street-level expertise” (Blauberger/Rittberger 
2015: 370). Moreover, drawing on the capacities of existing NRAs by enabling them to cooper-
ate through an ERN can save resources (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015: 370). 
 The most commonly used analytical expression of the functional logic is the PA model 
(Egeberg et al. 2012: 29). In contrast to EU agencies, ERNs are usually conceptualised as cases 
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of non-delegation (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015: 368). In order to better capture the relation  
between principals and agents in regard to EU agencies, approaches from the governance  
literature can provide further insights. Analysing regulation as a three-party relationship – the 
European institutions as regulators (i.e. rule-makers), Frontex as regulatory intermediary and the 
national border guard authorities as targets (i.e. rule-takers) – the regulatory governance  
approach captures the fact that the PA modelʼs unidirectional logic is insufficient and that regu-
latory intermediaries feature different properties and roles (Abbott et al. 2017). Indeed, the  
relationship between Frontex and its “multiple principals” (Dehousse 2008: 801, see 4.3) can be 
described as a case of delegation rather than one of trusteeship, cooptation or orchestration.
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However, the indirect governance approach and its underlying logic of a trade-off between 
competence and control (Abbott et al., forthcoming) enable the researcher to better understand 
the (sometimes endogenous) institutional dynamics between a governor and its intermediary. 
 Being asked why decision-makers do not perceive the Commission as being able to fulfil 
the functions mentioned in this subsection, functionalists would argue that “agencies can be 
more efficient than the Commission because they are usually smaller organisational entities with 
more specialised expertise, which allows them to respond to complex and emerging issues.” 
(Groenleer 2009: 101f.) Furthermore, they show the practical advantage of having more flexible 
staffing structures, which allows them to uphold a high level of professionalism (Groenleer 2009: 
101). Besides a lack of capacity and resources, the Commission’s alleged growing politicisation 
might have also increased the functional need for delegating regulation to agencies (Kele-
men/Tarrant 2011: 924; Rittberger/Wonka 2011: 781). 
 
In summary, the functional approach expects institutional choices and designs to be “explained 
in terms of the functions that a given institution is expected to perform, and the effects on policy 
outcomes it is expected to produce” (Pollack 2006: 167). It assumes rational decision-makers to 
choose a certain regulatory body because it is perceived as the adequate institutional solution to 
meet a particular demand, i.e. a distinct “‘regulatory gap’ between rulemaking authority located 
at the EU level and implementation at the national level” (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015: 369). 
For many of the above-mentioned functions to be fulfilled effectively, a certain degree of 
independence (or “autonomy”) has to be granted to the regulatory institution. Therefore, func-
tionalism assumes regulatory bodies to be “deliberately designed to operate at armʼs length from 
their political principals” (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 785). This independence should not only be 
reflected in the regulatory institution’s governance structure, but also in the way decisions on the 
execution of regulatory tasks are taken, in order to ensure efficient and unbiased procedures. 
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  That the orchestration framework is however useful to analyse the relationship between the Commission (orches-
trator), ERNs (intermediaries) and NRAs (targets) was shown by Blauberger and Rittberger (2015: 368f.). 
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4.3 The Supply-Side: the Political Approach 
However, these functional arguments have not remained uncontested: advocates of the political 
approach argue that functionalism spuriously neglects the role of politics, i.e. the diverging  
preferences, bargaining, and power struggles among the relevant actors. Whereas functionalists 
fail to identify who exactly fulfils the role of the agent (Thatcher 2011: 792; Kelemen/Tarrant 
2011: 925), the political approach acknowledges that EU regulatory institutions have multiple 
agents. The latter are expected to not primarily fear an “agency drift”, i.e. that an agent pursues 
its own political agenda, differing from that of its principal, but rather a “‘political drift’, in 
which agencies are somehow ‘captured’ by one of their institutional rivals in the leadership  
contest.” (Dehousse 2008: 796) 
 Hence, the political approach does not expect the creation, design, and transformation of 
EU regulatory institutions to be determined by functional necessities, but “driven by motivations 
of the major players in EU regulatory politics to enhance their institutional power and secure 
influence over policy outcomes.” (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015: 369) Moreover, political  
accounts state that a further centralisation of regulatory authority might also occur as a symbolic 
measure, i.e. as a possibility for policy-makers to demonstrate their willingness “to solve novel, 
pervasive and urgent problems” (Groenleer 2009: 103). 
 Nevertheless, opinions on which institutions can be seen as principals (apart from the 
Council) differ. Even though the Commission – who tends to present itself as the main principal 
of EU agencies – “corresponded to the standard principal-agent categories of monitoring and 
enforcing compliance, and filling in the details of incomplete contracting” (Trauner 2012: 786), 
it has to be noted that the powers that are delegated to agencies are in many cases not held by 
the Commission before, but by national authorities.
34
 Hence, it is rather a vertical and not a  
horizontal transfer of powers (i.e. from the national to the EU level and not from the EU institu-
tions to agencies) that occurs (Dehousse 2008: 792, 2016: 71). The EP has been treated in an 
even more ambiguous way and scholars could sometimes not agree on whether to treat it as a 
principal or an agent. However, also taking into consideration ex post accountability and control 
mechanisms, one can even argue for treating the EP as a principal in cases where it was not  
involved in the creation of an agency as co-legislator (Trauner 2012: 786ff.). 
 Hence, in order to being able to investigate the political considerations and the strategic 
interactions between the EU member states and institutions (Rittberger/Wonka 2011: 782), the 
first step is to analyse the institutional context, as decision-making procedures determine which 
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  In the case of Frontex, it can also be argued that „the Council did not delegate its own existing executive powers 
but rather that the tasks in question had been largely exercised by the Member States and not the Council (or the 
Commission). At the same time the agency replaces, in a sense, much of the fragmentary and opaque structures 
that were attached to the Council in one form or another, for example the Common Unit for external border prac-
titioners” (Curtin 2009: 164). 
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actors play a role in the political conflict (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 926f.). Since the EBCG  
regulation was adopted by an ordinary legislative procedure, the political approachʼs assump-
tions in regard to the preferences of the Commission, the EP and the Council will be elaborated 
on in the following sections. It has to be noted that conflicts might not only occur between these 
institutions, but also within them. 
 Advocates of the political approach expect the Commission to strive for an expansion of 
supranational regulatory authority (as opposed to national or intergovernmental institutional 
solutions) and to particularly aim at maintaining or increasing its own regulatory powers: like 
most bureaucratic structures, the Commission has a certain institutional self-interest and usually 
tries to expand its powers (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 927). Hence, the delegation of regulatory 
tasks to other institutions than itself is only the second-best option from the Commissionʼs point 
of view. However, if an expansion of its own powers is unlikely to be accepted by the Council, 
the Commission can be expected to agree on the creation or transformation of an EU regulatory 
body (Dehousse 2008: 796). In these cases, the political approach assumes that the Commission 
tries to gain as much control as possible over the agencyʼs governance structure and to oppose 
intergovernmental network-structures. However, if the creation of an agency explicitly restricts 
the Commissionʼs powers, the latter is expected to oppose the agency solution. 
 Some of the EPʼs preferences resemble those of the Commission. Kelemen and Tarrant 
(2011) list three main concerns the Parliament has: it is in favour of more centralised, suprana-
tional regulatory institutions, it tries to expand its own powers and it aims at appealing to the 
electorate “by favouring regulatory institutions that promise to yield outcomes favourable for 
diffuse public interests.” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 928) Regarding the Parliamentʼs attempts to 
protect its own interests, one has to note that it particularly tries to expand its oversight powers 
and to enhance the transparency and accountability of regulatory institutions (Kelemen/Tarrant 
2011: 928). However, the EP’s influence on the design of EU agencies is a rather recent  
development. Until the mid-1990s, the EP only played a minor role in their establishment. This 
has changed after the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, when the Parliament could expand its 
legislative prerogatives beyond mere consultation and “began to assert its influence over the 
creation and design of new agencies” (Groenleer 2009: 107; also see Egeberg et al. 2012: 32). 
 The member states in the Council are typically torn between “their desire to make  
credible regulatory commitments that would allow them to enjoy gains from trade or benefits of 
collective actions and their desire to manipulate the distributional consequences of regulatory 
decisions” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 928). Hence, they acknowledge the need for common regula-
tion, for instance to avoid further crises, but at the same time show a certain reluctance to dele-
gate to the EU level and give up power. This reluctance is in many cases reflected in agenciesʼ 
MBs, which are strategically set up in order to protect national interests and keep sovereignty 
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over policy-outcomes (Kelemen 2002: 110).
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 In cases where member states anticipate redis-
tributive consequences at their expense, the political account expects them to try to prevent  
delegation; “where it does occur member states will maintain as much national control as  
possible” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 928). In particular, national governments are assumed to 
“jealously guard their remaining autonomy in implementation” (Blauberger/Rittberger 2015: 
369) in these situations, rather favouring regulatory bodies with loose network structures that 
coordinate national bureaucracies (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 930). While the political approach is 
often focused on redistribution, sovereignty concerns can be another reason for member statesʼ 
reluctance (Blauberger/Rittberger 2017: 1 f.). 
 Advocates of the political approach would argue that the reasons why many new regula-
tory tasks were not delegated to the Commission since the beginning of the 1990s are not  
functional, but political and that national governments have simply been “unwilling to counte-
nance any significant expansion of the Commission” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 929). 
 
To conclude, the political approach doubts that variation in regulatory bodies’ institutional  
design across cases and time can be explained by functional necessities and instead assumes that 
“inter-institutional battles over regulatory authority and conflicts between member states over 
the distributional effects of regulation play a decisive role in the design of EU regulatory bodies.” 
(Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 925) It expects actorsʼ preferences to be driven by rationalist calcula-
tions and “determined by their expectations concerning how various design options will impact 
on policy outcomes.” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 924) Hence, a decision is perceived as rational if 
it provides the actor with more power, not if it optimises the fulfilment of a certain function – 
regulatory bodies are not depicted as functional solutions, but as “political instruments through 
which member states and EU institutions act” (Busuioc et al. 2012: 4). This enables the  
researcher “to understand the relative weakness of existing agencies and the multiplicity of  
controls to which they are subjected.” (Dehousse 2008: 789) In summary, the political approach 
would expect the regulatory tasks, their design, and the overarching governance structure of an 
EU regulatory body to reflect the diverging preferences and power relations among EU regulato-
ry bodiesʼ principals.  
 Having introduced the two main theoretical approaches to the creation, transformation, 
and design of EU regulatory bodies allows me to present a possible combination of both  
accounts in the following subsection. 
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  A number of studies investigate the role MBs play de facto. For instance, Busuioc (2012: 733) concludes that 
“boards are in act living up to the strategic expectations for which the were set up.” 
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4.4 A Combined Functional-Political Approach 
Usually, the functional and the political approach are treated as analytically distinct approaches 
to EU regulatory bodies and researchers either use the one or the other in order to explain the 
delegation of regulatory tasks (Groenleer 2009: 100). For instance, Kelemen and Tarrant (2017) 
insist that political considerations not only determine the institutional design, but also the insti-
tutional choice of EU bureaucratic structures – in other words, whether policy-makers choose to 
delegate to an ERN or an EU agency – and that functional considerations play no major role. 
 In contrast, Blauberger and Rittberger (2015, 2017) suggest a combined functional-
political approach and argue that by defining their respective domain of application as suggested 
by Jupille et al. (2013: 21), both accounts’ explanatory power can be increased. Even though 
they focus on the creation and design of ERNs when suggesting a combination of both  
approaches, the authorsʼ framework also increases explanatory leverage in regard to an agencyʼs 
transformation: whereas functional explanations can be expected to be most qualified to explain 
why decision-makers saw a need to expand Frontexʼs regulatory role in the first place and trans-
formed Frontex into a less network-like agency by delegating new regulatory tasks, i.e. intro-
duced a clearer hierarchy between member states and agency, one can assume that political  
accounts are more suitable to investigate the following bargaining process resulting in a particu-
lar design of the agencyʼs new tasks and an unchanged governance structure. 
 Rittberger and Blauberger (2017) suggest that functional considerations will be able to 
explain the choice of an ERN if EU regulatory competencies are highly developed but opera-
tional ones are not. As one can observe an evolution “away” from a network structure towards a 
further centralisation of regulatory authority on the European level, the scope conditions – the 
conditions under which the theory is expected to hold – have to be redefined: it is not a lack of 
operational, but of regulatory competencies that will be treated as scope condition for a  
functional explanation of the creation of an EU agency or the further centralisation of regulatory 
authority. Hence, where EU regulatory competencies are weakly developed, functional con-
siderations are expected to explain the centralisation of regulatory authority, even though opera-
tional competencies might be highly developed. This scope condition was clearly given before 
Frontex was reformed: even though there had been no European border and coast guards, the 
agencyʼs operational role had been highly developed and was strengthened by several amend-
ments (see 2.2). In contrast, its regulatory competencies had been weak: expect for monitoring, 
all regulatory tasks were newly introduced features of the Frontex regulation (see 3.1). Whereas 
the SBC contains common rules for external border controls, it does not entail many details on 
border surveillance and “leaves the national organisation of border management in the hands of 
the Member States.” (Rijpma 2016: 9) The following two hypotheses can be deduced from 
Blauberger and Rittbergerʼs elaborations on a combined functional-political approach: 
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H1 (functional approach): In the context of the migration crisis, regulatory deficits in rule set-
ting, monitoring and enforcement caused a functional gap in the EUʼs external border manage-
ment, which was the reason for decision-makers to delegate new regulatory tasks to Frontex. 
 
H2 (political approach): Inter-institutional power struggles and national sovereignty concerns 
shaped the design of the regulatory tasks and the governance structure. Sovereignty concerns 
that were asymmetrically distributed across member states led to particular strong efforts to 
limit regulation and to control decision-making on it. 
 
 
4.5 Observable Implications for the Combined Functional-Political Approach 
In this section, I operationalise the above-mentioned hypotheses and translate them into obser-
vable implications. Thus, I will be able to test in the following whether they can account for the 
transformation Frontex experienced (see 6). 
 
4.5.1 Observable Implications for the Functional Part of the Explanation: Delegation of Fur-
ther Tasks due to Regulatory Deficits 
In order to confirm the explanatory power of the functional approach in regard to the extension 
of Frontexʼs regulatory role, one would have to observe a functional gap in the EUʼs EBM prior 
to the agencyʼs transformation. Such a functional gap would become apparent in the form of 
(some) member statesʼ inability to implement existing rules (for instance on the registration of 
arriving asylum seekers) and/or other kinds of varying standards in border management across 
member states. One can expect such varying standards to be present in cases of diverging  
degrees of “migratory pressures” across different parts of the external borders, assuming  
migrants and refugees
36
 to choose parts of the borders where standards are lower, i.e. where a 
successful entry is more or even most likely. 
 Some empirical observations would emphasise the seriousness of the functional gap and 
hence further update the confidence in my theoretical assumptions: one can state that the  
functional gap caused most pressure to act if it also affected other policy areas. Moreover, it can 
be expected to have been most serious if developments of disintegration could be observed or if 
states took unilateral measures in order to mitigate negative externalities of other states’ non-
compliance with EU policies. 
A mismatch between institutional capacities and the degree of policy problemsʼ com-
plexity can be caused by operational and/or regulatory deficits. Since this section aims at deri-
ving observable implications for a functional explanation for the delegation of regulatory tasks, 
this functional gap would have had – at least to a remarkable degree – to be caused by a regula-
                                                 
36
  When referring to people crossing the external borders of the EU, I use the terms “refugees and migrants”. In this 
way, both those people who flee armed conflict or persecution, being classified by international law as refugees 
(see 1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 protocol) and those leaving their home because of the attempt to im-
prove their living conditions and not due to an immediate threat are included. Since not all of them may eventu-
ally seek asylum, the term “asylum seekers” would not be appropriate. 
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tory deficit in Frontexʼs mandate. Hence, the empirical analysis is not primarily interested in 
Frontexʼs possible lack of resources, personnel, or coordinating power (that most likely has been 
present as well), but rather in the lack of regulatory power that had been delegated to the agency 
before. The following subsections develop observable implications for regulatory deficits that 
would explain the (further) widening of a functional gap and consequently the delegation of the 
new regulatory tasks. It is not only necessary that such regulatory deficits existed, policy-makers 
must also have been aware of them. Hence, one has to observe them referring to it. 
 In order to explain the establishment of a technical and operational strategy for IBM by 
Frontex in functional terms one would have to observe a regulatory deficit in rule setting prior to 
the adoption of the new regulation. Such a deficit would become visible in the form of a lacking 
sound legislative framework. Moreover, legislation in other policy areas might have negatively 
affected EBM or set the wrong incentives. 
 A regulatory deficit in monitoring was present if the supervision of member statesʼ EBM 
showed serious gaps. For instance, this was the case if monitoring did not assess (all) compo-
nents being essential for an effective EBM, if it was not frequent enough, if it was not connected 
to any corrective measures, and/or if it was only introduced de jure, but not carried out de facto. 
 For a functional explanation to hold true in regard to the delegation of enforcement tasks, 
one has to observe that there were deficiencies in EBM in one or several member states, but 
these neither showed the necessary efforts to improve this situation themselves nor asked for 
support from Frontex. Functional explanations would be even more convincing if EU and  
national actors not only recognised this lack of willingness to cooperate, but even exerted pres-
sure by requesting the member state(s) concerned to accept help and maybe even issued threats. 
 
4.5.2 Observable Implications for the Political Part of the Explanation: Inter-Institutional 
Power Struggles and Inter-State Bargaining due to Sovereignty Concerns 
In order to confirm the political approach in regard to the continuity of Frontex’s governance 
structure and the design of the agency’s regulatory tasks, one would have to observe at least 
some degree of inter-institutional/-state disagreement and bargaining. Hence, the political  
approach would expect the institutional outcome to reflect not only functional necessities, but 
also the diverging preferences of Frontex’s principals. How the political approach would expect 
these to be shaped, is to be elaborated on in the following. 
The Commission is assumed to strive for a supranationalisation of the agency’s gover-
nance structure and in particular an expansion of its own powers, for instance by trying to gain 
an additional seat in the MB. Since the regulatory authority that is to be delegated to Frontex 
had not been held by the Commission before, but by national authorities, one can also expect the 
Commission to support an expansion of the agency’s regulatory mandate. At the same time, the 
33 
Commission should aim at securing as much decision-making power as possible over these far-
reaching regulatory tasks. Similar preferences could already be observed in its 2002 Communi-
cation on European Border Management, when “the Commission had contemplated the  
establishment of a true European corps of border guards, disposing of executive powers inde-
pendent from the Member States.” (Heijer et al. 2016: 19) Whereas member states in the Coun-
cil had resisted this move and adopted Frontex as a regulatory agency tasked with mainly coor-
dinative activities (Heijer et al. 2016: 19), Groenleerʼs (2009: 100) observation of a generally 
growing role of the Commission in regard to JHA agencies might as well hold true in the case of 
the new Frontex regulation. 
 In relation of JHA agencies’ institutional design, the Commission has often been an ally 
of the EP. The latter also favours more direct accountability mechanisms at the European level, 
“including transparent appointment procedures for senior management, comprehensive consulta-
tion and information rights for the EP, possibly in conjunction with national parliaments” 
(Trauner 2012: 787). Concerning the development of the EBM policy, the EP “has had mixed 
reactions” (European Parliament 2017: 4) While supporting the creation of Frontex from the 
very beginning and emphasising the need to allocate sufficient resources (European Parliament 
2017: 4), the EP has always pleaded for a “more communitarian” character of the agency 
(Trauner 2012: 793). However, the Parliament only had a consultative role when the original 
2004 Frontex regulation was adopted and the Council largely ignored its amendments (Trauner 
2012: 793). 
 Since the Parliament was actively involved as co-legislator in the most recent reform, 
one would assume the new regulation to increasingly reflect its preferences. This growing  
influence might become visible in the form of a seat in the MB granted to the Parliament or the 
introduction of a further body increasing the agency’s transparency (in particular the EP’s  
oversight powers). The political approach would also expect the EP to support the expansion of 
the Commission’s powers. Furthermore, the protection of fundamental rights – which played 
little to no role in the founding regulation (Rijpma 2017: 218) – is a key concern of the EP in its 
relations with Frontex. This reflects the political approachʼs expectation that the Parliament  
usually tries to design regulatory institutions in a way that appeals to certain societal groups. In 
the present case, these “diffuse public interests” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 928) are fundamental 
rights concerns voiced by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or the like. However, issues 
like the principle of non-refoulement have not only been contested between the Council and EP, 
but also within the Parliament (Trauner 2012: 795).
37
 
                                                 
37
  Nevertheless, the EP could achieve remarkable successes such as the appointment of a fundamental right officer 
and a consultative forum (Regulation (EU) No 1168/2011, art. 26a) since Frontex’s creation. 
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Because external border control can be described as a core state power, one would assume the 
EU member states to oppose a more supranational governance structure and to aim at control-
ling the decision-making on the agency’s regulatory tasks either through the MB or even the 
Council itself. The Council can be expected to pursue similar aims as it usually does in regard to 
JHA agencies:   
“JHA has been one of the policy fields where the Council’s concern to prevent  ‘political drift’ – 
when an institutional rival seeks to capture an agency – has been at least as strong [sic] its anxiety 
to prevent ‘agency drift’ – when an agent pursues an agenda different from that of its principals 
[…]. Where the Parliament has gained more influence over the creation and operation of Commu-
nity agencies, the Council has eagerly sought to limit the EP’s role in relation to agencies estab-
lished in the former second and third pillars.” (Trauner 2012: 785). 
 
Hence, one can conclude that the member states in the Council should strive to keep their role as 
Frontex’s “dominant principal” (Trauner 2012: 785). Instead of redistributive concerns, one can 
expect member states’ geographical position to determine their preferences, as this is decisive 
for whether or not they fear sovereignty losses: it is to assumed that member states with external 
borders oppose an extension of the EP’s and the Commission’s decision-making power most 
resolutely. Furthermore, they might also reject the delegation of regulatory tasks because of  
sovereignty concerns. Member states that have no external border themselves but are affected by 
the regulatory gap’s consequences should rather support a broad scope of these tasks. 
 
In the fourth chapter, I first justified the choice of my theoretical framework, which is usually 
used to explain why decision-makers create ERNs in some cases, but EU agencies in others. It is 
adequate to draw on the functional and political approach because the lines between ERNs and 
EU agencies are blurred. In particular, even though Frontex legally is an agency, it also shows 
some distinct network features. Moreover, in the course of its most recent reform, these network 
components experienced a remarkable dilution. 
Subsequently, I showed that the functional approach assumes regulatory bodies to be 
created, designed, and sometimes transformed in order to fulfil certain functions. Hence, this 
account expects the delegation of regulatory tasks and the design of a regulatory institution to 
reflect functional necessities and to fill a certain gap between institutional capacities and policy 
problems. In contrast, the political approach focuses on diverging preferences, bargaining, and 
power struggles among the relevant actors. Therefore, it would expect the regulatory tasks, their 
design, and the overarching governance structure of an EU regulatory body to reflect the varying 
preferences and power relations among EU regulatory bodiesʼ principals.  
Eventually, I introduced a possible combination of both accounts as suggested by  
Blauberger and Rittberger (2015, 2017), who argue that by defining their respective domain of 
application, one can further increase the approaches’ explanatory power. Since one can observe 
an evolution “away” from a network structure towards a further centralisation of regulatory au-
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thority on the European level, I refined the scope conditions: it is not a lack of operational, but 
of regulatory competencies, which will be treated as scope condition for a functional explana-
tion of the creation of an EU agency or the further centralisation of regulatory authority.  
I deduced two hypotheses from this combined functional-political approach. The first 
hypothesis, being derived from the functional approach, assumes that a functional gap in the 
EUʼs EBM caused by regulatory deficits was the reason for decision-makers to delegate new 
regulatory tasks to Frontex. The second hypothesis, which is deduced from the political  
approach, presumes that inter-institutional power struggles and national sovereignty concerns 
shaped the design of these regulatory tasks and prevented a change of the governance structure. 
Moreover, it is to be expected that sovereignty concerns that were asymmetrically distributed 
across member states led to particular strong efforts to limit regulation and to control decision-
making on it. In the last subsection, I developed observable implications for the case at hand. 
Before empirically assessing to what extent these theoretical expectations are confirmed, 
it is necessary to elaborate on the methodological tools I draw on for this purpose.  
 
5 Methodological Approach: Robust Congruence Case Study 
After having developed these diverse propositions about possible evidence, I elaborate on the 
methodological tool that I use in order to determine whether the accessible empirical evidence 
confirms or disconfirms the theoretical expectations. It is to be drawn on ontological and epis-
temological assumptions from congruence methods as understood by Beach and Pedersen (2016: 
269-301), which allows me to assess mechanistic evidence for the theorised causal relationship 
without making the study of the underlying causal mechanism explicit. Even though they can be 
described as the most commonly used within-case approach, congruence methods have almost 
disappeared from current methodological debates and are often conflated with process tracing 
(Beach/Pedersen 2016: 269). After describing why the latter are not the most suitable approach 
and why congruence methods are better suited for the purpose of this study, I clarify what type 
and variant of congruence method is to be chosen. 
 Even though the most recent change of Frontex’s institutional design undoubtedly is a 
case of further European integration, for which process tracing has been identified as a suitable 
methodological approach (Schimmelfennig 2014), it is not the most appropriate choice in this 
case. First, tracing every single causal mechanism at hand would go far beyond the scope of this 
paper. Second, neither the functional nor the political approach offer theoretical expectations 
that are specific enough to genuinely unpack a certain causal mechanism; in other words: “the 
causal mechanisms linking causes and outcomes are not explicitly theorised” (Beach/Pedersen 
2016: 272). Since it is only possible to trace a mechanism empirically if one is “told about what 
the process actually is” (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 270), another method has to be applied. 
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An approach that is better suited for the purpose of this study are congruence methods,
38
 which 
have initially been introduced by George and Bennett (2005: 181-204). The authors’ understan-
ding of congruence however shows certain weaknesses, as they in fact only assess “correlations 
across values of causes and outcomes” (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 270, italics in original). Beach 
and Pedersen go beyond this approach and provide a methodological tool that enables the  
researcher to assess mechanistic evidence for the theorised causal relationship without making 
the study of the underlying causal mechanism explicit. 
 Even though congruence and process tracing methods have to be distinguished, they 
show important similarities. Like process tracing, congruence studies are within-case analyses. 
Moreover, neither of them counterfactually compares existing with hypothetical cases in which 
the cause is absent; instead they allow the researcher to investigate the complexity of actual  
cases and push her “toward thinking more in terms of observable implications of hypothesised 
causal relationships” instead of cross-case patterns (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 272). Both methods 
make asymmetric and deterministic causal claims and draw on Bayesian probability in order to 
make inferences (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 272). Bayesian inference “emphasises the theoretical 
impact and likelihood of collecting individual observations” (Rohlfing 2012: 180). Since this 
analysis only collects mechanistic evidence and does not explicitly unpack a causal mechanism, 
it will neither be necessary to assess each piece’s of evidence uniqueness (i.e. to ask whether it 
is considered to be sufficient for inferring causation) nor to ask if it shows a high certainty (i.e. 
to test if it is necessary for inferring causation) (Rohlfing 2012: 182f.). While not going into 
depth concerning the probative value of causal process observations, it will, however, be  
focused on collecting pieces of evidence of high quality – this understanding of causal inference 
is opposed to frequentism, which is “based on the number of observations and the premise that 
the more supportive or disconfirming observations one collects, the stronger causal inferences 
are.” (Rohlfing 2012: 180) 
 If the hypothesised causal link exists, I expect to find different types of evidence 
(Beach/Pedersen 2013: 99f.), namely pattern evidence (e.g. information on the increasing  
number of irregular border crossings), sequence evidence (e.g. a certain chronology of events 
such as  actors’ statements, the publication of evaluation reports, etc.), trace evidence (e.g. 
Council conclusions as evidence that meetings took place), and account evidence (e.g. negotiat-
ing mandates revealing different actors’ positions). It is crucial to assess the accuracy of the 
pieces of evidence one collects, meaning their validity and their reliability. Reliability can be 
increased by asking critical question in relation to one’s sources, which is to be done exemplari-
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  From a more general point of view, congruence methods also offer other advantages such as the fact that they 
require less analytical resources than process tracing. Therefore, a commonly used approach is to combine both 
methods: for instance, one can first carry out a plausibility probe and subsequently trace the most promising 
causal conjectures (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 273f.). 
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ly, and by corroborating, i.e. by using new and different evidence, which is to be done whenever 
possible (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 191-226). 
 Similar to their classification of different variants of process tracing, Beach and Pedersen 
distinguish between explaining-outcome, theory-building, theory-testing, and refining-theory 
congruence case studies. Since the literature on EU regulation offers well-developed theoretical 
conjectures, it is possible to evaluate their prior probability of being present in the case at hand  
and apply a theory-testing congruence case study. In order to carry out this variant of congru-
ence study, it is necessary to select a typical case, in other words: a case where both condition 
and outcome are present. This requirement is fulfilled by choosing a case where the conditions 
of a functional gap and political power struggles are given, as well as the outcome of an institu-
tional change of a regulatory body. Moreover, Beach and Pedersen advise to only select cases 
where one can find a rich empirical record (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 284). As there was an exten-
sive public debate on EBM in the context of the migration crisis and one can not only access 
official documents such as communications from the Commission, but also a number of leaked 
documents, this requirement is met as well. 
 Not being a comparative, but a within-case method, congruence studies can only make 
claims about causal relationships within the studied case. Since the actual causal mechanism 
producing the evidence is not explicitly theorised and unpacked, the type of causal inferences 
that can be made in congruence studies is much weaker than that made in process tracing: 
“The inference we make using congruence are either disconfirming or confirming claims about the 
existence or nonexistence of a plausible causal relationship. Congruence methods produce weaker 
mechanistic evidence than process-tracing, enabling us to make only tentative conclusions about a 
causal process that potentially links a given cause and outcome.” (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 272f.) 
 
Hence, even if one finds the predicted evidence, it is only possible to make a relatively weak 
inference about a causal relationship, because the mechanism has not been traced explicitly 
(Beach/Pedersen 2016: 273). 
 In order to meet these limitations,
39
 this study will make use of a cluster of tests, which is 
one of two types of congruence studies between which Beach and Pedersen distinguish.  
Whereas in “a singular test, a single proposition about potential evidence is assessed multiple 
times during a temporal process or across space”, cluster tests empirically assess “multiple non-
overlapping propositions about evidence” (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 273). The latter allows the 
researcher to get closer to actually apprehending what could be parts of a causal mechanism (i.e. 
to “grey-box” the mechanism, see figure 1), which should produce slightly stronger mechanistic 
evidence (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 273). Nevertheless, it has to be noted that one stills deals with 
indirect evidence, since the causal mechanism is not explicitly theorised. 
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  Typically, this weakness of congruence studies is met by supplementing the first case study with analyses of 
further typical cases and/or process tracing studies. It will however not be possible to strengthen cross-case in-
ferences within the scope of this paper. 
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Figure 1: Mechanisms in congruence and process tracing case studies (derived from Beach and Pedersen 2016: 
274) 
 
To conclude, I consider congruence methods to be more suitable than process tracing to empiri-
cally assess whether the accessible empirical evidence confirms or disconfirms the theoretical 
expectations developed above (4.5). However, it is crucial to recognise that in contrast to  
process tracing, congruence studies do not explicitly disaggregate or “unpack” causal mecha-
nisms and instead draw on a “minimalist understanding of mechanisms […], where they are 
viewed as merely causal arrows in between causes and outcomes.” (Beach/Pedersen 2016: 272) 
Since the functional-political approach’s well-developed theoretical arguments can be deduced 
from the existing literature, it is appropriate to carry out a theory-testing congruence study. The 
limitations of congruence methods are partly met by using a cluster of tests.  
Having clarified the methodological proceeding, I carry out the empirical analysis in the 
following chapter. 
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6 From Management of Operational Cooperation to European Border 
and Coast Guards 
In the following empirical analysis, I show that the combined functional-political approach can 
account for the delegation of new regulatory tasks to Frontex, their design, and the continuity of 
the agency’s governance structure. 
 In the introductory section, I draw on functional arguments and demonstrate that existing 
institutional capacities were not sufficient to meet the challenge of increasingly complex policy 
problems in the context of the migration crisis. Moreover, I show that this widening of a  
functional gap in the EU’s EBM was recognised by decision-makers. I subsequently reveal the 
negative externalities this functional gap implied for other policy areas, namely asylum policy, 
internal security, and the single market, which further triggered the functional pressure to  
expand Frontex’s mandate. I conclude the section by showing how decision-makers tried to 
tackle the problem by operational means at first, but finally recognised that regulatory deficits 
had also been a cause of the emergence of a functional gap in EBM and consequently had to be 
limited as well. 
 In each of the following three subsections, I first examine these regulatory deficits in rule 
setting, monitoring, and enforcement and provide evidence for their recognition by decision-
makers. These pieces of evidence include statements made before the Commission’s proposal 
was presented as well as justifications that were used to explain the delegation of regulatory 
tasks during the legislative procedure. Secondly, I investigate in each case how inter-
institutional and inter-state bargaining shaped the design of the regulatory tasks. Eventually, I 
explain how these power struggles prevented a supranationalisation of Frontex’s governance 
structure. I assess the Commission’s, the Council’s,40 and the EP’s (respectively the responsible 
Committee’s on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs)41 preferences regarding the design of 
the regulatory tasks and the governance structure by examining the institutions’ initial  
proposal/negotiating mandates.
42
 Comparing these positions with the final regulation allows me 
to reveal which institution could prevail in which respects. The only aspect causing public inter-
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  For details on the Dutch Council Presidency’s “thematic approach in the handling of this file” see Council of the 
European Union 2016b: 2. 
41
  Within the scope of this paper, it will not be possible to take into consideration the opinions of the advisory 
Committees (Foreign Affairs, Budgets and Fisheries). In the final vote on 30 May 2016, 40 members of the re-
sponsible Committee were in favour of the proposal (members of ALDE, ECR, PPE, S&D), ten voted against it 
(EFDD, ENF, GUE/NGL) and five decided to abstain (S&D, Verts/ALE) (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs 2016: 193). 
42
  As usual, after the vote on the negotiating mandates by the Council and the EP, the further bargaining process 
became blurred. However, it will be possible to analyse some documents on the Trilogue that have been leaked 
by Statewatch. An overview of basically all relevant documents related to the legislative process can be found on 
the FREE Group website (a “wiki-lex” exercise launched in cooperation with Statewatch). Besides, as also 
pointed out by Ferraro and Capitani, it is indeed “interesting to compare the negotiating position of the European 
Parliament, the Council and the Commission” (Ferraro/Capitani 2016: 3). 
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state disagreement – namely Frontex’s possible enforcement powers – is also to be investigated 
by having a closer look at media sources. 
 In the last subsection of this chapter, I discuss possible alternative explanations, namely 
Historical and Sociological Institutionalism. 
 
6.1 A Widening Functional Gap in External Border Management 
In the present case, the growing complexity of policy “problems” mentioned by the functional 
approach occurred in the form of a sharp increase in the number of refugees and migrants cross-
ing the external borders of the EU. This was caused by various developments in the MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa) region, in particular by the Syrian civil war. However, politi-
cians like German Interior Minister de Maizière argued that Greece’s “behaviour” (see below) 
also caused a certain pull-effect (Die Welt 2015). 
 Even though a functional gap between national as well as EU border management capa-
cities and the actual challenges had been present before,
43
 a number of figures indicate that its 
extent has reached new levels. In 2015, 1.82 million “irregular" border crossings were counted 
(European Parliamentary Research Service 2016: 2). This was not only six times the number of 
detections reported the year before (European Parliamentary Research Service 2016: 2) – which 
itself was an unprecedented year with record monthly averages since April 2014 – but even a 
“never-before-seen figure” (Frontex 2015: 10). Finally, July 2015 can be described as a “turning 
point” with more than 100 000 detections (Frontex 2015: 10). The number of irregular border 
crossings counted in 2015 even exceeded the total number of the period from 2009 to 2014, i.e. 
813 044 (COM (2015) 675 final: 2). According to the eighth biannual report on the functioning 
of the Schengen area, fingerprints were only taken in 23% of cases (COM(2015) 675 final: 4).
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In contrast, the forth report on the Schengen area’s functioning had still emphasised positive 
developments, for instance the progress made in the Greek EBM (COM(2013) 832 final: 5). 
That border guard authorities have been increasingly overburdened is also shown by the fact that 
in 2015, 470 dead bodies were counted in the Mediterranean. Compared to the previous year, 
this was an increase of 112% (Frontex 2016: 12).
45
 Growing difficulties in protecting human 
                                                 
43
 The most recent migration crisis was or is not the first of its kind. Besides ongoing deficiencies in the EU’s EBM, 
a major crisis situation could be for instance observed during the 2011 “Franco-Italian affair”, when the Italian 
authorities issued about 24 000 temporary-residence permits for North-African asylum seekers. As many Tunisi-
ans headed towards France, the country reintroduced border checks (according to art. 26, SBC) and even blocked 
a train carrying third-country nationals at its border (Heijer et al. 2016: 7f.; Carrera et al. 2017: 10f.). Further-
more, Greek border authorities had also been well-known for their capacity shortages and organisational prob-
lems before (Monar 2016: 142). 
44
  Period of investigation: 1 May 2015 – 10 December 2015. 
45
  The numbers on deadly incidents in the Mediterranean vary hugely across different sources. However, figures 
provided by other institutions such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) show an increase in 
recorded deaths as well (see for instance IOM numbers). 
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rights such as violations of the obligation of non-refoulement under Art. 3 ECHR (Carrera et al. 
2017: 12-17) indicate a functional gap in EBM as well. 
 Consequently, the Commission admitted that “[t]he crisis has exposed weaknesses and 
gaps in existing border management mechanisms, which have proved insufficient to guarantee 
effective and integrated border management” (COM(2015) 673 final: 2) and the Council recog-
nised that the growing number of border crossings led to “severe difficulties in several Member 
States in ensuring efficient external border controls in accordance with the Schengen acquis and 
in the reception and processing of migrants arriving.” (Council 2016: 2) According to EU ana-
lyses, national border guards were “unable or unwilling to ‘protect’ the Schengen area effective-
ly by stopping the influx of irregular migrants. Frontex, on the other hand, was held to have 
been too illequipped in terms of powers, personnel and equipment to render sufficient support or 
remedy the situation.” (Rosenfeldt 2015) 
 Because of varying standards in EBM, the functional gap was bigger in some member 
states than in others. That such varying standards existed is evidenced by diametrical develop-
ments at different parts of the EU’s external borders. As shown by the 2015 general report of 
Frontex, one could observe a “shift towards the Eastern Mediterranean route” (Frontex 2016: 
10): whereas the Central Mediterranean route experienced a slight decrease in the number of 
detections of irregular border-crossings – about 154 000 –, the largest number of detections was 
counted on Eastern Mediterranean route – 885 386 (Frontex 2016: 10).46 The fact “that the 
Schengen rules are enforced differently at national level” (Unisys 2014: 19) was already recog-
nised by EP representatives in 2014. 
 Hence, the vast majority of refugees and migrants entering the EU via the Eastern Medi-
terranean route arrived on several Greek islands, where the functional gap in EBM became most 
obvious:
47
 the “non-management” (Monar 2016: 142) of the Greek external border was the  
single biggest issue in regard to EBM in 2015. As pointed out by a Commission spokeswoman, 
only 121 000 out of 400 000 refugees and migrants crossing the Greek part of the external  
borders from July 20, 2015 to November 30, 2015 were registered appropriately (Deutschland-
funk 2015). That there were “serious deficiencies” (European Commission 2016) in Greek EBM 
was for instance recognised by Commission and member states experts during an unannounced 
evaluation visit
48
 to the Greek-Turkish land border as well as to Chios and Samos
49
 in Novem-
                                                 
46
  Due to comparably low numbers of detections of irregular border-crossings, the Western Mediterranean route, 
the Western African route, and the situation at the Eastern land border can be neglected for the purpose of this 
paper (Frontex 2016: 10f.). The Western Balkans route has to be seen mostly as a follow-on of the Eastern Medi-
terranean route (Monar 2016: 134). 
47
  The Greek struggles to ensure an effective EBM were aggravated by the impact of the economic and financial 
crises (EurAktiv 2015): while “shortages of capacity and organisational problems of the Greek border authorities” 
(Monar 2016: 142) had also been an issue before, the debt-crisis linked austerity measures have further exacer-
bated this problem. 
48
  As foreseen by the Schengen evaluation mechanism (Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013). 
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ber 2015, i.e. in the month before the Commission presented its EBCG proposal. The draft  
report concluded that “Greece is seriously neglecting its obligations and that there are serious 
deficiencies in the carrying out of external border controls that must be overcome and dealt with 
by the Greek authorities.” (European Commission 2016) In its recommendations, the Council 
particularly pointed to “the lack of appropriate identification and registration of irregular  
migrants at the islands, of sufficient staff, and of sufficient equipment for verifying identity  
documents. Under the current circumstances, situational awareness and reaction capability are 
not sufficient for efficient border surveillance.” (Council of the European Union 2016a: 4) 
 In order to remedy these deficiencies at all parts of the Greek external borders, the 
Council recommended a number of measures to be taken to ensure compliance with the 
Schengen acquis, namely in regard to the registration procedure, border surveillance, risk ana-
lyses, international cooperation (with Turkey), human resources and training, border checks 
procedures, infrastructure and equipment (Council 2016: 5-12).
50
 The Council also emphasised 
that the whole EU was affected by the functional gap in Greek EBM: “The overall functioning 
of the Schengen area is at serious risk […] The difficulties faced in the protection of the external 
borders by Greece is an issue relevant to the whole EU and must be solved in the interest of the 
whole EU.” (Council 2016: 3) 
 The functional gap in EBM also affected other policy areas, which further triggered the 
pressure to amend the Frontex regulation. These close links are reflected in a section of the 
Commission’s proposal explicitly dedicated to other EU policies that the new regulation should 
complement (COM(2015) 671 final: 91). First and foremost, the closely linked field of migra-
tion and asylum was concerned: the growing number of asylum-seekers crossing the EU’s  
external borders, in many cases without being registered appropriately, revealed the Dublin  
system’s dysfunctionality. In 2015, 1 255 600 asylum applications were received within the EU 
(thus almost twice the number reported the year before); their asymmetrical distribution among 
member states further complicated the situation (Monar 2016: 135). The debates on possible 
relocation mechanisms – including some member states’ complete refusal to cooperate – led to 
serious tensions. Even though some political leaders (especially those from Central/Eastern  
Europe) clearly tried to do so, the crisis could “in no way be reduced to border controls” (De 
Bruycker 2016: 560). While acknowledging that the new Frontex regulation was not the univer-
sal solution to the current problems, the responsible EP committee’s rapporteur Artis Pabriks 
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  In 2015, 868 000 “irregular migrants” arrived on these islands (Council 2016: 4). 
50
  It has to be noted that there are limitations in regard to what border controls can achieve in practical, economic, 
humanitarian and legal terms (Heijer et al. 2016: 8f.), to which Greece also pointed. For instance, Immigration 
Minister Mouzalas said he had taken EU ambassadors out to sea to show them situation and that pushing back a 
plastic boat with 50 or 70 refugees aboard in the middle of the sea means in fact letting drown them (EurAktiv 
2015a). In contrast, Austrian Interior Minister Mikl-Leitner stated that it was a myth that the Greek-Turkish bor-
der cannot be controlled, emphasising the strong naval fleets Greece possesses (Politico 2016). 
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(European People’s Party/EPP) from Latvia however stated that it “addresses the need to ensure 
the proper control of the Schengen external border as a precondition to manage migration  
effectively” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 127, italics added). 
 Moreover, he argued that the regulation addressed the need “to ensure high level of  
security within […] the Union.” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 
127). This reveals that another policy area being particularly affected was internal security: as 
pointed out by Neville, an EBM “system that cannot cope with the number of arrivals, cannot 
register them, cannot properly detect falsified documents and cannot properly check those arri-
ving against existing databases, like the Schengen Information System (SIS) database […] poses 
an inherent risk to an area without internal border controls.” (Neville 2016: 14). This became 
most apparent in the course of the November 2015 Paris attacks, committed by islamists who 
reentered the EU through Greece disguised as refugees and by using fraudulent documents. As a 
consequence, France reintroduced internal border controls because of a “persistent terrorist 
threat”51 and the Council also recognised that deficiencies in EBM “constitute a serious threat to 
[…] internal security” (Council 2016: 4). That the negative impact the functional gap in EBM 
had on internal security was a reason to strengthen Frontex as well is evidenced by a number of 
statements. For instance, Cazeneuve referred to “the security of the continent” when advocating 
the EBCG regulation (gouvernement.fr 2016). Growing security considerations also become 
visible when comparing the 2004 with the 2016 regulation: whereas the term “terrorism” was 
not mentioned in the old Frontex regulation, it was now included six times and thus reflects the 
enhanced contribution the agency shall make to the prevention of terrorism, inter alia through 
risk analyses and data sharing (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, recital 18 and art. 47(1)(a)).
52
 
 France was not the only country that reintroduced border controls. While a number of 
member states unilaterally decided on re-introducing internal border controls (in accordance 
with art. 23, 24, 25 SBC) – sometimes without sufficient prior consultation with neighbouring 
member states (Monar 2016: 141f.) – others followed a Council recommendation (in accordance 
with art. 29 SBC). The functional gap’s seriousness is evidenced by these tendencies of “disin-
tegration” one could – and still can – observe. Since the Schengen agreement is an “important 
complement to the Single Market, giving tangible reality to the four fundamental freedoms 
(goods, services, capital and persons)” (Neville 2016: 14), the reintroduction of internal border 
controls also affected the common European market. These significant social, political and eco-
nomic “costs of non-Schengen” were recognised by the Commission, estimating that the imme-
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  A regularly updated list of all temporary reintroductions of border controls can be found on the Commission’s 
Migration and Home Affairs website. 
52
  As stated in an informal SCIFA discussion paper, the Commission included an enhanced role of Frontex in the 
fight against terrorism upon a request of the Council (Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European 
Union 2016a: 2). 
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diate economic costs of a full reintroduction of internal border controls within the Schengen area 
for the EU economy would range between €5 and 18 billion annually. Therefore, the Commis-
sion suggested a “Back to Schengen Roadmap” (COM(2016) 120 final: 3). While some member 
states still consider internal border controls an appropriate measure, a number of decisions-
makers referred to the need for an abolishment of internal border controls when arguing in  
favour of the regulation. For instance, Pabriks emphasised that “adopting this Regulation is  
urgent in order to strengthen the control of the external border and thus return to a situation 
without border controls within the Schengen area.” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs 2016: 130) Similarly, the Commission stated in its EBCG proposal that “we can 
only have a Schengen area without internal borders if its external borders are effectively secured 
and protected.” (COM(2015) 673 final: 2) The Council emphasised “safeguarding EU-internal 
free movement” was one of the main objectives of the new regulation (Council of the European 
Union 2016e: 1). 
 In regard to the reactions to the widening functional gap in EBM, one can observe an 
interesting development. At first, there were attempts by policy-makers to meet the increasing 
challenges at the EUʼs external borders by operational means, i.e. by enhancing “the de facto 
Frontex role in border management” (European Public Affairs 2016, italics in original). Follow-
ing an extraordinary Council meeting on migration in April 2015, “Frontexʼs budget for  
maritime operations hosted by Italy and Greece was almost tripled, to EUR 70.4 million,  
resulting in a higher volume of operational activities.” (Frontex 2016: 17) Temporarily, up to 1 
000 officers from member states performed border control duties (Frontex 2016: 17); the in-
creased budget also made the provision of additional equipment possible (European Public  
Affairs 2016). Another example of these attempts to manage the migration crisis by operational 
means was the introduction of the so-called hotspot approach: together with other agencies such 
as the European Asylum Support Office, Frontex and “frontline” member statesʼ authorities  
collaborate on the ground in order to ensure compliance with EU law (COM(2015) 240 final). 
The establishment of EUNAVFOR Med Operation Sophia represents another component of this 
“short-term response to the refugee crisis” (Heijer et al. 2016: 19; European Council 2015: 1).53 
In his speech on the conclusions of the above-mentioned special European Council, Commis-
sion President Jean-Claude Juncker underlined that there was no need to amend Frontex’s  
regulation: “We do not need to expand the mandate, but we must ensure that the operation has 
the resources it needs to be able to operate at the high seas.” (European Commission 2015) 
 On the one hand, this demonstrates the sense of urgency that was present – increasing the 
agencyʼs budget was a measure that could be taken much faster than an amendment of the Fron-
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  As noted by Heijer et al., the fact that such a “police mission with military means” has been established instead 
of a border management operation reveals “the security dimension that this crisis has taken in the eyes of Euro-
pean policy makers.” (Heijer et al. 2016: 19) 
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tex regulation. On the other hand, it also reveals decision-makersʼ reluctance to delegate regula-
tory power to Frontex. However, the further deepening of the crisis after these measures had 
been taken – as already mentioned, July 2015 can be seen as a “turning point” – indicates that 
there was a regulatory deficit that could not be compensated by merely strengthening Frontexʼs 
operational role. Moreover, the implementation of operational measures was difficult: for  
instance, there was a long delay in the establishment of hotspots in Greece (Tagesspiegel 2015). 
 Only two weeks after Juncker neglected a need to amend the Frontex regulation, a 
Commissionʼs communication labelled “A European Agenda on Migration” revealed a change 
of mind that had been taken place in the meantime. Despite of still being focused on strengthen-
ing the agencyʼs operational role, in particular in regard to return missions (COM(2015) 240 
final: 10), this publication demonstrated that the Commission perceived a need to make use of 
its right of initiative and intended to launch further reflections on EBM. The Council approved 
this step at its meeting on 25 and 26 June 2015 (European Council 2015). 
 Eventually, the Commission presented its EBCG proposal on 15 December 2015 
(COM(2015) 671 final). Two days later, the European Council invited the Council “to reach a 
position on the border guards proposal by June 2015, and the Presidency decided to pursue work 
[…] as a matter of absolute priority.” (Council of the European Union 2016b: 1) In February, 
the European Council even announced that work should be accelerated in order to reach an 
agreement under the Netherlands Presidency “and to make the new system operational as soon 
as possible (Council of the European Union 2016b: 1). 
 
In this introductory part of the empirical chapter, I demonstrated that the functional gap in the 
EU’s EBM widened in the context of the migration crisis and showed how this affected other 
policy areas as well. I revealed that decision-makers tried to tackle the problem by operational 
means at first, which did not bring the expected success. Therefore, the Commission decided to 
make use of its right of initiative and national decision-makers subsequently recognised as well 
that “existing mechanisms at the EU level are no longer sufficient to guarantee efficient  
integrated border management at the EU’s external borders.” (Netherlands Presidency of the 
Council of the European Union 2016a: 2) 
 Even though the Commission’s initial announcement had focused on strengthening  
Frontex’s operational capacities, the agency’s regulatory mandate was eventually reinforced as 
well. In the following three subsections, I first investigate what kind of regulatory deficits led to 
this measure and present evidence that indicates that decision-makers were aware of them.  
Secondly, I analyse how political considerations and strategic interactions among Frontex’s 
principals shaped the design of the regulatory tasks, being established as a response to these 
regulatory deficits, as well as how they affected the agency’s governance structure. 
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6.2 Rule Setting 
6.2.1 Functional Reasons for the Creation of the Rule Setting Task: Lack of a Sound Legisla-
tive Framework for the EU’s Integrated Border Management 
In order to better capture the regulatory deficit in rule setting being present before the adoption 
of the EBCG regulation, it is crucial to have a closer look at the notion of IBM. Even though an 
IBM concept had already been introduced in the early 2000s, it had not been outlined at legisla-
tive level before the EBCG regulation was adopted. 
 After the Treaty of Amsterdam had shifted the “power to adopt rules for the regulation 
and management of the external borders” to the European level (Rijpma 2012: 87), the 2001 
Laeken Declaration introduced IBM as political – i.e. not legally binding – objective and asked 
“the Council and the Commission to work out arrangements for cooperation between services 
responsible for external border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or 
common services to control external borders could be created.” (European Council 2001: 12) In 
the following year, a Commission communication entitled “Towards Integrated Management for 
the External Borders” listed five components that should be included: a common corpus of  
legislation, a common coordination and operational cooperation mechanism, common integrated 
risk analysis, staff trained in a European dimension, as well as interoperational equipment and 
burden-sharing between the member states in the run up to the establishment of a European 
Corps of Border Guards (COM(2002) 233 final: 12). The idea of an IBM was also debated  
during the negotiations on Constitutional Treaty (Ferraro/De Capitani 2016: 4). 
 According to Carrera (2007: 4) the “first generation of the EU IBM” was created by the 
adoption of the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and the establishment of Frontex. However,  
neither the 2004 Frontex regulation nor the 2006 SBC comprise a definition of IBM or elaborate 
on how they exactly contribute to achieving the integration of border management. In 2006, the 
Council adopted an IBM strategy, which stated that the following dimensions should be inclu-
ded: border control as defined in the SBC, investigation and detection of cross border crime, the 
so-called four-tier access control model,
54
 inter-agency and international cooperation, as well as 
coordination and coherence of member states’, institutions’ and other bodies’ activities (Council 
of the European Union 2006). A 2008 Commission communication elaborated on the next steps 
in border management (COM(2008) 69 final). 
 Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the gradual introduction of an integrated management system 
for external borders is a treaty objective (art. 77(2)(d) TFEU). Whereas being set as an objective 
in primary law, IBM had not yet been introduced in “hard” law (De Bruycker 2016: 563; Ferra-
ro/Capitani 2016: 2). Hence, there were commonly formulated goals, but their implementation 
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  This model includes “measures in third countries of origin or transit, cooperation with neighbouring countries, 
measures on border control at the external border and control measures within the common area of free move-
ment” (Carrera 2007: 3). 
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was left to member states, on whose willingness to cooperate their achievement fully depended 
(Heijer et al. 2016: 14). 
 This legal situation did not correspond with the policy area’s high level of interdepen-
dence: as pointed out by many observers, “the external border is as strong as its weakest link” 
(Heijer et al. 2016: 7). Nevertheless, member states remained individually responsible for guard-
ing their part of the external borders (art. 4(2) TEU; art. 72 TFEU; Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004, recital 4). Since the length and “vulnerability” of external borders varies significant-
ly across member states, this implies an asymmetric distribution of responsibility, which was – 
and in fact still is – not compensated by an adequate solidarity mechanism (De Bruycker 2016: 
565-567).
55
 Instead, the EU’s common border policy suffers from a free-rider behaviour (Heijer 
et al. 2016: 7). 
 There is not only a lack of incentives for member states with external borders to manage 
these effectively because of this lack of solidarity, the common European asylum system – to 
which border management is “intimately linked” (Heijer et al. 2016: 7) – even shows distinct 
disincentives for member states to implement existing legislation: a reinforcement of controls of 
member states’ parts of the external borders “will not only trigger their responsibility for  
asylum-seekers under the Dublin-system, but also for the return of irregular migrants under the 
Return Directive [Directive 2008/115/EC].” (Heijer et al. 2016: 7) Hence, member states with 
external borders are rather incentivised to “disregard their obligations to comply with European 
and international standards and fundamental rights protections” (Carrera et al. 2017: 1). If they 
do not register and process asylum seekers as they are obliged to, member states of first entry 
can avoid responsibility for these migrants and refugees. They may also engage in other  
“practices whose compatibility with Schengen rules, the Treaties and the EU Charter of Funda-
mental Rights is questionable.” (Carrera et al. 2017: 10) 
 While the notion of IBM was missing at the legislative level, “a common culture of  
border management” (Rijpma 2017: 227) should be achieved through developing a common 
core curriculum, joint operational activities and trainings. However, the reinforced Schengen 
evaluation mechanism (SEM; Council Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013; including the possibility 
to reintroduce internal border checks) reveals that these rather “soft” instruments could not fos-
ter trust between member states (Rijpma 2017: 227). Furthermore, the above-mentioned diverg-
ing standards in border controls show that this approach did not result in a genuinely integrated 
EBM. 
 Even though the above-mentioned Agenda on Migration still focused on the amendment 
of Frontex’s operational role, the Commission already recognised the regulatory deficit in rule 
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  It is noteworthy that art. 67(2) TFEU explicitly mentions solidarity as a principle on which the common policy 
on external border control should be based. 
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setting: “while rules on border control are in place, border management today varies, based on a 
patchwork of sectorial documents and instruments. In 2016, the Commission will consolidate 
this into a Union standard for border management to cover all aspects of the Union’s external 
border management.” (COM(2015) 240 final: 11). 
 This necessity was further emphasised by the publication of an external evaluation of 
Frontex in July of the same year. Its final report’s recommendations, being addressed to Frontex, 
the Commission, and the Council, highlighted the “need to establish a common and perhaps 
updated understanding of the concept of Integrated Border Management and clarify Frontex’s 
role in implementing this concept” (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 102).56 
According to the Commission, this feasibility study on the creation of a European System of 
Border Guards was taken into account in the preparation of the proposal (COM(2015) 671 final: 
6). Hence, it constitutes an important piece of evidence to which I refer on several occasions. 
 That this recommendation had an impact on national decision-makers and made them 
recognise the need to reduce the existing regulatory deficit in rule setting becomes apparent 
when having a look at the MB’s recommendation, which has been published in the course of the 
external evaluation. The MB endorsed that the EU’s IBM concept should be updated – based on 
the 2006 Council Conclusions and the catalogues on external borders (Management Board Deci-
sion No 40/2015: 5). Out of the six components such an update should include according to the 
MB, four were included in the new Frontex regulation: inter-agency cooperation, cooperation 
between member states coordinated by Frontex/solidarity mechanisms, enhanced cooperation 
with third countries and the use of new technologies (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 4). 
 Moreover, references to the need of eliminating a regulatory deficit in rule setting can 
also be found in documents such as the Commission’s explanatory memorandum on its EBCG 
proposal: “in the absence of strategic implementation of integrated border management at Union 
level, there are discrepancies in implementation that still remain at national level among  
Member States. Hence, there is a need, as identified by the Commission in the European Agenda 
on Migration, to have Union standards for border management to cover all aspects of the  
Union’s external border management.” (COM(2015) 671 final: 3) 
 
To conclude, a sound legislative framework for IBM had clearly been lacking before the adop-
tion of the EBCG regulation: whereas being set as an objective in primary law, IBM had not yet 
been introduced in “hard”, secondary law. This regulatory deficit was recognised by decision-
makers, whose bargaining on the concrete design of rule setting is to be investigated in the  
following section. 
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  Before, a 2009 evaluation report had already recommended a Frontex Communication Strategy, which “should 
be devised to enable Frontex to establish an overview of and contribute to the international debate on IBM.” 
(COWI 2009: 78). 
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6.2.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Rule Setting: Exclusion of the European Parliament 
from Decision-Making Despite of Possible Violation of the Meroni Doctrine 
First of all, it is noteworthy that most EU agencies do not have rule-making responsibilities  
because the Commission still guards this prerogative (Levi-Faur 2011: 813). This division of 
regulatory tasks was confirmed by the so-called “Meroni doctrine” (Meroni vs High Authority 
[1957/1958] ECR 133), strictly limiting the degree to which the EU institutions can delegate 
tasks to regulatory agencies: the latter are only allowed to execute legislation and policies made 
by the European institutions, not having any discretionary powers themselves (Groenleer 2009: 
97f.). 
 Nevertheless, according to the final regulation, the ED proposes a technical and opera-
tional strategy for IBM, which is then decided on by the MB. Only stating that it should be  
established by the agency, the Commission’s initial proposal entailed no details on decision-
making on the strategy. However, the Commission wanted the strategy to ensure (instead of 
support) the implementation of European IBM. Also by stating that national strategies shall be 
coherent (instead of being in line), the Commission chose a language that emphasised the  
supremacy of the agency’s strategy over national ones even more (COM(2015) 671 final, art. 
3(2) and 3(3)). This confirms that the Commission strove for an expansion of supranational  
regulatory authority, which is in line with assumptions derived from the political approach. 
 Even though there was no public inter-institutional/-state debate on Frontex’s new  
technical and operational strategy, a Council Presidency document leaked by Statewatch reveals 
that the issue was discussed during the Trilogue (Council of the European Union 2016d). Such 
documents that were not intended to be published usually are particularly reliable. The EPʼs and 
the Councilʼs preferences can be assessed by having a closer look at their negotiating mandates. 
According to its amendments, the EP wanted the Commission – if appropriate and after consult-
ing the Agency – to present a legislative proposal for an European IBM strategy, including  
general guidelines, objectives, and key actions to be taken to establish an IBM system. Further-
more, the Parliament wanted the strategy to be revised whenever necessary and to ensure the 
continuous and uniform application of Union law, including the Union acquis on fundamental 
rights, at all external borders (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 35, 
amendment 55). A 2014 survey among EP representatives had already shown that they are large-
ly supportive of a more integrated border management approach: “A fully fledged EU system 
with both decision making and executive powers was strongly supported under the assumption 
that adequate legal framework is put in place.” (Unisys 2014: 19) Since the EP tried to expand 
its own powers by proposing its involvement in the decision-making on the strategy and aimed 
at appealing to civil society groups being concerned with the protection of refugees’ fundamen-
tal rights, the political approach is suitable to explain its negotiating mandate. 
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Even though the rejection of the EP’s attempt to gain control over rule setting by the Council 
confirms the political approach, the finally established decision-making procedure is remarkable. 
As pointed out by Ferraro and De Capitani (2016), the fact that the ED and the MB develop the 
strategy and vote on it (without any clarification as what kind of legal document the strategy 
will finally be adopted to become binding) contradicts the regulationʼs eighth recital, which 
states that the EU institutions are responsible for the development of an IBM strategy. Actually, 
the agency defines and at the same time implements “an overarching political objective of the 
Treaty” (Ferraro/De Capitani 2016: 6), which questions the third articleʼs accordance with the 
above-mentioned Meroni doctrine. It is telling that the member states prioritised control over the 
IBM strategy’s content through the MB over such obvious concerns. While member states have 
recognised “[t]he need for continuous harmonisation of the code of conduct (e.g. defining  
common tactics and procedures) and common standards when performing different activities 
(liability rules on joint return operations)” (Unisys 2014: 17), they have always preferred render-
ing EBM more homogeneous through operational and rather soft means (e.g. exchange of best 
practice between seconded guest officers) (Unisys 2014: 17). Hence, when member states  
finally agreed to establish regulatory instruments in order to harmonise EBM standards, they 
were determined to control decision-making on it through their representatives in the MB.   
 While the Parliament had no success in its attempt to be involved in the strategy’s adop-
tion by co-decision, its suggestion that the strategy shall take into account specific situations of 
the member states was included in the regulation’s final version (Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 35, amendment 55; EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 3(2)). 
 
In summary, it has to be noted that the Council could prevail in regard to rule setting and only 
accepted those EP amendments that further strengthened the position of national border guard 
authorities. Moreover, the final design of rule setting possibly constitutes a violation of the  
Meroni doctrine.  
 
6.3 Monitoring 
6.3.1 Functional Reasons for the Enhancement of Monitoring: Deficiencies in the Supervision 
of Member States’ External Border Management 
Besides the lack of a sound legislative framework, deficiencies in member states’ EBM were not 
detected early enough because of a regulatory deficit in supervision. That this deficit has not 
only emerged during the most recent crisis but had already been present before is confirmed by 
a closer examination of the gradual enhancement of Frontex’s monitoring role. When Frontex 
was created in 2004, it had no supervisory powers over member states and only conducted risk 
analyses of the situation at the EU’s external borders (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 4). 
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The possibility to assess member states’ capacities “to face upcoming challenges” (i.e. equip-
ment, resources) was added in 2011, when the Frontex regulation was amended (Regulation (EU) 
No 1168/2011, art. 4). However, this should only be possible “after prior consultation” with the 
member state concerned and still formed part of the agency’s risk analyses. The results should 
be presented to the MB and, as part of the risk analyses, incorporated in the development of a 
common core curriculum for border guards’ training. Member states should not face any imme-
diate consequences in the case of deficiencies being detected. 
 However, according to the 2015 external evaluation of Frontex, this competence had not 
been implemented: “Although in 2014-2015 the Agency has taken steps towards the implemen-
tation of this provision by developing a methodology for the assessment, the framework for data 
collection and analysis is not functional yet.” (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 
2015: 105) As stated in the report, the reasons for the delay had been both internal and external: 
“On the one hand, the RAU [Frontex’s Risk Analysis Unit] reported that the introduction of this 
task in the Regulation did not result in the allocation of human resources for its performance. 
Given the rest of the on-going activities, new tasks set (such as the use of risk analysis in 
Schengen evaluations) and ad-hoc requests for risk analysis by the European Commission, the  
development of vulnerability assessment capacities were not prioritised. On the other hand, the 
assessment of vulnerabilities can also be a politically sensitive subject and there is a perceived  
reluctance from some Member States to engage in the process.” (Ramboll Management Consult-
ing/Eurasylum 2015: 35) 
 
No statement indicating that it was simply not necessary to conduct the tests (i.e. that there was 
no functional need for supervision) can be found – instead, the assessments’ implementation has 
been delayed because of a lack of resources and their politically sensitive nature. Since the key 
stakeholder groups being interviewed for the evaluation of Frontex states (representatives from 
the EU institutions, the member states, the MB, the research community, international organisa-
tions, NGOs and Frontex staff) considered the agency’s risk analysis to be helpful for improving 
EBM (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 141), a lack of trust in the assess-
ments’ effectiveness can also be excluded as a reason for the delay. Consequently, the report 
emphasised that assessments would improve the risk analyses, underlined the benefits they 
could bring for the agency’s, member states’ as well as other stakeholders’ activities, and  
recommended that the “Agency should enforce this provision of the Regulation and prioritise 
the development of its capacities in the area of vulnerability assessment for the purpose of risk 
analysis.” (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 105) 
 As briefly mentioned in the above-cited quotation, there are other supervisory mecha-
nisms that show certain links to EBM. For instance, Frontex had already been involved in the 
SEM before its regulation was amended in 2016. The agency submits annual risk analyses to the 
Commission and the member states, taking into account “illegal immigration and significant 
changes in the operational environment at the external borders” (Council Regulation (EU) No 
1053/2013, art. 7 (1)) and including recommendations referring to specific parts of the external 
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borders and border crossing-points. Besides, Frontex prepares recommendations on possible 
priorities for the unannounced on-site visits taking place in the SEM’s framework (Council 
Regulation (EU) No 1053/2013, art. 7 (2)). However, on average, only 5-7 member states are 
evaluated each year (European Commission 2016a), which does not ensure a continuous moni-
toring of member states’ EBM. Furthermore, the SEM only verifies the application of the 
Schengen aquis and does not assess the material dimension of EBM, i.e. member states’ capaci-
ties in terms of equipment, staff, etc. That member states did not sufficiently ensure the “availa-
bility of relevant technical equipment for joint operations” had already been mentioned in an 
2009 evaluation (COWI 2009) and was still considered a problem in 2015 (Ramboll Manage-
ment Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 176). The lack of sufficient equipment and staff ensuring the 
appropriate identification and registration of refugees and migrants was also one of the main 
problems of Greek EBM during the migration crisis (Council of the European Union 2016a: 4). 
 The Eurosur
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 Communication Network (ECN; Regulation (EU) No 1052/ 2013, art. 7) 
is supposed to fulfil the function of collecting data on member states’ capacities in separate  
external border sections (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 35). However, 
according to Frontex, this function of ECN is not used sufficiently by national authorities – in 
contrast, Frontex officials and national officials deployed in Frontex-led operations are much 
more willing to share information such as analytical reports (Frontex 2015: 13). The quality and 
timeliness of information from member states had already strongly varied in 2009, which affect-
ed the quality of Frontex’s risk analyses negatively – even though national representatives  
considered the latter to be very important (COWI 2009: 47). 
 This reveals that there was indeed a regulatory deficit in the supervision of member 
states’ EBM. Several pieces of evidence confirm that this was also recognised by decision-
makers, which finally explains the vulnerability assessments’ introduction in the new regulation. 
For instance, the Presidency of the Council sent a note to the delegation in early October, stating 
that the above-mentioned external evaluation of Frontex should be taken into account when 
amending its mandate and asking them how existing evaluation and monitoring mechanisms 
could be improved and if more frequent visits to ensure the Schengen aquis’s well-functioning 
could be helpful (Council of the European Union 2015: 3f.). The EP’s rapporteur described the 
EBCG proposal as “a response to [...] the lack of an effective monitoring and preventive 
measures” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 129). Similarly, the 
Commission stated that for Frontex to effectively work in all phases of border management, it 
needed “a system where deficiencies are identified well in advance” in its communication on the 
new regulation (COM (2015) 673: 3). Moreover, that the existing supervision was not sufficient 
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  The European Border Surveillance System (Eurosur) is “managed by Frontex and can be described as a map of 
the situational picture at the border which serves to exchange information.” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Jus-
tice and Home Affairs 2016: 127) 
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was emphasised by a Commission official, who stated that compared to Frontex’s newly added 
vulnerability assessments, “Schengen evaluation is different because it is designed to see if 
member states comply with the zone’s border-free rules.” (EUobserver 2016) 
 Whereas the assessments added to the Frontex regulation in 2011 have never become 
functional, one can already observe progress in regard to the more recently delegated monitoring 
tasks. At the JHA Council in April 2016 – thus even before Frontex’s new regulation was 
adopted – the member states asked the Commission to start preparations to implement five  
“priority elements”, inter alia the conduction of vulnerability assessments (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2016: 6). This demonstrates that the importance of this regulatory deficit and the 
need for action was recognised by the national ministers. As Frontex ED Fabrice Leggeri told 
Members of the European Parliaments (MEPs) in the civil liberties committee on 12 October 
2016, six member states had volunteered to “undergo border checks before similar stress tests 
are carried out for all EU states” (EUobserver 2016). Three of those – Finland, Germany and 
Slovenia – were selected by the agency, being “used to set up a baseline in order to create a 
benchmark for the upcoming controls.” (EUobserver 2016) Moreover, a vulnerability assess-
ment network, being composed of experts from member states, the EBCG Agency and the 
Commission, was established in order to support the implementation of monitoring and has  
already had its first meeting on 12-13 December 2016 (COM(2017) 42 final: 5f.). At the end of 
2016, a common vulnerability assessment methodology (including baseline assessments,  
simulation exercises and emerging threats mechanism) has already been adopted (COM(2017) 
42 final: 5) and Frontex started to collect data on member states’ capacities in January 2017, 
which will “serve as a basis and key reference for performing vulnerability assessments in 2017.” 
(European Commission 2017) This swift action indicates that the 2016 delegation of further 
monitoring tasks was not symbolic but that there actually was a regulatory deficit that was rec-
ognised by decision-makers and should be eliminated as soon as possible by carrying out  
vulnerability assessments. 
 
Summarising the above, it can be stated that even though a number of monitoring mechanisms 
have already existed prior to the adoption of the EBCG regulation, they did not assess all com-
ponents being essential for an effective EBM (SEM), were not connected to any corrective 
measures (Frontex assessments), suffered from member states’ lack of willingness to provide the 
necessary information (ECN), were not frequent enough (SEM), or were only introduced de jure, 
but not carried out de facto (Frontex assessments). As demonstrated, this regulatory deficit in 
supervision was recognised by decision-makers. In section 6.3.2, I investigate to what degree the 
design of the newly introduced vulnerability assessments changed during the legislative process. 
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6.3.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Monitoring: Consensus on Decision-Making Proce-
dures and Partial Success of the Council’s Attempts to Indirectly Control Supervision 
Like in the case of rule setting, the Commission’s proposal on monitoring (i.e. the establishment 
of vulnerability assessments, the deployment of liaison officers, and the closely linked provi-
sions on information exchange) was still vague in some respects. For instance, it did not specify 
who would decide on criteria for the vulnerability assessments (COM (2015) 671 final, art. 12). 
One could assume that this reluctance was due to the fact that the Commission has already 
gained supervisory power with the SEM’s introduction. 
Taking various sources provided by Statewatch into account, it has to be considered that 
the design of monitoring was one of the most debated issues between member states. For  
instance, the assessments’ exact form was discussed during a JHA ministers meeting, where 
details such as the involvement of member states in the tests and the bindings decisions of the 
ED were debated (Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2016: 2). 
Member states representatives had already voiced their concerns regarding assessments of their 
resources in 2014 (Unisys 2014: 18). However, a public debate could not be observed. 
As revealed by a Council Presidency document leaked by Statewatch, the design of  
monitoring was also one of the most contested issues during the Trilogues, even being debated 
at several meetings (Council of the European Union 2016d). In its amendments, the EP suggest-
ed that the ED should present to the MB a proposal laying down objective criteria against which 
the agency would carry out the vulnerability assessments; the final decision was delegated to the 
MB (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 49 ff., amendment 65). This 
decision-making process was adopted in the final regulation (EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 
13(1)). However, the EP’s request for a stronger focus on monitoring states’ capacity to handle 
the arrival of large number of persons with full respect for fundamental rights was deleted by the 
Council. 
 The final regulation states that the results will be submitted to the member state  
concerned, who may comment on the assessment, as well as to the EP, the Council, and the 
Commission at least once a year. In this way, the EP could reach its goal of expanding its over-
sight powers – before, risk analyses had only been accessible to the Council and the Commis-
sion (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 4). The importance of such oversight powers was  
emphasised by the EP’s rapporteur: “The rapporteur also considers necessary to increase the 
accountability of the future Agency by providing for more information to be made available to 
Parliament and the general public. More transparency is necessary to increase legitimacy and to 
avoid false impressions as to the role of the Agency.” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs 2016: 130) Since it was not established, the EP’s and the Commission’s proposal 
of giving the supervisory/advisory board access to the assessments’ results became obsolete. 
55 
According to the new regulation, the ED will (when necessary and after consulting the member 
state concerned) recommend measures to be taken within a certain time limit and invite the  
respective state to implement these. The Commission’s proposal that the member state should do 
so by using resources under the Union financial instruments was obviously deleted by the  
Council. This confirms that the majority of member states oppose stronger solidarity elements in 
the Frontex regulation. If a member state does not follow the recommendation within the  
defined period of time, the MB will adopt a binding decision based on a proposal of the ED. The 
Council added that the MB should decide on corrective measures based on a proposal by the ED. 
If the respective member state does not follow this decision, further action in accordance with 
art. 19 (see below) may be taken. 
 The agencies’ liaison officers (EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 12) are now also deployed 
in member states, not only in third countries like before (EU Regulation No 1168/2011, art. 14). 
As suggested in the Commission’s proposal, these officers explicitly support the agency in car-
rying out the vulnerability assessments by collecting information (COM(2015) 671 final, art. 11). 
While the Commission did not specify in which member states liaison officers should be  
deployed, the EP suggested to send them to all member states (Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 47, amendment 64). As the final regulation states that Frontex 
should “ensure regular monitoring of all Member States’ management of the external borders 
through liaison officers” (EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 12, italics added), liaison officers will 
obviously only be deployed in member states with external borders. 
 Several of the Council’s amendments were included in the final document. The MB (not 
the ED as suggested by the Commission and the EP) – based on a proposal of the ED and in 
consultation with the member states concerned – decides on the nature of the liaison officers’ 
deployment, who will not have unlimited access to information from the national coordination 
centre (but instead receive information selected by national authorities); the liaison officers’ 
reports (being part of the vulnerability assessments) have to be send to the member state  
concerned. Hence, the Council could further strengthen the MB’s role and achieve that  
Frontex’s liaison officers do not have access to potentially sensitive national information.  
However, some of the Council’s amendments were not accepted by the Parliament: the provi-
sion that liaison officers should only take instructions from the agency was not deleted and it 
was not added that monitoring through liaison officers should only be done if necessary. Hence, 
member states could neither ensure a greater degree of influence over the liaison officers nor 
limit the scope of their deployment. Last but not least, the EP could successfully achieve that the 
liaison officers contribute to promoting the application of the acquis communautaire relating to 
EBM, including with regard to respect for fundamental rights (EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 12 
(3e)).  
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Whereas the Council and the EP agreed on decision-making on the vulnerability assessments’ 
methodology, the former had to insist on granting the MB the right to decide on the nature of 
liaison officers’ deployment. Apart from that, both the EP and the Council could push through 
some of their preferences: for instance, the Council prevented an introduction of greater  
financial solidarity among member states and restricted the liaison officers’ access to infor-
mation; the EP could partly prevail with regard to fundamental rights protection and expanded 
its oversight powers. It is noteworthy that the Commission did not try to gain additional power. 
 
6.4 Enforcement 
6.4.1 Functional Reasons for the Creation of the Enforcement Task: Inability to Tackle 
Greece’s Reluctance to Request Assistance from Frontex 
That EBM suffered another regulatory deficit became particularly apparent when Greece  
delayed a request for additional border assistance (according to some observers due to domestic 
political reasons) and only backed down when the countryʼs suspension from Schengen area 
became a realistic scenario (Monar 2016: 142). It is to be argued that this particular experience 
let decision-makers recognise a regulatory deficit in the EUʼs EBM in terms of enforcement. 
 The Greek failure to identify and register arriving people as prescribed by EU rules 
caused serious impatience among other member states (EurAktiv 2015). However, before  
Frontexʼs transformation, any EU involvement in border control required an active request by 
the member state concerned (Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, art. 7, 8(1)). Hence, when Greece 
“turned down a deployment of up to 400 Frontex staff to immediately reinforce its border with 
Macedonia, complaining in a letter to the European Commission that their mandate was too 
broad and went beyond registration” (Financial Times 2015), it was not possible to force the 
government to cooperate. Moreover, Greece declined to request a Rapid Border Intervention 
Team (RaBIT) and “resisted taking many of the 300 eurodac machines available to help them 
fingerprint and register migrants in the EUʼs common database, citing problems with internet 
connections and staff training.” (Financial Times 2015) 
 Therefore, other governments – especially of those member states being most affected by 
Greeceʼs “wave-through” approach and those strongly opposed to migration – exerted public 
pressure in order to force the country to make a request and publicly accused Prime Minister 
Alexis Tsipras’s coalition of refusing EU help, in particular foreign border guards. The Com-
mission increased pressure on Greece to accept additional support as well (EurAktiv 2015) and 
backed Macedonia’s plan to erect a fence with Greece (Financial Times 2015). Some Eastern 
European politicians (e.g. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico) even used the threat of a temporal 
exclusion of Greece from the Schengen area, while other governments raised this possibility at 
57 
least informally as pointed out by Greek Immigration Minister Ioannis Mouzalas: “It is not said 
officially, but there is pressure” (EurAktiv 2015a). Even though the German government did not 
publicly call for a suspension of Greece from the Schengen area, frustrations were growing  
behind the scenes: “‘The red line for the Germans was not allowing Frontex to come in and help 
them’, said one EU ambassador in Brussels. ‘The Germans are furious and that’s why people are 
talking about pushing Greece out.’” (Financial Times 2015) Since Greece does not have any 
land borders with other member states, this measure would have rather been symbolic, most 
probably without any effect on migratory flows. Nevertheless, it would have had negative  
economic effects, in particular on Greek tourism. Thus, a senior diplomat described the threat of 
a suspension from the Schengen area with the following words: “It’s a tool for pushing Greece 
to accept EU help” (EurAktiv 2015a). 
 At the same time, the accusations were rejected by the Greek government (EurAktiv 
2015). For instance, Mouzalas said these were “lies” and denied that Greece “refused an EU 
offer of devices to share the identity of data of incoming refugees around the bloc.” (EurAktiv 
2015a) Besides, Greece rejected the criticism that its authorities were incapable of protecting the 
EU’s external borders. Mouzalas described the situation as an “unfair” blame game towards the 
country (EurAktiv 2015a): “Schengen is part of the blame game: ‘If you don’t do this or that, we 
do this to you.’ It is a punishment” (EUobserver 2016). Acknowledging that there was a prob-
lem, Mouzalas pleaded for a common solution and emphasised that a proposal on how to enter 
the EU legally and seek asylum was still missing (EUobserver 2016).
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 Moreover, the Greek 
government accused other member states of not offering the right help (Huffington Post 2016). 
 In early December 2015, EU interior ministers wanted to meet in order to discuss possi-
ble reactions to Greece’s inability to cope with the flow of refugees and migrants entering the 
EU (EurAktiv 2015). According to diplomats, a discussion of a temporary suspension of Greece 
from the Schengen area was possible (EurAktiv 2015a). One day before this meeting took place, 
Greece finally accepted EU help to secure its borders, i.e. European aid and foreign border 
guards. More precisely, three offers had been accepted: “EU staff to help on its northern frontier, 
foreign border guards on its Aegean islands and tents and supplies to house stranded migrants
59” 
(EurAktiv 2015). On the Greek islands, Frontex organised a RaBIT, a mechanism that forces 
other EU member states to reinforce Greek border guards, which has only been the second time 
the system has been activated (EurAktiv 2015). 
 Even though Greece could finally be convinced to accept support from Frontex, the 
whole debate “poisoned relations among European governments” (EurAktiv 2015), which led 
the Commission to conclude that another mechanism was needed, in other words: that a regula-
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  It has to be noted that some observers suspected Greece of using the refugee crisis as bargaining chip in order to 
win concessions on the implementation of its third bailout (Financial Times 2015). 
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  In accordance with the EU Civil Protection Mechanism (Reuters 2015a). 
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tory deficit in enforcement was present. This is evidenced by the Commission’s statement that 
an effective EBM needed “a strong and responsive system to ensure crises are adequately  
addressed whenever needed” (COM (2015) 673: 4). Moreover, the Commission explained that 
enforcement would be applied in “urgent situations […] where that Member State considers that 
there is no need for additional intervention.” (COM(2015) 673 final: 6) This quite obvious refe-
rence to Greek authorities’ reluctance to request support reveals that this experience was crucial 
for the Commission to recognise the regulatory deficit in enforcement. Likewise, the EP’s  
rapporteur presented the EBCG proposal as 
“a response to the weaknesses identified be they the unwillingness or inability of Member States 
to make border guards and equipment available for the deployment by the Agency when so re-
quested, […] or the fact that mechanisms created were not activated by Member States (there 
were only two rapid border interventions since the mechanism was established).” (Committee on 
Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 129) 
 
In summary, it was the particular experience of the Greek non-use of operational support on a 
voluntary basis that let decision-makers realise that a regulatory deficit in enforcement was  
present. That this issue was not completely new is underlined by the fact that the RaBIT inter-
vention that took finally place was only the second of its kind (EurAktiv 2015). Compared to 
rule setting and monitoring, the discrepancy between the Commission’s initial proposal and the 
final design of Frontex’s new enforcement task was most significant. In the next subsection, I 
analyse how these changes came about. 
 
6.4.2 Political Reasons for the Design of Enforcement: Inter-State Bargaining and Abolish-
ment of the “Right to Intervene” through a Strategic Use of Norms 
Whereas the governance structure’s as well as rule setting and monitoring tasks’ institutional 
design only caused inter-institutional disagreement (at least as far as we know), the agency’s 
new enforcement powers were also contested between member states and fiercely discussed. 
Compared to rule setting and monitoring, enforcement can be considered to be most “visible” 
and far-reaching in terms of possible sovereignty losses, as it not only implies national authori-
ties’ subordination to a common strategy or their supervision by the agency, but may ultimately 
result in an intervention of foreign border guards. An analysis of the debate on enforcement is 
not only helpful for assessing European institutions’, but also member states’ diverging prefer-
ences and check whether or not they are determined by sovereignty concerns as assumed by the 
observable implications. 
 Already before the Commission presented its proposal on a new Frontex regulation, the 
Presidency of the Council had invited the latter to discuss how to ensure “a better and at times 
compulsory allocation of border guards and equipment from low risk areas to those most affect-
ed by illegal migration” (Council of the European Union 2015: 3). Initially “boldly” (Rosenfeldt 
59 
2016) labelled as “right to intervene” (COM(2015) 673 final: 6), the Commission’s proposal 
would have empowered Frontex – based on a decision of the Commission itself – to intervene 
against the will of the member state concerned if corrective measures had not been taken or “in 
the event of disproportionate migratory pressure at the external border, rendering the control of 
external borders ineffective to such an extent that it risks putting in jeopardy the functioning of 
the Schengen area.” (COM(2015) 671 final, art. 18(1)). It is noteworthy that in contrast to the 
rather vague or even lacking statements on decision-making on rule setting and monitoring, the 
Commission clearly aimed at expanding its competences in regard to enforcement, which  
confirms the political approach’s assumption that the Commission has an “institutional self-
interest in increasing its own powers.” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 927)  
Several statements by Commission representatives can be seen as attempts to make the 
proposal more likely to be accepted. Commission First Vice-President Frans Timmermans de-
scribed the mechanism as “a safety net which, like all safety nets, we hope will never need to be 
used.” (EurActiv 2015b) Similarly, Justice and Home Affairs Commissioner Dimitris Avramo-
poulos appeasingly stated: “We don’t replace member states’ responsibilities and definitely not 
their sovereignty” (quoted from EurActiv 2015b). Migration and Home Affairs Director General 
Matthias Ruete emphasised that member states had to agree to the operational plan and that 
there was no possibility to force them to cooperate: “We can take the member state to court, 
that’s all” (quoted from EUobserver 2016a). That the functional argument of credible commit-
ment might also play a role regarding the design of a regulatory task (even though the policy 
area concerned was not of economic nature), can be discerned from a statement by Timmermans, 
who argued that even if the agency’s “right to intervene” might never be used, it was “essential 
to restore the credibility of our border management system” (EurActiv 2015b, italics added).60 
 Nevertheless, a number of member states perceived the mechanism as “an encroachment 
on their sovereign powers” (Politico 2015) and strongly opposed it. Besides representatives 
from Spain, Romania, and Greece who raised concerns, the Polish and Hungarian foreign minis-
ters described the proposal as undemocratic and said it violated national sovereignty (euobserver 
2015; EurActiv 2015; Reuters 2015; Tagesschau 2016).
61
 Having external borders, all of these 
member states could potentially be affected by the “right to intervene”. At the same time, poten-
tial sovereignty losses were not equally likely in all of these cases. 
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  Furthermore, it is remarkable as well that the EP’s rapporteur referred to functional necessities in his explanatory 
memorandum by stating that “[t]he amendments proposed by the rapporteur aim to further strengthen the pro-
posal by increasing the Agency’s effectiveness, as well as its efficiency” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs 2016: 129). Hence, actors might also draw on functional arguments in order to justify amend-
ments which in fact primarily expand their own powers. 
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  At first, Sweden opposed the “right to intervene”: by arguing that “[b]order control is the competence for the 
member states, and it’s hard to say that there is a need to impose that on member states forcefully” (Politico 2015, 
italics added), Swedish Interior Minister Ygeman also used a rather functional line of reasoning. However, he 
changed his opinion and was finally also supportive (Dagens Industri 2016). 
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In regard to Greece, the above-mentioned debate on its reluctance to request support from Fron-
tex (see 6.4.1) made such a scenario quite likely. Several statements made by Greek officials 
during these discussions underlined the government’s sensitivity in regard to EBM. Inter alia, 
Mouzalas said he welcomed assistance from Frontex to register refugees, but at the same time 
emphasised that under Greek law, only Greek forces could patrol the country’s border (EurAktiv 
2015a). Another concern was “sensitivity over the long-running dispute over Macedonia’s name 
and suspicions about Turkish designs on certain Greek islands, including Lesbos, point of entry 
for many migrants.” (Financial Times 2015) Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias also empha-
sised the need for a regulation that is in line with the treaties: 
“The problems have to be resolved in a democratic manner, within the framework of the treaties 
[…] We have said that the process and regulation for Frontex can certainly change, but any 
change must be in line with articles 72 and 79 of the Treaty on the European Union, which priori-
tizes each member state’s sovereign interests with regard to defending its security and the immi-
gration issue.” (quoted from Politico 2015)62 
 
To which degree Greece saw its sovereignty under threat was reflected in the quite narrow terms 
stipulated by the Greek government according to which it would accept a cooperation with 
Frontex. For instance, it only considered the deployment of foreign border guards acceptable in 
the north of the country, where migrants were trapped because Macedonia tightened border 
checks. This was also recognised by the Commission: “Sensitive to suggestions Greece was 
losing sovereignty on its territory, a government spokeswomen stressed Frontex would only 
work on registration of people not documented further south and not take park in ‘joint border 
controls’.” (Reuters 2015a) Hence, regarding the new Frontex regulation, Tsipras stated that 
while his government was in favour of European border guards, it was also determined to keep 
ultimate responsibility for its borders (Tagesspiegel 2015). 
 Since they did not face an immediate de facto threat of sovereignty losses at their  
external borders, some other countries’ (like Poland’s) opposition rather was an expression of 
their general reluctance to further communitarise asylum and border issues. Therefore, they 
framed the issue as a general critique of the lacking democratic accountability of supranational 
structures. For example, Polish Foreign Minister Waszczykowski stated that replacing Frontex 
“by a structure that is independent of member states is shocking” (EurActiv 2015b) and “[t]here 
would be an undemocratic structure reporting to nobody knows who.” (Politico 2015) Such 
statements can be seen as an attempt to appeal to the right-wing electorate of Waszczykowski’s 
PiS (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) party. 
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  These doubts about the right to intervene’s constitutionality are shared by several authors, who raise concerns as 
regards art. 4(2) TEU (respect for essential state functions, including ensuring territorial integrity, maintaining 
law and order and safeguarding national security) and art. 72 TFEU (no affection of the exercise of responsibili-
ties incumbent upon member states with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of in-
ternal security) (see for instance De Bruycker 2016: 562; Rijpma 2016: 18). 
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In contrast, France and Germany were not only supportive of the Commission’s suggestions, but 
most probably even gave the impetus for the “right to intervene”. Only nine days before the 
Commission presented its ECBG proposal, Interior Ministers Cazeneuve and de Maizière sent a 
letter to Avramopoulos, claiming that “in exceptional circumstances, Frontex should also take 
initiative to deploy under its own responsibility rapid intervention teams at its external borders” 
(Politico 2015). In other words: both ministers favoured a proposal “which has the goal of when 
a national state is not effectively fulfilling its duty on defending the external border, then that 
can be taken over by Frontex” (Reuters 2015) – without a prior request of the member state  
concerned (see also Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2015). Therefore, it is likely the article was 
included due to this Franco-German initiative. At least, this was the interpretation of some 
Greek observers: for instance, a Greek blog (publishing in English) labelled the draft as “an all 
German plan” (Keep Talking Greece 2015). Even though a rather obvious attempt to demon-
strate his ability to act, a statement by Cazeneuve indicates that there has been at least some kind 
of influence: “We would have not proceeded in the case of Frontex without the almost fusing 
relationship between me and de Maizière” (Le Monde 2017, own translation). Both member 
states were supported by Luxembourg (holding the Presidency of the Council at that time), 
whose Foreign Minister stated that “every country, which is on the external border and does not 
want to build a fence, needs to accept a European mechanism” (euobserver 2015). All of these 
three governments did not have to fear possible Frontex interventions at their part of the external 
border. In contrast, both France and Germany had a vital interest (in the case of France rather 
security-related, in the case of Germany because of migration) in preventing a repetition of the 
situation at the Greek external borders. 
 It has to be noted that these member states’ preferences obviously experienced a certain 
change over time. In October 2015, they had still agreed on Council Conclusions requesting an 
enhancement of Frontex’s mandate being “in full respect of the national competence of the 
Member States” (European Council 2015a: 3). It can be argued that some governments changed 
their minds because of Greece’s lack of action, pointing to the fact that de Maizière and  
Cazeneuve explicitly criticised the delay in the establishment of Greek hotspots in the above-
mentioned letter (Tagesspiegel 2015). 
 The fact that Italy was also supportive of the issue is striking. As described by Politico 
(2015), Italy was “also backing the measure. Sandro Gozi, the country’s under-secretary for 
European Affairs, told reporters Tuesday that his country was in favour of the creation of an EU 
border force but wouldn’t comment further.” Indeed, Italian officials did not further comment on 
the issue. Whereas this indifference seems puzzling at first sight, it can be explained by having a 
look at Italian preferences in regard to Frontex: since Italy is one the countries suffering most 
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from the lack of burden-sharing in EBM,
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 it has been focusing on calling for a strengthened 
Frontex for years (see for instance Ministero dell’Interno 2014). Domestic pressure on the  
government pointing to the high costs Italy spends for its border guards is in particular exerted 
by right-wing Lega Nord. Hence, empowering Frontex in terms of human and financial  
resources can be considered the Italian government’s top priority, obviously even accepting a 
loss of sovereignty in return. 
 Similarly, the Belgian reluctance to agree on the introduction is not self-explanatory. 
Having a closer look at diplomats’ statements is, however, insightful. As elaborated on by a  
representative of the Belgian government, even Belgium would have difficulties to agree on this 
proposal – despite its support for European integration: the government was concerned that – 
like in the case of EU deficit procedures – the new provision would primarily affect smaller 
member states, while the bigger ones would be able to prevent being affected by using their 
greater power. He concluded: “In the EU, some states are unfortunately more equal than others.” 
(Tagesspiegel 2015, own translation) Hence, also member states in fact not having to fear any 
restrictions of their sovereignty opposed the right to intervene, simply because they considered 
themselves being rather small and powerless as well. 
 Recognising that the situations at the external borders requiring urgent action were one 
“of the most politically sensitive issues” (Council of the European Union 2016f: 3), the Nether-
lands Council Presidency suggested the reintroduction of internal border controls as “balanced 
wording aiming to avert, or mitigate risks for the Schengen Area” (Council of the European  
Union 2016f: 3; also see below). 
 Last but not least, the EP’s position is to be analysed. Whereas Green and Leftist mem-
bers of Parliament criticised the planned enforcement task due to accountability and responsibil-
ity concerns in regard to fundamental rights violations (EUobserver 2016a), the EP’s President 
Schulz was rather supportive: “That the EU creates common instruments to help and intervene, 
that is completely normal. The European Commission’s proposals … are a step in the right di-
rection” (EurActiv 2015b). However, Pabriks stated in the Committee’s on Civil Liberties,  
Justice and Home Affairs report on the proposal: 
“As regards the proposed procedure for situations at the border requiring urgent action (Article 18) 
the rapporteur considers that the proposal respects Member States’ sovereignty as it also foresees 
that the Member State concerned has to agree with the Agency on the operational plan and is also 
the one who has to issue instructions to the teams. The rapporteur, however, believes that deci-
sions to act should be taken by the Council to strengthen the decision making process and further 
emphasise the sovereignty of the Member States.” (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs 2016: 129) 
 
Since the political approach assumes that “[d]elegation to the Commission remains the first 
preference for the European Parliament and for the Commission itself” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 
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928f.), it is quite remarkable that the EP’s proposal preferred delegation to the Council. How-
ever, the EP also aims at appealing to the electorate “by favouring regulatory institutions that 
promise to yield outcomes favourable for diffuse public interests.” (Kelemen/Tarrant 2011: 928) 
Statements by Paprisk like “If we succeed with this file, we can show our electorate that the EU 
is serious, and efficient” (EUobserver 2016a) suggest the assumption that appealing to the  
electorate was a main concern for parts of the EP that obviously expected the public opinion to 
prefer delegation to the Council. Similar statements can be found when analysing the other  
institutionsʼ discourses. For instance, head of Migration and Home Affairs directorate Matthias 
Ruete stated that the EU was exposed to “enormous pressure also from our citizens to see if we 
can move for a more collective management of external borders” (EUobserver 2016a) and the 
Netherlands Council presidency emphasised in regard to external border control: “Our citizens 
expect us to carry out this task, and will lose their confidence in Schengen if we donʼt.” (Nether-
lands Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2016: 1) 
 Consequently, the situations requiring urgent action were also debated during the 
Trilogues (Council of the European Union 2016d: 2). According to the final regulation, the 
Council – based on a proposal from the Commission – adopts an implementing act in cases of 
member statesʼ noncompliance with binding measures (art. 13(8)) or exceptional situations. If 
the state concerned does not comply with the Councilʼs decision within 30 days and decides not 
to cooperate with the agency, the Commission can trigger article 29 of the SBC, allowing other 
member states to reintroduce controls at internal borders. Hence, a member state’s request can 
be superseded, but it is not possible to intervene against its will. The Council’s negotiation  
mandate reveals that member states would have preferred to delegate the power to “recommend 
that one or more Member States decide to reintroduce border control” (Council of the European 
Union 2016: 55) to the Council. Moreover, the Council’s proposal to oblige member states not 
following the recommendation of reintroducing border controls to justify this decision by  
informing the Commission in writing of their reasons (Council of the European Union 2016: 55) 
was not added to the final regulation. The final outcome reveals that not only decision-making 
on regulatory activities or details on their execution might be amended during legislative process, 
but that the scope of these tasks can be significantly watered down as well.  
 
To conclude, it has to be noted that sovereignty concerns were not the only factor determining 
member states’ preferences. Some member states also opposed the right to intervene because of 
their general reluctance towards further European integration or because they feared disad-
vantages for less powerful countries. The significant variation one can observe between the 
Commission’s initial proposal and the final solution agreed on by the Council and the EP cannot 
only be explained by the fact that the Commission envisaged a more far-reaching mechanism 
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than in regard to rule setting and monitoring, empowering itself to a considerable degree. By 
strategically drawing on common norms such as democracy, the intervention right’s opponents 
could eventually achieve a considerable dilution of enforcement and thus prevailed over a group 
led by Germany and France, even though one would expect the latters – being the “engines of 
European integration” – to have more bargaining power. In addition, it has to be underlined that 
the empowerment of the Council in regard to enforcement was supported by the EP. 
 
6.5 Governance Structure: Political Reasons for the Failure of the Struggle for 
Supranationalisation 
As already mentioned (see 3.1), Frontex’s overall governance structure remained largely stable. 
The Commission and the EP, however, tried to “supranationalise” the way in which the agency 
is governed, but faced too resolute opposition from the Council. In contrast, the latter even tried 
to further enhance the role of the MB by establishing an executive board. 
 One of the proposals of the Commission and the EP being rejected by the Council was 
the establishment of a “supervisory” (Commission) respectively an “advisory” (EP)64 board. 
This additional body within Frontex’s governance structure would have been composed of the 
deputy ED, four (Commission) respectively three (EP) senior officials of the agency to be  
chosen by the MB, one representative of the Commission, and, according to the EP’s proposal, 
the fundamental rights officer. These officials would have advised the ED and reported to the 
MB. Inter alia, the board was intended to advise the ED on the measures needed to be taken for 
the practical execution of the Commission’s respectively the Council’s decision on situations 
requiring urgent action (COM(2015) 671 final, art. 69; Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs 2016: 114f., amendment 161). 
 The supranational institutionsʼ attempt to establish an additional advisory or supervisory 
body confirm some of the political approachʼs assumptions. For instance, one can argue that the 
EP tried to enhance the transparency and accountability of Frontex in this way. However, it did 
not suggest that the new board should report to the Parliament, which contradicts the assumption 
that the EP usually tries to strengthen its oversight powers. This is puzzling, since interviewees 
from all political parties represented in the EP had expressed their wish for an expansion of  
parliamentary control powers over Frontex in 2014 (Unisys 2014: 20). By aiming at the estab-
lishment of a further body with a Commission representative, the Commission clearly tried to 
expand its own powers as predicted by the political approach. 
 While rejecting the creation of such an advisory/supervisory board because of “a con-
sistent request by many delegations” (Council of the European Union 2016c: 2), the Council 
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board for reasons of efficiency (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 130). 
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wanted to enable the MB to “establish a small-sized Executive Board” (Council of the European 
Union 2016: 113, art. 61(6)). This board should assist the MB and the ED “with regard to the 
preparation of the decisions, programmes and activities to be adopted by the Management Board 
and when necessary, because of urgency, to take certain provisional decisions on behalf of the 
MB, excluding decisions on which a reinforced majority is needed in the Management Board.” 
(Council of the European Union 2016: 113, art. 61(6)) Since no other elaborations on the com-
position of such a board can be found in the Councilʼs mandate, this innovation would have  
further empowered the MB – being the responsible body for the new board’s establishment. In-
stead of a stronger role for the EU’s supranational institutions, this would have implied an even 
more intergovernmental governance structure, in other words: an even more dependent agency. 
 This try to render Frontexʼs governance structure more intergovernmental also confirms 
the political approach: since further regulatory tasks were delegated to the agency, member 
states attempted to tighten control by the MB, which they had set up strategically in order to 
protect their national interests and to keep sovereignty over policy-outcomes (Kelemen 2002: 
110). However, the result of these diverging preferences obviously was the lowest common  
denominator of neither establishing a supervisory/advisory nor an executive board. 
 The EP also tried to gain a seat in the MB (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs 2016: 107, amendment 147). This attempt to gain more influence was blocked by 
the Council as well, even though the MB would have still been dominated by member statesʼ 
representatives. This shows that the Council was not willing to make any concessions in regard 
to this instrument through which member states protect national interests and keep sovereignty 
over policy-outcomes. 
 The appointment of the ED was one of the key issues discussed during the first Trilogue 
(Council of the European Union 2016d: 2). In this respect, the EP could slightly improve its 
position: the candidates proposed by the Commission now have to make a statement before the 
competent committee(s) and answer questions. Afterwards, the EP adopts an opinion setting out 
its views and may also indicate a preferred candidate (EU Regulation 2016/1624, art. 69(2)). 
However, the Parliament initially wanted to appoint the ED together with the Council by  
common accord based on a list proposed by the Commission. Furthermore, it suggested that the 
ED and his/her deputy could be dismissed by the Court of Justice at the request of the EP, the 
Council or the Commission (Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2016: 
113f., amendment 160). 
 
In summary, except for the comparably small concession in regard to the EDʼs appointment, the 
Council rejected all proposals of the EP and the Commission. In contrast, it even attempted to 
further strengthen the MB’s position by allowing it to establish an additional executive board. 
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The fact that Frontex’s governance structure persisted despite of the EP’s and the Commission’s 
efforts of supranationalisation reveals the remarkable extent of member states’ reluctance to 
grant more independence to a JHA agency that touches upon one of their core state powers. 
 
In the previous five subsections, I demonstrated that the combined functional-political approach 
is an adequate theoretical framework to investigate the change of Frontex’s institutional design. 
However, one has to consider the possibility that other theoretical accounts might provide alter-
native explanations, which could even capture components of the studied phenomenon that are 
neglected by the functional-political approach. 
 
6.6 Alternative Explanations: Historical and Sociological Institutionalism 
Since this thesis investigates the institutional change of an already existing agency, and not an 
agency’s initial creation, it seems all the more important to also elaborate on approaches that 
theorise the ways in which existing institutions shape new institutional outcomes. Therefore, I 
discuss whether or not Historical and Sociological Institutionalism provide alternative explana-
tions to the functional-political approach regarding the change of Frontex’s institutional design. 
Historical Institutionalism (HI) is characterised by “the primacy it accords temporality – 
the notion that the timing and sequence of events shape political processes.” (Fioretos 2011: 371) 
Put simply, HI theorises two basic modes of institutional change. First, its advocates argue that 
past institutional developments strongly condition present decisions through path dependency 
(Thatcher 2011: 793). Institutional changes that are driven by path dependency are assumed to 
be rather incremental, resulting in periods of relative stability. This idea implies the assumption 
that institutions are “sticky”, i.e. that they are rather redesigned than abolished (Pierson 1996: 
142ff.). Secondly, HI emphasises the importance of so-called critical junctures. These can be 
described as moments of fluidity, turning points, crises, or unsettled times, and are expected to 
trigger new outcomes, which would not have occurred without these particular events (Capoc-
cia/Kelemen 2007: 341f.). Thus, historical institutionalist hypotheses may be weakened by con-
ducting counterfactual analyses (Ekelund 2013: 104). The occurrence of such critical junctures 
makes far-reaching, punctuated changes possible (Capoccia/Kelemen 2007: 341f.). 
Since it was characterised by relative stability and incremental changes, the period in 
time before the adoption of the EBCG regulation can be well explained by drawing on the  
notion of path dependency. For instance, the 2007 and 2011 amendments to the Frontex regula-
tion strengthened the agency’s operational role, but did not fundamentally change its overall 
institutional design.  
In contrast, the most recent reform repealed Frontex’s founding Regulation (EC) No 
2007/2004. Considering the events that took place in the context of the migration crisis, and in 
67 
particular the situation at the Greek external borders, one could assume that the occurrence of a 
critical juncture can account for this major transformation and for the point in time at which it 
occurred. Indeed, decision-makers referred to the migration crisis on numerous occasions when 
justifying the new regulation, which supports the hypothesis that this particular event caused the 
observed institutional change (Ekelund 2013: 104). Since the Commission only decided to  
propose a new Frontex regulation when it became obvious that operational means could not 
tackle the crisis situation at the EU’s external borders adequately, one can assume that without 
the migration crisis, the observed institutional change would have not occurred. Member states 
decision to delegate several far-reaching regulatory tasks to Frontex – despite of their previous 
reluctance to do so – can be seen as one of the major changes that HI expects to occur due to a 
critical juncture. The fact that Frontex is the first JHA agency to be granted with such tasks  
supports this line of reasoning.  
At the same time, some of the changes indicate that path dependency also played a role. 
For instance, Frontex’s – respectively member states’ – inability to deal with the challenges at 
the EU’s external borders led de facto to a redesign of the agency, not to its replacement. More-
over, in contrast to its regulatory role, Frontex’s governance structure was “sticky” and  
remained dominated by member states – neither the EP nor the Commission could force the 
Council to accept further changes.
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 This continuity contradicts the historical institutionalist 
expectation that critical junctures lead to the occurrence of major changes. 
A case that helps illustrating this issue is the euro area crisis and the creation of the SSM 
(see 2.1). Since the migration and the euro area crises are often compared (see for instance 
Börzel/Risse 2017) and the latter can also be described as a critical juncture, this seems appro-
priate. In contrast to the establishment of the EBCG Agency, decision-makers decided to both 
delegate regulation and to render it more independent by enhancing the ECB’s role when they 
created the SSM. Hence, both regulatory tasks and governance structure experienced a punctu-
ated, major change and thereby followed the logic of a critical juncture. Consequently, a number 
of studies draw on historical institutionalist arguments when explaining the case of the SSM or 
the creation of the Banking Union in general (see for instance Jones et al. 2016; Glöckler et al. 
2016). 
 To conclude, HI is indeed well-suited to analyse how one could first observe a period of 
stability with incremental changes in the form of several amendments, followed by more  
far-reaching changes in the course of the migration crisis. However, it can barely account for the 
variation on the dependent variable that is being analysed in this thesis: Historical Institutiona-
lists cannot explain why one could observe path dependent stability regarding Frontex’s  
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that these agencies’ governance structure is not likely to be changed quickly “due to the path dependency of the 
institutional design of these agencies” (Trauner 2012: 785). 
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governance structure, but punctuated, major changes concerning its regulatory tasks. In other 
words: they would expect either path-dependent, incremental change of both the governance 
structure and the regulatory tasks, or far-reaching, punctuated change triggered by a critical 
juncture on both variables. Since a possible combination of both modes of change has not yet 
been theorised by advocates of HI, the specific variation of the present case cannot be fully  
captured by this theoretical account.
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Another possibility is to consider Sociological Institutionalism (SI), which has already 
been mentioned briefly as a possible explanation for the proliferation of EU agencies across 
sectors and states (see 4.1). SI focuses on the social and cultural context in which change takes 
place and analyses its influence on individuals’ identities, behaviour, and preferences. Hence, 
advocates of this theoretical account perceive institutional change “as a response to choices 
made on the basis of socially constructed preferences and not necessarily to fulfil particular 
functional needs” (Ekelund 2013: 103, italics added). In particular, SI expects transformations to 
take place because of processes of isomorphism and mimicry (DiMaggio/Powell 1983),  
meaning that “institutional change takes place through mimetism, the development of cultural 
norms about ‘appropriate institutional forms’ across organisational fields and by coercion” 
(Thatcher 2011: 792). Thus, isomorphic processes that cause diffusions of particular institutional 
designs cannot only be observed between the national and the EU level, but also across policy 
areas at the EU level. The timing of change “is expected to coincide with, or closely follow,” the 
change of similar institutional structures (Ekelund 2013: 104).  
The expansion of Frontex’s regulatory role can be seen as an attempt of decision-makers 
to align its institutional design with that of decision-making and quasi-regulatory agencies  
operating in other policy areas. This delegation of regulation to an EU agency – even in the  
politically highly sensitive AFSJ – confirms SI’s assumption that affording non-majoritarian 
bodies such tasks is perceived as an especially legitimate, if not even a “fashionable” idea  
(Egeberg et al. 2017: 4). Even though observable implications such as direct references to other 
institutions and their institutional design or statements “about the desirability of the agency form” 
(Ekelund 2013: 104) could be barely observed, it has to be noted that Frontex’s continuing  
existence as EU agency was not questioned at all. While the Commission did not explicitly justi-
fy its choice of the agency form, it stated in its explanatory memorandum that “having regard to 
the fact that the Frontex Agency, renamed European Border and Coast Guard Agency, was  
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tional change came about in the case at hand. 
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established by means of a Regulation, the same legal instrument is also appropriate for this  
proposal.” (COM(2015) 671 final: 6, italics added) 
Whereas the isomorphism argument can account for the expansion of the Frontex’s regu-
latory role, it has difficulties in explaining the continuity of the agency’s governance structure: 
Sociological Institutionalists would expect an alignment of Frontex’s overall institutional design 
with that of other agencies, and cannot explain why only some components have been adjusted, 
while others remained stable. Indeed, it would be possible that the diverging development of 
regulatory tasks and governance structure was an attempt to imitate the reactions to similar crisis 
situations in other policy areas. Again, the accessible evidence does not support such a claim: 
even though decision-makers referred to the case of the Banking Union on many occasions (see 
for instance Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2016: 1; Euraktiv 
2016a), they obviously did not attempt to mimic it when they changed Frontex’s institutional 
design. As already mentioned above, this would have implied to not only expand the agency’s 
regulatory role, but also to render regulation more independent. Thus, SI is not suitable to  
analyse the diverging development of Frontex regulatory tasks and governance structure. 
On the contrary, Frontex shows a very particular institutional design after the adoption of 
the EBCG regulation, which can be located somewhere in between typical JHA agencies and 
their more powerful decision-making and quasi-regulatory counterparts in other policy areas. 
This unique design contradicts the hypothesis that decision-makers tried to imitate another regu-
latory body when designing the “new” agency. Since Frontex’s institutional change was not part 
of a larger wave of reforms of EU agencies, SI also has difficulties in explaining the timing of 
change. In addition, sociological approaches rather study the formation of preferences (Thatcher 
2011: 792) and not how diverging preferences are finally aggregated to produce an institutional 
outcome. Thus, drawing on Sociological Institutionalist assumptions would have also meant to 
focus on another phase of Frontex’s transformation and to investigate how the Commission’s, 
the EP’s, and the Council’s initial positions came about. 
 
To conclude this discussion of alternative explanations, it has to be noted that they both provide 
further insights concerning Frontex’s most recent institutional change. In particular, HI’s notion 
of path dependency can account for the relative stability one could observe before the estab-
lishment of the EBCG, as well as for the continuity of the governance structure. Moreover, HI is 
especially useful to capture the role of the migration crisis as a critical juncture, which can  
explain why Frontex was reformed at this particular point in time and how the remarkable  
expansion of its regulatory role came about. The latter would be seen as an attempt to imitate 
other EU agencies by SI: since Frontex was granted a regulatory role, its institutional design 
experienced a decisive shift towards the decision-making and quasi-regulatory agencies operat-
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ing in other policy areas. Furthermore, Frontex’s form as an EU agency was not questioned at 
all, which confirms that these regulatory bodies are still perceived as legitimate, adequate, or 
even “fashionable ideas” by decision-makers (Egeberg et al. 2017: 4). 
However, neither HI nor SI can account for the discrepancy between the expansion of 
Frontex’s regulatory tasks and the continuity of its governance structure: both institutionalist 
approaches would either expect variation on both or none of the dependent variables. Although, 
from a theoretical perspective, institutionalist approaches seem to offer adequate explanations 
for Frontex’s institutional change, the accessible empirical evidence disconfirms their applica-
bility to the case at hand. Therefore, the functional-political approach seems to be most suitable 
to explain the particular institutional change that Frontex experienced.  
Revealing these limitations of possible alternative explanations further updates the  
degree of confidence I have in the combined functional-political approach. Therefore, it is now 
possible to summarise my empirical findings and to elaborate on their contribution to existing 
research. 
 
7 Concluding Remarks 
In the following, I first summarise my main empirical findings (7.1). Subsequently, I elaborate 
on their contribution to existing research, also mentioning some possibilities for future studies 
(7.2). In the last subsection, I raise the question of whether or not the newly introduced regulato-
ry tasks actually reduce the previous deficits in EBM. Moreover, I analyse if one can expect 
Frontex to effectively carry out its new activities and flesh out some features of the EBCG regu-
lation that seem to be in particular functionally problematic (7.3). 
 
7.1 Empirical Findings 
In this thesis, I demonstrated that the combined functional-political approach, which theorises 
the creation, design, and transformation of EU regulatory institutions, is well-suited to explain 
the changes that the institutional design of Frontex has experienced in 2016. Both hypotheses 
that were deduced from these theoretical accounts could be confirmed to a great extent by using 
various pieces of empirical evidence. Nevertheless, some limitations regarding the political ap-
proach are to be pointed out below. 
 First, I revealed that the shift from mere coordination to additional regulation indeed 
occurred due to functional necessities. I described the increasingly complex policy problems in 
the context of the migration crisis, which further widened the functional gap in the EU’s EBM. 
The close ties between EBM and other policy areas such as asylum and internal security further 
triggered this functional pressure. I demonstrated that decision-makers eventually recognised 
that the growing functional gap in EBM did not only emerge due to an operational, but also  
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because of a regulatory deficit. In regard to rule setting, this deficit was characterised by the lack 
of a sound legislative framework: whereas various non-binding documents elaborated on IBM 
and the latter was finally set as an objective in primary law, there was no secondary legislation 
clarifying IBM’s actual implementation. Concerning monitoring, a number of mechanisms  
existed prior to the EBCG regulation’s adoption. However, they did not assess all components 
being essential for an effective EBM, were not frequent enough, did not imply any corrective 
measures, suffered from member states’ reluctance to provide information, or were only  
introduced de jure, but not carried out de facto. That both deficits were recognised by decision-
makers was evidenced by a number of sources. The regulatory deficit in enforcement was  
characterised by the fact that the decision to make use of Frontex’s operational means was com-
pletely left to the member state concerned. Regarding the recognition of this issue, the particular 
experience of Greece’s non-use of operational support on a voluntary basis was crucial. 
Thus, functional arguments explain why member states agreed on the introduction of 
regulatory tasks, even though they had shown different preferences beforehand: as revealed by a 
2014 survey, member state representatives had endorsed an enhancement of Frontex’s  
operational and supporting tasks such as the facilitation of return operations, support in  
negotiating readmission agreements/procurement activities, or the conducting of risk analyses, 
but had shown clear reluctance towards an assessment of their resources (Unisys 2014: 18).
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 However, assuming that “institutional choices are explained in terms of the functions 
that a given institution is expected to perform” (Pollack 2006: 167), functionalism would have 
failed to explain the regulatory tasksʼ diverging design and the agencyʼs unmodified governance 
structure. Therefore, I secondly used the political approach to investigate the considerable inter-
institutional and inter-state disagreement, which could be observed although the new Frontex 
regulation was adopted by a fast track legislative procedure of less than a year. While the politi-
cal account’s assumptions are accurate in many regards, some peculiarities are to be pointed out. 
 Actors’ preferences regarding the design of rule-setting largely confirm the political  
approaches’ assumptions. Whereas the EP wanted to set down the new IBM strategy through  
co-decision, the Council favoured a decision by the MB. Eventually, the Council could prevail 
and only accepted those EP amendments that strengthened member statesʼ prerogatives. Except 
for decision-making procedures, the actual content of the relevant article was barely changed 
during the legislative process, its wording only being slightly diluted. It is, however, remarkable 
that the Council ignored possible problems arising from a violation of the Meroni doctrine. 
Even though the Council and EP agreed on delegating decision-making on the vulnera-
bility assessments’ methodology to the MB and the ED, monitoring was a contested issue as 
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return/readmission/reintegration, relocation/resettlement, and cooperation with transit countries/countries of 
origin (European Council 2015: 1-4). 
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well. Eventually, both the EP and the Council could push through some of their preferences. 
Inter alia, the Council prevented an introduction of greater financial solidarity among member 
states, insisted on granting the MB the right to decide on the nature of liaison officers’ deploy-
ment, and was able to restrict the latters’ access to information. The EP could partly prevail with 
regard to two of its main concerns: fundamental rights protection and expansion of its own over-
sight powers, which had only been weakly developed before.  
It is noteworthy that both in regard to rule setting and monitoring, the Commission’s 
proposal left considerable room for manoeuvre concerning the design of decision-making. This 
is particularly remarkable in regard to rule setting: the Commission, often acting as the EP’s 
“ally” in regard to bargaining on JHA agencies’ institutional design, did not support the Parlia-
ment’s attempt to establish a decision-making on the IBM strategy through co-decision – even 
though this would have expanded the Commission’s own powers as well. 
The delegation of enforcement capacities – in the form of a so-called right to intervene, 
to be implemented by the Commission – was the only issue being publicly debated between 
member states. Concerning the latters’ preferences, it has to be noted that sovereignty concerns 
immediately linked to the right to intervene were obviously not the only determining factor. 
Some member states also opposed this mechanism because of their general reluctance towards 
further European integration, due to domestic electoral considerations, and/or because they 
feared disadvantages for less powerful countries. At the same time, electoral interests could also 
cause a supportive stance towards the right to intervene, as evidenced by the case of Italy. By 
strategically using common norms, the intervention right’s opponents could achieve a consider-
able dilution of enforcement and thus prevailed over a group led by Germany and France. It has 
to be underlined that the strengthening of the Council in regard to enforcement was supported by 
the EP, which is usually supports an expansion of the Commission’s powers. Several pieces of 
evidence indicate that this was an attempt of MEPs to appeal to their electorate.  
Last but not least, member states showed remarkably great reluctance to supranationalise 
Frontexʼs governance structure. Apart from a comparably small concession in regard to the 
EDʼs appointment, the Council rejected all proposals of the EP and the Commission – member 
states even tried to further strengthen the role of the MB by establishing an executive board. 
Eventually, Frontex’s governance structure did not undergo any fundamental change, which can 
be seen as an agreement on the lowest common denominator. 
  
73 
By collecting various pieces of evidence, I demonstrated that functional necessities led to a  
further centralisation of regulatory authority in the policy area of EBM, whereas the design of 
the newly introduced regulatory tasks and the governance structure were shaped by political 
power struggles. After this summary of my main empirical findings, I now proceed by elaborat-
ing on their contribution to existing research.  
 
7.2 Contribution and Further Research  
First, by conducting this analysis, I demonstrated that the combined functional-political  
approach, which had previously only been used to explain the creation and design of ERNs, can 
also account for the transformation of an already existing EU agency. In addition, I revealed that 
alternative explanations offered by Historical and Sociological Institutionalism cannot adequate-
ly capture the discrepancy between the expansion of Frontex’s regulatory tasks and the continui-
ty of its governance structure. Therefore, I significantly updated the degree of confidence one 
can have in the combined functional-political account’s validity. As already mentioned, the 
Commission’s partial reluctance cannot be fully covered by the political approach. Its restraint 
with regard to decision-making on rule setting and monitoring could be explained by having a 
look at enforcement. In this respect, the Commission tried to increase its own powers remarka-
bly by suggesting a so-called “right to intervene”. It seems as if this innovation was the  
Commission’s priority, which probably caused a certain willingness to compromise regarding 
the other regulatory tasks. Such possible issue linkages are not captured by the political  
approach. Additional research investigating this aspect would make it necessary to conduct  
interviews, which could lead to a much deeper understanding of the negotiation process. 
Secondly, the peculiarities I revealed with regard to inter-state bargaining on enforce-
ment might be linked to the fact that this study does not analyse economic regulation, but regu-
lation of the core state power of border control. Strategic references to common norms like  
democracy are not explicitly mentioned in political accounts, since the latters usually neglect 
JHA agencies. Negotiations on economic regulation hardly offer the opportunity to draw on 
such values to achieve certain goals, but instead revolve around (re)distributional issues.  
However, a dysfunctional EBM is not only an issue that is of interest to political and economic 
elites, but also to the broader public. Therefore, a mere examination of possible sovereignty 
losses was not sufficient to predetermine member states’ preferences. These peculiarities reveal 
that further research on JHA agencies is needed, and that it is in particular necessary to investi-
gate bargaining on these agencies’ institutional design in order to refine the political approach. 
The assumption that regulation of EBM cannot be equated with economic regulation is 
further supported by the fact that decision-makers ignored the new IBM strategy’s possible  
violation of the Meroni doctrine. This contrasts with the case of the EBA, an agency that  
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operates in the economic field (banking regulation) and that was transformed in the course of a 
crisis as well. However, the EBA’s “regulatory powers have been tailored to a strict reading of 
the Meroni doctrine” (Dehousse 2016: 80, italics added). Decision-makers might have simply 
considered the threat of a lawsuit less likely in the case of EBM than in regard to banking regu-
lation. In addition, member states’ strong efforts to at least indirectly control decision-making on 
rule setting can be also explained by the fact that national border guard authorities are affected 
by the new technical and operational Frontex strategy, and not “only” market players like banks. 
In order to investigate such possible considerations, it would be particularly interesting to  
conduct interviews with member states representatives who were involved in the negotiations. 
Notably, the debate on the right to intervene contradicts the assumption that 
“regulatory integration is less prone to politicisation because it only strengthens European  
control rights over power resources that remain notionally national.” (Genschel/Jachtenfuchs 
2015: 8) Delegating regulatory tasks to the non-majoritarian institution Frontex could not depo-
liticise the issue, as one would usually expect (Grande/Kriesi 2016: 290). A possible reason for 
this might be that whereas power resources – namely border guards – have indeed remained 
national after the EBCG’s establishment, the regulation of EBM does not impose the same  
constraints on all member states (due to their different geographical positions). Further research 
on the politicisation of regulation and its scope conditions, in particular in cases of delegation to 
EU agencies, could provide additional insights. 
Thirdly, concerning the particular case of Frontex, I contributed to a better understanding 
of the agency’s institutional design and its evolution over time. I pointed out some ambiguities 
of the EBCG regulation, which was presented as a highly ambitious piece of legislation by  
decision-makers (see also below). In addition, I provided further insights with regard to the rela-
tionship between the agency’s principals. Frontex has – similar to other JHA agencies –  
obviously “become a focal point of inter-institutional struggles, conceptually embedded in the 
different visions of the Council and the EP concerning how to ensure their accountability.” 
(Trauner 2012: 785) Since having a bigger say in the appointment of the ED and strengthening 
the Commissionʼs role in the MB have been goals of the EP since the creation of Frontex (Leo-
nard 2009: 382; Trauner 2012: 793),
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 it is striking that MEPs could not reach these goals when 
the Parliament has finally become a “legislative actor of equal standing” (Trauner 2012: 784).69 
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  A number of proposals put forward by the EP during the negotiations on the initial establishment of Frontex were 
rejected by the Council. For a summary, see Leonard 2009: 381-385; Trauner 2012: 793-796.   
69
  Nevertheless, “the EPʼs strategies vis-à-vis both the Frontex agency and the institutional competitors were fairly 
effective in terms of compensating ex post for its limited involvement in the founding regulation of the agency.” 
(Trauner 2012: 796, italics in original). As this study analyses Frontexʼs formal-institutional governance struc-
ture, this will not be described more closely. Trauner, however, provides a highly useful overview of this issue, 
describing inter alia how the EP voted to freeze one third of Frontexʼs administrative budget in 2007 in order to 
make the agency increase its accountability and effectiveness (Trauner 2012: 793-796). 
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Fourthly, these findings should also be reflected in the light of JHA agencies’ development in 
general. As pointed out by Groenleer, “the creation [and consequently also the transformation] 
of European agencies should be seen as a part of the debate on reform of the EU institutional 
framework and the future of European governance” (Groenleer 2006: 163) Many observers  
believe that due to the gradual introduction of the co-decision procedure, JHA are “likely to be 
increasingly caught up in the dynamics of supranationalism and that problems in relation to 
transparency, democratic control and accountability will decrease if not eventually be overcome” 
(Trauner 2012: 784). However, the unchanged governance structure and the intergovernmentally 
dominated decision-making on regulatory tasks contradict the assumption that EU agenciesʼ 
multi-principal framework is remarkably dynamic (Trauner 2012: 798f.) and that agencies in the 
AFSJ gradually gain autonomy vis-à-vis the EU member states and institutions (Kaunert et al. 
2013: 274). Similarly, Groenleer’s assumption of a growing role of the Commission in regard to 
JHA agencies (Groenleer 2009: 100) does only seem to hold true to a very limited extent in the 
case at hand. My findings rather support previous studies that emphasise that “the continuous 
establishment of new agencies expands the EUʼs administrative capacity without compromising 
member state control over the agencies” (Christensen/Nielson 2010: 179) and reveal that the 
same might hold true in regard to JHA agenciesʼ further evolution under the co-decision proce-
dure.  
 
Having shown how this study on the change of Frontex’s formal-institutional design contributes 
to existing research and how it might be supplemented by further studies, it is important to even-
tually reflect on the new institutional design’s implications for the agency’s future activities. 
 
7.3 Implications for the Effectiveness of Regulation 
In the final section, I elaborate on how Frontex’s new de jure role in regulating the EU’s EBM 
can be expected to play out de facto. As pointed out by Rijpma, the delegation of regulatory 
tasks to Frontex “could make an important contribution to a more integrated and efficient  
management of the borders without unnecessary duplication or undue centralisation.” (Rijpma 
2017: 240) However, this goal can only be achieved if regulation is designed adequately. First, I 
argue that not all of the newly introduced regulatory tasks seem to be able to compensate the 
previously identified deficits. Secondly, I question if the agency’s governance structure allows 
for an effective execution of these tasks. 
 With regard to rule setting, a certain discrepancy has to be emphasised: whereas the 
regulatory deficit in rule setting was in particular characterised by a lacking secondary legisla-
tion on IBM’s implementation, the new regulation does not clarify as what kind of legal  
document the strategy will finally be adopted to actually become binding. While being  
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mentioned in Frontex’s Programming Document 2017-2019 (Frontex 2016a), no concrete action 
in regard to the new IBM strategy has been taken yet in late July 2017. 
In contrast, the newly introduced vulnerability assessments are indeed designed in a way 
that could reduce existing regulatory deficits. As pointed out by the Commission, the assess-
ments are “designed in a way so as to complement the Schengen evaluation mechanism” 
(COM(2015) 673 final: 4, italics added): in cases of noncompliance, the agency’s MB – not the 
Council like in the case of the SEM – can adopt a binding decision setting out measures to be 
taken by the respective member state. This implies at least a slightly more supranational  
decision-making. Sending liaison officers to member states enables Frontex to “ensure proper 
and effective monitoring not only through risk analyses, information exchange and Eurosur, but 
also through its presence on the ground.” (COM(2015) 671 final: 83) Hence, Frontex is not only 
present if its assistance is requested on an ad hoc basis in the context of SEM on-site visits at the 
external borders, but “ensure[s] regular monitoring of all Member States’” EBM (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1624, art. 12(1), italics added). Since member states are obliged to provide infor-
mation (Regulation (EU) 2016/1624, art. 10, 13(3)), a major issue hampering an effective  
functioning of the ECN is addressed. However, liaison officers’ access to information is restric-
ted. Being linked to the implementation of binding decisions, the new assessments are expected 
to increasingly focus on the prevention of crisis situations (COM(2015) 671 final: 4).  
The scope of enforcement tasks was significantly watered down during the legislative 
process. According to the final provision, a member state’s request can be superseded, but it is 
de facto not possible to intervene against its will. Hence, the previous regulatory deficit is not 
completely abolished. However, it has also been shown that the threat of a reintroduction of  
internal border controls can be effective.  
In summary, it has to be noted that not all of the new regulatory tasks seem equally able 
to fill the identified functional gaps. However, a weakness all newly established activities might 
suffer from are Frontex’s dominant intergovernmental features. Since from a functional perspec-
tive, regulation is expected to require more independent, i.e. supranational, decision-making 
structures than mere coordination, one can doubt that the observed institutional changes are  
sufficient to significantly improve the EUʼs EBM with regard to three issues: it can be ques-
tioned if Frontex will be independent enough from EU member states to carry out its new regu-
latory tasks effectively, to send signals of credible commitment, and to successfully shift blame. 
 First, according to the logic of the PA-model, the EU governance systemʼs principals 
delegate regulatory functions to independent agencies in order to limit their own possibilities for 
political interventions, hereby ensuring better implementation of EU policies. Therefore, func-
tionalism assumes agencies to be “deliberately designed to operate at armʼs length from their 
political principals” (Rittberger/Wonka 2010: 785).  
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At the same time, agenciesʼ MBs are strategically set up in order to protect national interests 
(Kelemen 2002: 110). As pointed out by Busuioc (2012: 733), these boards show a number of 
pitfalls such as “a lack of interest in overall agency performance; a bias towards a ‘national out-
look’ not aligned with their European roles; the presence of conflicts of interests; a focus on 
administrative detail; poor participation in discussions; and a lack of knowledge on financial and 
budgetary matters.” Hence, the delegation of further competencies to the MB in regard to rule 
setting and monitoring, as well as its still continuing powerful position within Frontex’s overall 
governance structure, seem to make an effective regulation rather less likely. In the case of en-
forcement, the Council is even able to directly exert political influence, while the EP, only being 
informed of the measures that are taken, is excluded. Already in 2009, members of the MB and 
Frontex staff had criticised 
“how the dual role of the members is executed: On the one hand members are responsible for the 
overall planning and management of the Agency and on the other hand members are representa-
tives of their respective governments. Hence, some members find that some members tend to  
‘politicise’ the MB and promote national interests at the cost of the overall effectiveness of the 
Agency. The composition of the Board is widely discussed. According to the preamble in the 
Regulation members should be national border guard chiefs. However, in practice members have 
different backgrounds. This influences discussions in the Board with some members preferring 
the operational discussions and other members preferring political discussions.” (COWI 2009: 65) 
 
Moreover, Frontex Senior Management would have favoured the participation of key MEPs in 
MB meetings as observers (COWI 2009: 65).
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 The fact that the composition and the tasks of 
the MB were even considered ineffective by MMBs and Frontex staff themselves, underlines 
that the MB’s role is not only a problem of theoretical nature. However, decision-makers did 
obviously not learn from these previous institutional deficiencies.
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In contrast, they even delegated further tasks to the MB, which could also make it also 
more difficult for the MB to strike the balance between strategic and operational management. 
Agenciesʼ MBs often fail to effectively fulfil their role as links between governance and man-
agement if they take over daily management functions and move too much into details (Groen-
leer 2009: 120). Even before Frontexʼs transformation, an external evaluation of Frontex pointed 
to the lack of effectiveness of the procedures and working methods of the MB (plenary and 
lengthy discussions in meetings, delays in decision-making process because meeting agenda 
often exceeds the time available) and recommended more decentralised consultations through 
working groups (Ramboll Management Consulting/Eurasylum 2015: 113). 
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  During the negotiations on Frontex’s establishment, the Commission had suggested a MB being composed of 
only twelve member states representatives and two representatives of the Commission. The EP had even pre-
ferred the Council and the Commission to each appoint six MMB. In addition, it had proposed to elect a Com-
mission representative as chair of the MB. However, the Council could eventually push through that each mem-
ber state has a representative in the MB (Leonard 2009: 382). 
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  Such a lack of lesson-drawing could already be observed when Frontex replaced its predecessors. As mentioned 
by Wolff and Schout (2013: 319), Frontex continued to suffer “from the downside of this hands-on hierarchical 
control: political interferences.” 
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The continuity of the MB’s composition is particularly puzzling because whenever an agency is 
transformed in the course of a transboundary crisis, one would expect a limitation of the number 
of actors who have a final say over the use of capacities in order to facilitate the responses to 
crises (Boin et al. 2014: 423). Nevertheless, the composition of Frontexʼs MB did not change: it 
continues to have 34 members and is therefore still dominated by member states (Regulation 
(EU) 2016/1624, art. 63). Still, “this means that control of the work of the Agency is to a large 
extent in the hands of the Member States, which have been considered the main stakeholders.” 
(Leonard 2009: 383)
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That regulation might be inefficient if it is not carried out independently enough, can be 
illustrated by referring to the example of banking supervision once again. Frontex’s newly in-
troduced vulnerability assessments are often compared to the stress tests in the Banking Union 
(see for instance Netherlands Presidency of the Council of the European Union 2016: 1; 
Euraktiv 2016a). However, they rather resemble the mechanisms in banking supervision that 
had been present before the creation of the Banking Union, when the ECB had not yet possessed 
supervisory powers over European banks. Back then, the EBA was solely responsible for con-
ducting stress tests. The first stress tests conducted by the agency were harshly criticised and not 
able to calm the markets. According to some observers, this was because of the agency’s weak 
powers and the risk of capture it was exposed to, which prevented it from sending signs of cred-
ible commitment to the markets. The EBA’s governance structure was described as “highly 
problematic, as it gives each member state equal weight in crucial decision-making and does not 
give voting power to any representation of EU interest beyond individual member states” 
(Dehousse 2016: 79f.). An indication that the composition of MBs might indeed affect the re-
sults of monitoring is Spanish banks’ poor performance in the first stress tests – Spain was not 
represented in the EBA’s MB (Dehousse 2016: 80). Since stress tests conducted by the EBA had 
not been able to convince investors, additional supervisory tasks were delegated to the more 
independent ECB in the framework of the Banking Union’s SSM. Now, the ECB directly super-
vises 37 of the 51 banks that are subject to the EBA-led stress tests and conducts parallel stress 
tests of further 56 banks (European Central Bank 2017).  
This experience from banking regulation, which revealed that it might be crucial to dele-
gate supervision to an independent actor, was obviously not taken into consideration when de-
signing Frontex’s new monitoring tasks. Even though there are two Commission representatives 
in the Frontex’s MB, they can be easily outvoted. Therefore, Frontex’s vulnerability assessments 
are likely to suffer similar weaknesses as bank stress tests did before the SSM’s introduction. 
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  Apart from concerns in terms of effectiveness, the MB’s composition has also been criticised from a human 
rights perspective (House of Lords 2008: 109).   
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Secondly, while the argument of credible commitment is most prominent in studies on economic 
regulation, it is not obvious that such considerations only play a role in certain policy areas. In-
stead of sending signals of regulatory stability to firms and consumers (Rittberger/ Wonka 2010: 
735), decision-makers might also be interested in credibly committing themselves towards their 
voters or sending dissuasive signals to refugees, migrants, and smugglers. A number of pieces of 
evidence suggest that “ensuring a credible response to the ongoing, unprecedented challenges 
for the common external borders and the integrity of the Schengen Area” (Council of the Euro-
pean Union 2016b: 1, italics added) was one of decision-makersʼ main motivations for the adop-
tion of Regulation (EU) 2016/1624. As already emphasised by other scholars, “the agency 
would need an institutional design and management structure that allows it to assume responsi-
bility for upholding policies, thus isolating them from political pressures [and a] strong, inde-
pendent mandate” (Ekelund 2013: 103) for this purpose. In other words, a credible commitment 
to the new regulatory tasks would have been for instance making the agencyʼs governance struc-
ture more independent by giving the EP a seat in the MB. Even though member states’ repre-
sentatives expressed their intention to credibly commit themselves, they clearly rejected such 
institutional changes. 
 Thirdly, close ties between principal(s) and agent can be expected to be detrimental to 
blame shifting. The creation of – and consequently also the delegation of further tasks to – Fron-
tex can be seen as a way for the member states and the Commission to shift the blame for deadly 
incidents at the EUʼs external borders. Similarly, “a failure to curb irregular migration would be 
attributed to the agency rather the EU institutions or member states.” (Rijpma 2012: 92) In other 
words: Frontex is criticised both “for reinforcing the proverbial ‘Fortress Europe’ [and] for not 
doing enough to protect it.” (Rijpma 2017: 218) Indeed, these attempts of blame shifting can be 
seen as successful: criticism on the EUʼs EBM has often been “misdirected against a relatively 
weak actor”, namely Frontex (Rijpma 2010: 1). A recent study by Rittberger et al. (2017) con-
firms that, in a context of complex, multi-level policy making structures, the “implementing 
actor” Frontex is held publicly responsible for the human tragedies at the EU’s external borders, 
not the member states.  
While the even closer ties between Frontex and the member states might not be obvious 
enough for the general public in regard to rule setting and monitoring, it is likely that the Com-
missionʼs and the Councilʼs immediate involvement in decision-making on enforcement will be 
recognised in cases where the provision is used. That this design of enforcement was chosen is 
even more puzzling since enforcement tasks can be expected to be most politicised, which has 
already become obvious during the negotiations on the new regulation. At the same time, these 
obstacles for successful blame shifting might be desirable in terms of transparency and account-
ability: the Councilʼs involvement in enforcement activities makes it less likely that successes or 
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failures of policies are attributed to the implementing agent Frontex instead of the responsible 
decision-making body, rendering responsibility for the EU’s EBM more transparent.  
 
Despite these first thoughts on functionally problematic components of Frontex’s new institu-
tional design, it certainly remains to be seen how Frontex’s new institutional design will affect 
the agency’s de facto role in the EU’s EBM. 
 
To conclude, this study offered a rather critical stance towards the scope of one of the main in-
stitutional changes decision-makers could agree on in light of the most recent migration crisis. 
This constitutes a necessary complement to the Commission’s depiction, which labelled the 
EBCG as the establishment of “an integrated management system for external borders at Union 
level” (COM(2015) 671 final: 5). However, I equally acknowledged that for the first time, a 
JHA agency has been granted a far-reaching regulatory role. In the light of the situation at the 
EU’s external borders, which will most probably not become less challenging in the near future, 
it is likely that this was only the first step towards a tightened regulation of EBM. The experi-
ences from banking regulation support this presumption. 
 
By focusing on Frontex’s expanded regulatory role and its unchanged governance structure, I 
revealed that the combined functional-political approach offers suitable conceptual lenses for 
capturing not only the variation between these variables, but also the discrepancy between the 
functional gap in the EU’s EBM and the final institutional outcome. Since decision-makers 
could not agree on creating a genuinely European Border and Coast Guard, meaning that Fron-
tex still depends on member states’ contributions in the form of national border guards, it would 
have been all the more important to design regulation in a way that ensures its effective execu-
tion. However, EU member states were only willing to delegate regulation to the EBCG Agency, 
but not to give up decision-making power on it – this can be seen as an attempt to enhance Fron-
texʼs competences, without being willing to loosen control (Abbott et al., forthcoming). Since 
EU agencies are agents of multiple principals, they almost necessarily show a certain degree of 
weakness (Dehousse 2008). However, it has to be noted that output-legitimacy – due to an at 
least alleged lack of input-legitimacy –  is of crucial importance to EU agencies. Their inability 
to carry out tasks effectively may undermine the credibility of the advantages common Europe-
an solutions provide and therefore eventually puts European integration itself at risk. 
  
81 
References 
Abbott, Kenneth W./Levi-Faur, David/Snidal, Duncan (2017): Theorizing Regulatory Interme-
 diaries: The RIT Model, in: The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and So-
 cial Science 670 (1), 14-35. 
Abbott, Kenneth W./Genschel, Philipp/Snidal, Duncan/Zangl, Bernhard (forthcoming): The Go-
 vernor’s Dilemma: A Theory of Indirect Governance, working paper. 
Beach, Derek/Pedersen, Rasmus Brun (2013): Process-Tracing Methods. Foundations and
 Guidelines, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Beach, Derek/Pedersen, Rasmus Brun (2016): Causal Case Study Methods, Ann Arbor: Univer-
 sity of Michigan Press. 
Blauberger, Michael/Rittberger, Berthold (2015): Conceptualizing and Theorizing EU regula-
 tory Networks, in: Regulation & Governance 9 (4), 367-376. 
Blauberger, Michael/Rittberger, Berthold (2017): A rejoinder to Tarrant and Kelemen, in: Regu-
 lation and Governance, 1-5. 
Boin, Arjen/Busuioc, Madalina/Groenleer, Martijn (2014): Building European Union capacity to 
 manage transboundary crises: Network or lead-agency model? In: Regulation and Go-
 vernance 8, 418-436. 
Börzel, Tanja A. (2005): Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope, in: 
 Journal of European Public Policy 12 (2), 217-236. 
Börzel, Tanja A. (2016): From EU Governance of Crisis to Crisis of EU Governance: Regu-
 latory Failure, Redistributive Conflict and Eurosceptic Publics, in: Journal of Common 
 Market Studies 54 (1), 8-31. 
Börzel, Tanja/Risse, Thomas (2017): From the euro to the Schengen crises: European integration 
 theories, politicization, and identity politics, in: Journal of European Public Policy, pub-
 lished online 28 April 2017, 1-26. 
Busuioc, Madaline (2012): European agencies and their boards: promises and pitfalls of accoun-
 tability beyond design, in: Journal of European Public Policy 19 (5), 719-736. 
Busuioc, Madaline (2013): European Agencies. Law and Practices of Accountability, Oxford: 
 Oxford University Press. 
Busuioc, Madalina/Groenleer, Martijn/Trondal, Jarle (2012): The phenomenon of European 
 Union agencies: setting the scene, in: Busuioc, Madalina/Groenleer, Martijn/Trondal, 
 Jarle (eds.): The agency phenomenon in the European Union. Emergence, institution
 alisation and everyday decision-making, Manchester/New York: Manchester University 
 Press, 1-16. 
Busuioc, Madaline/Groenleer, Martijn (2013): Beyond Design: The Evolution of Europol and
 Eurojust, in: Perspectives on European Politics and Society 14 (3), 285-304. 
Capoccia, Giovanni/Kelemen, R. Daniel (2007): The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, Nar-
 rative, and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism, in: World Politics 59 (3), 341-
 369. 
Carrera, Sergio (2007): The EU Border Management Strategy. FRONTEX and the Challenges
 of Irregular Immigration in the Canary Islands, CEPS Working Document No. 261, 
accessed 29 January 2017. 
Carrera, Sergio/Hertog, Leonhard den/Parkin, Joanna (2013): The Peculiar Nature of EU Home
 Affairs Agencies in Migration Control: Beyond Accountability versus Autonomy, in:
 European Journal of Migration and Law 15, 337-358. 
Carrera, Sergio/Hertog, Leonhard den (2016): A European Border and Coast Guard: What’s in a 
 name? In: CEPS Paper in Liberty and Security in Europe 88, accessed 5 April 2017.  
Carrera, Sergio/Blockmans, Steven/Cassarino, Jean-Pierre/Gros, Daniel/Guild, Elspeth (2017):
 The European Border and Coast Guard. Addressing migration and asylum challenges in
 the Mediterranean? CEPS Task Force Report, accessed 9 May 2017.  
COM(2002) 233 final: Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
 Parliament. Towards Integrated Management of the External Border of the Member 
 States of the European Union. 
82 
COM(2005) 59 final: Interinstitutional agreement on the operating framework for the European 
 regulatory agencies. 
COM(2008) 69 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
 Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
 gions. Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union. 
COM(2015) 240 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
 Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Re-
 gions. A European Agenda on Migration. 
COM(2015) 671 final: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
 the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, 
 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Decision 2005/267/EC. 
COM(2015) 673: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
 Council. A European Border and Coast Guard and effective management of Europeʼs ex-
 ternal borders. 
COM(2015) 675 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and 
 the Council. Eighth biannual report on the functioning of the Schengen area, 1 Mai – 10 
 December. 
COM(2016) 120 final: Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the 
 European Council and the Council. Back to Schengen – A Roadmap. 
COM(2017) 42 final: Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
 Council and the Council on the operationalisation of the European Border and Coast 
 Guard. 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (2016): Report on the proposal for a re-
 gulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and 
 Coast Guard and repealing Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 
 863/2007 and  Council Decision 2005/267/EC (COM (2015) 0671 – C8-0408/2015 – 
 2015/0310(COD)), accessed 1 April 2017. 
Cortinovis, Roberto (2015): The Evolution of Frontex Governance: Shifting from Soft to Hard
 Law? In: Journal of Contemporary European Research 11 (3), 252-267. 
Council of the European Union (2006): Integrated Border Management; Strategy deliberations,
 accessed 5 June 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2015): The future management of the EUs external borders, 
 accessed 13 June 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2016): Mandate for negotiations with the European Parliament,
 accessed 5 April 2017.  
Council of the European Union (2016a): Implementing Decision setting out a Recommendation. 
 on addressing the serious deficiencies identified in the 2015 evaluation on the application 
 of the Schengen acquis in the field of management of the external borders by Greece, 
 accessed 17 May 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2016b): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
 and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation
 (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC – 
 State of play, accessed 10 May 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2016c): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
 and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation
 (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC –  
 Guidance for further work, accessed 10 April 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2016d): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
 and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation
 (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC –  
 Progress report, accessed 10 May 2017. 
 
 
83 
Council of the European Union (2016e): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
 and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation
 (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC –   
 accessed 10 May 2017. 
Council of the European Union (2016f): Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
 and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulation
 (EC) No 2007/2004, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC – 
 State of play, accessed 10 April 2017. 
COWI (2009): External evaluation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational
 Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union. Final
 report, Kongens Lyngby: COWI A/S, 2 July 2017.  
Curtin, Deirdre (2009): Executive Power of the European Union, Oxford: Oxford University
 Press. 
Dagens Industri (2016): Ygeman svänger om Frontex, accessed 13 June 2017. 
De Bruycker, Philippe (2016): The European Border And Coast Guard: A New Model Built On
 An Old Logic, in: European Papers 1 (2), 559-569. 
Dehousse, Renaud (2008): Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for a Multi-
 principal Model, in: West European Politics 31 (4), 789-805. 
Dehousse, Renaud (2016): The Politics of Delegation in the European Union, in: Ritleng, Domi-
 nique (ed.): Independence and Legitimacy in the Institutional System of the European 
 Union, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 57-82. 
De Larosière, Jacques (2009): The high-level group on financial supervision in the EU, Brus-
 sels: European Commission, accessed 5 July 2017. 
De Rynck, Stefaan (2016): Banking on a union: the politics of changing eurozone banking, in: 
 Journal of European Public Policy 23 (1), 119-135. 
Deutschlandfunk (2015): EU-Kommission will Frontex stärken, URL: accessed 8 June 2017. 
DiMaggio, Paul/Powell, Walter W. (1983): The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism
 and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in: American Sociological Review 48 
 (2), 147-160. 
Die Welt (2015): De Maizière hält Zurückweisen von Flüchtlingen für möglich, accessed 8 June 
2017. 
Eberlein, Burkard/Grande, Edgar (2005): Beyond delegation: transnational regulatory regimes
 and the EU regulatory state, in: Journal of European Public Policy 12 (1), 89-112. 
ECFR (2016): The European border guard: New in name only? Accessed 28 January 2017.   
Egeberg, Morten/Marten, Maria/Trondal, Jarle (2012): Building executive power at the Europea- 
n level: on the role of European Union agencies, in: Busuioc, Madalina/Groenleer, Mar-
tijn/Trondal, Jarle (eds.): The agency phenomenon in the European Union. Emergence, 
institutionalisation and everyday decision-making, Manchester/New York: Manchester 
University Press, 19-41. 
Egeberg, Morten/Trondal, Jarlie (2017): Researching European Union Agencies: What Have
 We Learnt (and Where Do We Go from Here)? In: Journal of Common Market Studies,
 1-16 (published online). 
Ekelund, Helena (2014): The Establishment of FRONTEX: A New Institutionalist Approach, in:
 European Integration 36 (2), 99-116. 
EUobserver (2015): Greece rejects Schengen Threats as ‘blame game’, accessed 1 June 2017. 
EUobserver (2016): EU states to undergo border stress tests, accessed 6 June 2017. 
EUobserver (2016a) MEPs question EU border guard proposal, accessed 13 June 2017. 
EurActiv (2015): Greece finally accepts EU help to secure its borders, accessed 1 June 2017.  
EurActiv (2015a): Greece told it could be kicked out of Schengen, accessed 1 June 2017. 
EurActiv (2015b): Brussels unveils controversial plan for EU border force, accessed 10 June 
 2017. 
EurActiv (2016): New EU border guard agency is no magic bullet, accessed 28 January 2017. 
EurActiv (2016a): New EU border guards plans migration ‘stress test’, accessed 1 June 2017.   
84 
European Central Bank (2017): Frequently asked questions on the 2016 EU-wide stress test,
 accessed 15 July 2017. 
European Commission (2015): Speech by President Jean-Claude Juncker at the debate in the
 European Parliament on the conclusions of the Special European Council on 23 April:
 ‘Tackling the migration crisis’, accessed 1 June 2017. 
European Commission (2016): Commission discusses draft Schengen Evaluation Report on
 Greece (press release), accessed 1 June 2017. 
European Commission (2016a): The Schengen Rules Explained, accessed 1 June 2017. 
European Commission (2017): European Agenda on Migration: Commission reports on pro-
 gress in making the new European Border and Coast Guard fully operational (press re-
 lease), accessed 6 June 2017. 
European Council (2001): Presidency Conclusions. European Council Meeting in Laeken. 14 
 and 15 December 2001, accessed 24 August 2017.  
European Council (2002): Feasibility Study for the Setting up of a European Border Police,
 Luxembourg: Office for the Official Publications of the European Union,  
 accessed 15 August 2017.  
European Council (2015): European Council meeting (25 and 26 June 2015) – Conclusions,
 accessed 5 June 2017. 
European Council (2015a): European Council meeting (15 October 2015) – Conclusions, 
 accessed 4 June 2017. 
European Parliament/Council of the EU/European Commission (2012): Joint Statement of the 
 European Parliament, the Council of the EU and the European Commission on decentra-
 lised agencies, accessed 4 June 2017.   
European Parliament (2017): Management of the external borders, accessed 4 June 2017. 
European Parliamentary Research Service (2016): European Border and Coast Guard system,
 accessed 29 January 2017.  
European Public Affairs (2016): Frontexʼs new mandate, a controversial EU approach to the
 refugee crisis, accessed 28 January 2017. 
Ferraro, Francesca/De Capitani, Emilio (2016): The new European Border and Coast Guard: yet
 another “half way” EU reform? In: ERA Forum, published online 8 December 2016. 
Financial Times (2015): Greece warned EU will reimpose border controls, accessed 8 June 2017. 
Fink, Melanie (2016): Salami Slicing Human Rights Accountability: How the European Border 
 and Coast Guard Agency may inherit Frontex’ genetic defect, accessed 3 July 2017. 
Fioretos, Orfeo (2011): Historical Institutionalism in International Relations, in: International 
 Organization 65 (2), 367-399. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2015): Berlin und Paris wollen Frontex stärken, 
  accessed 6 June 2017. 
Frontex (2011): Frontex Fundamental Rights Strategy, accessed 15 May 2017. 
Frontex (2015): Report to the European Parliament and the Council on Art 22(2) of Regulation 
 (EU) No 1052/2013. The functioning of Eurosur, accessed 6 June 2017. 
Frontex (2016): General Report 2015, accessed 1 June 2017. 
Frontex (2016a): Programming Document 2017-2019, accessed 20 July 2017.  
Frontex (2017): Legal basis, accessed 3 March 2017.  
Frontex (2017a): Management Board, accessed 1 July 2017. 
Genschel, Philipp/Jachtenfuchs, Markus (2015): More integration, less federation: the European
 integration of core state powers, in: Journal of European Public Policy, published 
 online, 1-18. 
George, Alexander L./Bennett, Andrew (2005): Case studies and theory development in the so
 cial sciences, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Gkliati, Mariana (2016): From Frontex to the European Border and Coast Guard: Responsibility
 for human rights violations at the borders, Lecture, 13.12.2016, Senate House, London. 
Glöckler, Gabriel/Lindner, Johannes/Salines, Marion (2017): Explaining the sudden creation of
 a banking supervisor for the euro area, in: Journal of European Public Policy 24 (8), 
 1135-1153. 
85 
Gouvernement.fr (2016): L’essentiel de la déclaration de politique générale de Bernard Caze-
 neuve, accessed 13 June 2017. 
Grande, Edgar/Kriesi, Hanspeter (2016): Conclusions: the postfunctionalists were (almost) right, 
in: Hutter, Swen/Grance, Edgar/Kriesi, Hanspeter (eds.): Politicising Europe. Integration 
and Mass Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 279-300. 
Groenleer, Martijin (2006): The European Commission and Agencies, in: Spence, David/
 Edwards, Geoffrey (eds.): The European Commission, London: John Harper Publishing,
 156-172. 
Groenleer, Martijin (2009): The Autonomy of European Union Agencies. A Comparative Study
 of Institutional Development, The Hague: Eburon. 
Heijer, Maarten den/Rijpma, Jorrit/Spijkerboer, Thomas (2016): Coercion, prohibition and great 
 expectations: The continuing failure of the Common European Asylum System, in: 
 Common Market Law Review 53 (3), 607-642, accessed 2 June 2017. 
House of Lords/European Union Committee (2008): 9
th
 Report of Session 2007-08. FRON-
 TEX: the EU external border agency. Report with evidence, London: The Stationery
 Office Limited, accessed 6 May 2017. 
House of Lords (2017): Leaving the European Union: Frontex and UK Border Security Coope-
 ration Within Europe, accessed 6 July 2017.   
Huffington Post (2016): EU Ministers Threaten To Expel Greece From Schengen Over Refugees,  
 accessed 9 July 2017. 
Jones, Erik/Kelemen, R. Daniel/Meunier, Sophie (2016): Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and 
 the Incomplete Nature of European Integration, in: Comparative Political Studies 49 (7), 
 1010-1034. 
Jones, Erik/Kelemen R. Daniel/Meunier, Sophie (2016): Is Europe failing, or is it ‘failing for-
 ward’? In: The Washington Post, accessed 29 April 2017. 
Jupille, Joseph/Caporaso, James A./Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003): Integration Institutions: Ratio-
 nalism, Constructivism, and the Study of the European Union, in: Comparative Political 
 Studies 36 (1-2), 7-40. 
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